Russian participation in operations to establish and maintain peace in the former Yugoslavia. Russia in Yugoslavia Rostov guys who served in the UN 554 opb
home 56th Guards Separate air assault brigade
(Kamyshin) At the end of 1989, the brigade was reorganized into a separate airborne brigade (airborne brigade). The brigade passed through “hot spots”: Afghanistan (12.1979-07.1988), Baku (12-19.01.1990 - 02.1990), Sumgait, Nakhichevan, Meghri, Julfa, Osh, Fergana, Uzgen (06.06.1990), Chechnya (12.94-10.96, Grozny, Pervomaisky, Argun and since 09.1999). On January 15, 1990, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, after a detailed study of the situation, adopted a decision “On the announcement state of emergency in Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous region
and some other areas." In accordance with it, the Airborne Forces began an operation carried out in two stages. At the first stage, from January 12 to 19, units of the 106th and 76th airborne divisions, the 56th and 38th airborne brigades and the 217th parachute regiment landed at airfields near Baku (for more details, see . article Black January), and in Yerevan - the 98th Guards Airborne Division. The 39th separate air assault brigade entered... On December 9, 1994, Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 2166 “On measures to suppress the activities of armed groups in the territory” followed Chechen Republic and in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict." Provided for the actions of military groups under the cover of front-line and army aviation advance in three directions towards Grozny and blockade it. The plan of the operation envisaged an attack by assault detachments from the northern, western and eastern directions. Having entered the city, the troops, in cooperation with the special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSK, were to seize the presidential palace, government buildings, television, radio, railway station, and other important objects in the city center and blockade central part
. The brigade was located - 1st MSB on the southern slopes of the Tersky Kh... Based on the Directive of the Minister of Defense No. 314/12/0198 of March 17, 1995 and at my personal request to carry out the tasks of restoring constitutional order and disarmament of illegal gangs on the territory of the Chechen Republic on the basis of the 167th motorized rifle brigade and the 723rd motorized rifle regiment The 205th separate motorized rifle brigade (military unit 74814) was formed with a location in the city of Grozny, Chechen Republic. May 2, 1995 - Brigade Day. The basis of the units and divisions of the brigade were battalions and companies: 167th separate motorized rifle brigade of the Red Banner Ural Military District (military unit 29709, Chebarkul Chelyabinsk region); partly of the 131st separate motorized rifle Krasnodar Red Banner Order of Kutuzov and Red Star of the Kuban Cossack Brigade (Maykop) of the Red Banner North Caucasus Military District; 723rd Guards Motorized Rifle Order of the Red Banner Suvorov Regiment (military unit 89539, Tchaikovsky) 16th Guard…
Farewell Eastern Slavonia!
Paratroopers of the 554th separate battalion of "blue helmets" successfully completed a peacekeeping mission as part of the UN forces on the Balkan soil.
The peacekeeping operation UNTAES - the UN Interim Administration in Western Sirmium, Baranja and Eastern Slavonia has entered its final phase. Since October 1997, the phased withdrawal of the main mission forces - Russians, Ukrainians, Slovaks, Czechs, Belgians - has continued by air, rail and the Danube River...
On October 26, in a solemn atmosphere, the flags of Russia and the UN were lowered at the airfield near Klisa, where the headquarters of the 554th Russian Regiment was located for five long years. separate battalion"blue helmets" Now the leadership of Croatia, which “integrated” with the help of the United Nations the ancestral Serbian lands of Western and Eastern Slavonia, is rushing the military to leave. And only the Serbian population looks doomedly at the backs of the “blue helmets” who deceived their aspirations and hopes.
To the sound of the anthem, the flags of Russia and the UN are slowly lowered down the flagpoles. This unusual event took place at 16.30 on October 26, 1997 at the Klis airfield, where the headquarters of the 554th is located. Russian battalion UN. The honorable mission of delivering these banners to their homeland is entrusted to the paratrooper officers Captain Vitaly Starikov, deputy company commander for educational work, and Lieutenant Sergei Sergeev, commander of the best platoon.
No matter how laconic and strict this ceremony was, I noticed: from the faces of the officers and soldiers standing in last time In general, in the battalion formation before leaving for their homeland, a chill seemed to run through. I looked at the battalion commander, Colonel Vladimir Osipenko, and his deputies, Colonel Yuri Yakush. Hero of Russia, Lieutenant Colonel Svyatoslav Golubyatnikov, Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Rybalko, Alexey Badeev, company commanders - Majors Sergei Selivanov and Alexey Ragozin, contract sergeants - Yuri Klimenko, Vladislav Baev, Andrey Aktaev... And other, painfully familiar faces of those , who for five and a half years carried out difficult peacekeeping tasks with dignity and honor as part of a battalion in Eastern Slavonia, increased the glory of RUSBAT-1.
There is not enough space to name all the names, because over the years there were 11 rotations in the battalion, 15 thousand soldiers passed through it and Airborne officers. I will only mention the names of battalion commanders and colonels:
- Viktor Loginov,
- Leonid Arshinov,
- Sergei Voznesensky,
- Alexandra Kobyleva,
- Alexandra Nizhegorodova,
- Mikhail Zhdanenu,
- Vladimir Osipenko.
Each of them, to the best of their strength and ability, together with the headquarters and all personnel, contributed to the peacekeeping activities of the Russian UN battalion, sought to ensure that Russian peacekeepers worthily represented our Armed Forces in the largest blue helmet operation, which received in 1992 official name UNPROFOR - "UN Peace Force".
And although the Russians had absolutely no experience in operating in such international missions, our “RUSBAT” eventually became known in all four sectors into which the territory of the former Yugoslavia was divided. I had the opportunity to visit our UN battalion more than once and I can say with full responsibility: the 554th battalion was the first to enter its zone of responsibility in the East sector, where until recently there were fierce battles and more than 50 percent of the cities and villages of Eastern Slavonia, including the notorious Vukovar, stood in ruins: he was the first to deploy his “check points” here - control posts between the Serbs and Croats on a front line 110 kilometers long: the first in the sector to ensure that former opponents began to store heavy weapons, let's go to the first negotiations."
Not once during the numerous armed conflicts that broke out between the Serbs and Croats, did our battalion retreat, did not surrender the occupied lines, did not abandon the local population to the mercy of fate, as the vaunted French and British repeatedly did, not to mention the Kenyans, Jordanians, Argentines ... Furthermore, when the situation in Sarajevo sharply escalated in February 1994, two companies of the battalion made a rapid march through the mountains of Bosnia and, with their decisive actions, actually prevented the bombing of Serbian positions by NATO aircraft, for which they received gratitude from the then Secretary General UN Boutros Thali. Our paratroopers-peacekeepers did not flinch even at the most dramatic moment of Operation UNPROFOR - in the summer of 1995, when the Croatian army, violating all international agreements, seized Krajina and Western Slavonia by force. In a matter of days, three sectors where UN forces were located fell. Only the East sector survived. It survived mainly because there were positions of a Russian battalion here, and the Airborne Forces headquarters planned a parachute landing operation to support it from the air in case of an attack by Croatian troops.
During the peacekeeping mission on Serbian soil, our paratroopers paid a heavy price - 21 officers and contract soldiers were killed and 48 wounded.
The first on this sad list is Sergeant Alexander Butorin, who was blown up by an anti-tank mine on January 20, 1993. The last one is senior lieutenant Dmitry Moiseev, who died on October 7 this year as a result of multiple hemorrhages in the lungs. I repeat: the Russian UN military contingent successfully passed the first test of peacekeeping activities in the Balkans. Belgian Lieutenant General Hanseth, commander of the UN forces in Eastern Slavonia, confirmed this in a conversation with a Krasnaya Zvezda correspondent. The same, unfortunately, cannot be said about our politicians and the foreign policy line they pursue in the Balkans in general and in the Serbian region in particular. Alas, for many years, especially when Andrei Kozyrev was the head of the Foreign Ministry, it was carried out inconsistently, with an eye to the West. More than once I witnessed when, at negotiations in Belgrade and Sarajevo, our high representatives curried favor with the US envoys and Western Europe
I will refer to just one, in my opinion, very eloquent example. Now on Smolensk Square they apparently prefer not to remember how in the spring of 1995, on the initiative of the Russian Foreign Ministry, a peace treaty on non-aggression was concluded between Croatia and the Serbian Land. While carrying out this task, Russian peacekeepers were forced to move control posts several kilometers, and several people were blown up by mines. But less than a year had passed before Croatian troops, in collusion with the United States and Western European countries, forcibly captured the Serbian Krajina along with its capital, Knin.
More than 10 thousand Serbs died, and about 200 thousand became refugees. And what about Russia, a member of the UN Security Council? Our Foreign Ministry did not even dare to declare an official protest against the barbarity of the Croats. What else can we talk about?
And there were many such examples. If behind the Russian contingent in Eastern Slavonia, like, for example, behind the Belgian one, there is not a state that knows what it wants, a logical question arises: was it even worth getting involved here in such a way? Summing up the UN peacekeeping operation in the Balkans, the role played in it by the Russians and Yugoslav funds mass media
and ordinary people always divide it into its component parts: official politicians and the “laborers” of this peacekeeping mission - soldiers and officers of the military contingent,” our UN military observers, representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs... It’s not difficult, I think, to guess at whose address the silent reproach sounds, and in whose words are words of sincere gratitude.
This is what Dragoljub Jvkovic, secretary of the Ten community for relations with UNTAES, said at the farewell meeting of the Russian “blue helmets”:
- In this difficult hour of parting, on behalf of the entire Serbian people, I express gratitude to the officers and soldiers of Russia for your humane mission, for reliable protection and Slavic kindness. I won’t hide the fact that we say goodbye to the “blue helmets”, especially the Russians, with bitterness. The decision of the UN Security Council to withdraw the military contingent of the mission is difficult for our people. But a bad peace is better than any war."
I won’t lie, the Croats say it differently:
“Our people have always perceived Russian soldiers as defenders of the Serbian aggressors,” elderly railway worker Jovan Petrakovic told me angrily at the loading station in the Croatian town of Vinkovci. - You only prevented us from defending our lands and homes...
...By November 1, the 554th UN battalion had already removed all control posts in the 120-kilometer area of responsibility and was engaged in the planned transfer of people and military equipment from Eastern Slavonia to Russia.
- The main forces of our battalion are already 50 percent in on the way home, - Colonel Vladimir Osipenko told me at the battalion headquarters. - Others are completing the preparation of cargo and equipment for shipment. Since October 20, the remaining Russian military contingent has been assigned the following tasks: guarding the residence of the Head of the Interim Administration in the town of Bobota, ensuring the safety of UN civilian personnel and protecting property at the Klisa airfield, as well as monitoring the general situation in the area of responsibility...
To the above, I will add that in the area of responsibility of the Russian battalion, the transfer of powers for the implementation of the Erdut Agreement to the transitional police under the leadership of the UN civilian police has successfully taken place. Now Slovak sappers, under the cover of Russians, are demining the front-line territories of Eastern Slavonia. Our doctors continue to treat the local population. Every day 30-40 people come to the battalion medical center local residents for inspection and consultation. And, perhaps, dentist Captain Valery Germanov of the medical service is especially popular among our military doctors. He has a kind soul and golden hands, no one refuses - neither Serbs nor Croats.
IN Lately In Russian society, a dispute is flaring up between the leadership of the Airborne Forces and the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces about the directions for reforming the Airborne Forces. airborne troops. On November 21, the head of the Main Operations Directorate - Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, Colonel General Yuri Baluevsky, announced that in order to increase combat readiness, the airborne troops will be freed from peacekeeping functions that are unusual for them. The Airborne Forces headquarters confirmed this information and reported that the number of troops would be reduced by 5.5 thousand military personnel. Already this year, the 10th parachute regiment in Gudauta (Abkhazia), the 237th airborne division of the 76th airborne division (Pskov) and the 283rd Podolsk aviation squadron will be disbanded.
Meanwhile, the final decision on deprivation Airborne troops peacekeeping functions have not been accepted, since the President of the Russian Federation has not yet signed a document on the directions of further military development in Russia. As reported by a number of media outlets, the Airborne Forces headquarters agrees with the reduction of some units and subunits, but the leadership of the troops is categorically against depriving the Airborne Forces of peacekeeping functions. The Airborne Forces headquarters associates its arguments on this matter with the following circumstances:
Firstly, there is an order from the President of the Russian Federation dated May 17, 1997, which states that the Airborne Forces in Peaceful time should form the basis of troops participating in peacekeeping operations.
Secondly, airborne troops are mobile. The peculiarities of their training, the tactics of their actions, the transportability of weapons and equipment allow short time transfer airborne units over long distances. According to paratroopers, this circumstance became one of the main reasons for involving the Airborne Forces in 1998-2000 to participate in more than 30 operations to authorize interethnic conflicts, eliminating the consequences of emergency situations, maintaining or restoring international peace and security. Transnistria and South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Armenia (liquidation of the consequences of the earthquake). middle Asia and Chechnya - this is not a complete list of regions of action Airborne troops.
Thirdly, the Airborne Forces headquarters believes that the Airborne Forces have developed a coherent system for training and replacing peacekeeping units. Since January 1, 2000, the 245th The educational center peacekeeping forces(Ryazan), on the basis of which training and rotation of personnel of peacekeeping contingents in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Abkhazia are carried out.
Fourthly, over the eight-year period of participation in peacekeeping operations in the Airborne Forces, friendly and respectful relations between the command of peacekeeping units and personnel with the local administration and residents of the conflicting parties have been established, close interaction has been organized with military contingents of other states, representatives of various international organizations(UN, OSCE, etc.).
Fifthly, repurposing the Airborne Forces for purely combat missions is unprofitable in material terms. According to calculations by the Airborne Forces headquarters, the total financial costs for transporting peacekeeping units from the areas of deployment will be about 900 million rubles:
a) according to the conclusion:
– by rail – 138-150 million rubles;
– by air transport – 254-280 million rubles.
Total: 392-430 million rubles.
b) by input:
– by rail – 168-180 million rubles;
– by air transport – 288-300 million rubles.
Total: 456-480 million rubles.
In addition, officers believe that this could lead to disruption in the implementation of peacekeeping missions, disruption of the management of units and subunits, disruption of a well-functioning system of interaction and comprehensive support.
Reference
The participation of units and units of the Russian Airborne Forces in peacekeeping operations began in March 1992, when the Russian 554th separate infantry battalion UN of 900 people, formed on the basis of the Airborne Forces.
In February 1994, in accordance with a political decision Russian leadership Part of the forces of the 554th FSB was redeployed to the Sarajevo area and, after appropriate reinforcement, was transformed into the 629th UN FSB with operational subordination to the Sarajevo sector and the task of separating the warring parties and monitoring compliance with the ceasefire agreement.
After the transfer of powers from the UN to NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 629th UN FSB in January 1996 stopped carrying out peacekeeping tasks and was withdrawn to Russian territory.
Based on the decision of the UN Security Council on the gradual reduction of the military component of the UN mission in Eastern Slavonia in October 1997, the 554th Regiment was transformed into a Security Group and reduced to 203 people. In June 1998, the Security Group was withdrawn to Russian territory.
Since May 1994, on the basis of the Agreement between Georgia and Abkhazia on a ceasefire and separation of forces, in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, the Collective Peacekeeping Forces (CPKF) were created. The main task is to separate the conflicting parties, maintain law and order, create conditions for a return to normal life in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, prevent the resumption of the armed conflict, and protect important facilities and communications.
The parachute battalion of the 10th separate airborne regiment of the Airborne Forces operates as part of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces.
Units of the 10th Special Operations Division are deployed as follows to carry out peacekeeping missions:
– one parachute battalion in the Gali region,
– one parachute platoon in the Kadori Gorge,
– one parachute platoon performs security and defense tasks at the KPM Headquarters in Sukhumi. The service is organized at one control post and six observation posts: in the Gali district - 6, in the Kadori gorge - 1.
In January 1996, a separate unit was sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina to participate in the peacekeeping operation of the multinational force airborne brigade numbering 1,500 people, formed on the basis of the Airborne Forces.
The brigade's area of responsibility is 1,750 square meters. km, the total length of the controlled line of separation of the parties is 75 km.
Tasks performed by the Russian brigade:
– separation of warring parties;
– maintaining law and order, returning to conditions of normal life in the assigned area of responsibility;
– participation in the provision humanitarian aid;
– assistance in the implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina of December 14, 1996.
The tasks are carried out by serving at four control posts and patrolling routes in the area of responsibility, as well as conducting reconnaissance and checking objects and planned targets. The brigade's units are deployed in the base areas of Uglevik, Priboi, Simin-Khan and Vukosavtsi.
The size of the Russian military contingent was reduced in 1999 and currently stands at 1,150 people. armored vehicles– 90 units, automotive equipment – 232 units.
In June 1999, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution N 1244, on the basis of a decree of the President of the Russian Federation, and in accordance with the “Agreed Points of Russian Participation in the KFOR Forces” signed by the Ministers of Defense of the Russian Federation and the United States on June 18, 1999 in Helsinki, a decision was made on sending to Kosovo (FRY) a military contingent of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation numbering 3,616 people, of which about 2,500 are paratroopers.
The main objectives are:
– creating security conditions for the return and residence of refugees and displaced persons;
– provision public safety;
– carrying out work to clear mines and destroy unexploded ordnance and explosive objects;
– fulfillment of border control duties;
– joint activities with KFOR forces to operate the Pristina (Slatina) airfield;
– ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of its forces, the international civilian presence and the personnel of other international organizations.
The tasks are carried out by serving in base areas and at control and observation posts by a security and maintenance group, patrolling routes in the area of responsibility, as well as conducting reconnaissance and checking objects. Units of the Russian military contingent (RMC) are deployed in the base areas - Slatina airfield, Banja, Velika Hoca, Kosovska Kamenica, Donje Karmenjane, Srbica and Kosovo Polje.
Tasks are carried out at 15 control posts and 14 observation posts. 13 guard posts, patrolling 23 routes, traveling patrol in 3 settlements. IN constant readiness There are 19 reserve groups, 4 helicopters. To ensure their own safety, 10 guards are appointed, patrol groups - 15, checkpoints - 8, and 3-6 columns are escorted daily. Number airborne units as part of the RVC in Kosovo:
– personnel – 2445 people,
– armored vehicles – 131 units,
– automotive equipment – 387 units.
Thus, at present, the Airborne Forces in three peacekeeping operations - in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo together with NATO, in Abkhazia as part of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces involve: - personnel - about 5,600 people; – armored vehicles – more than 320 units; – automotive equipment – more than 950 units.
In the 90s, Yugoslavia demonstrated to the whole world what, under a slightly different set of political circumstances, the collapse of the former Soviet Union: on the territory of the constituent parts of the former Yugoslavia, protracted and bloody civil wars broke out with the collapse of the vertical state power, urgent problem refugees and forced intervention of the world community.
In various territories and lands (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Eastern Slavonia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Albania, adjacent Adriatic waters, etc.) since 1992, a whole range of operations has unfolded, in which the UN, OSCE, NATO, EU took part , WEU, as well as a number of countries as participants in coalitions to conduct individual operations.
At the same time, a number of operations were of the nature of coercive actions (sea and air blockade of part of the territory of the former Yugoslavia, individual components of the operation in Albania, air operation pressure on the FRY, etc.). The other part of the operations was of a precautionary nature (Macedonia). There were operations and their individual components that corresponded to the classical understanding of peacekeeping (for example, the post-Dayton organization of elections in Bosnia under international control, etc.). Not all of these operations were carried out by the UN itself (see Chapter 1 on the role of the OSCE, NATO and WEU in individual operations), and some (the air operation to put pressure on the authorities of the FRY) did not have a UN mandate at all. In general, the complex of operations in the former Yugoslavia and Albania introduced many innovations and changes into the practice of UN peacekeeping.
The scale and strength of the Russian contingent involved in operations in this region (varying from 900 troops in 1992 to a maximum of 1,500 in 1994 and slightly exceeding 1,000 currently) is, let's say, significant. compared to operations in Moldova and South Ossetia(in 2000, 460 and 462 Russian peacekeepers were stationed there, respectively), but far from decisive. For comparison, it is enough to mention that only the ground component of the forces of the SFOR operation amounted to 33,400 troops different countries, not counting civilians.
However, in many respects, Russia's involvement in operations in the former Yugoslavia was and remains unique.
Firstly, this is an atypical situation in which the Russian military and not only Western military “observers”, but also NATO combat units who have trained for decades to “ great war", acted together in solving the tasks set by the UN.
Secondly, the extent of application military force in these operations as a whole was extremely high, on average much higher than in most all other operations of previous decades, with the exception of Desert Storm. As a result, there were increased demands on military professionalism and the ability to actually combat interaction Russian military with the military of other countries, and not only those that were previously allies under the Warsaw Pact.
Thirdly, in conditions of ethnic and historical proximity or the relationship of individual countries with certain warring forces, it was particularly difficult to maintain an unbiased, equidistant attitude of peacekeepers towards the parties to the conflicts. Although the unofficial “pro-Serbian” orientation of Russian peacekeepers only balanced the unofficial “pro-Croatian”, “pro-Muslim” or “anti-Serbian” orientation of some Western countries participating in the coalitions, in general Russia is not playing the nationalist “card” in this complex of conflicts ” and takes the position of a relatively unbiased mediator.
Fourthly, Russia’s cooperation with other countries and organizations in conducting operations in the former Yugoslavia was significantly affected by the Russia-NATO contradictions in connection with NATO expansion and NATO’s actions without a UN mandate in the FRY in 1999. More broadly, peacekeeping cooperation in Yugoslavia was and remains influenced by the intersection and clash of interests of the great powers in the Balkans and in Europe as a whole.
Units and formations of Russian airborne troops were first involved in the UN peacekeeping mission in Yugoslavia already in 1992. At that time, there were no specially trained peacekeeping contingents in Russia (with the exception of a small group of military observers from previous UN operations, which had experience only of non-combat operations “under the banner” of the UN). A special Russian motorized rifle battalion for landing in Yugoslavia was formed from airborne units on the basis of the Presidential Decree “On sending the Russian contingent to Yugoslavia to participate in UN peacekeeping operations” and the order of the Commander of the United Armed Forces of the CIS[i]. The size of the contingent was determined to be 900 people, armed with small arms, and equipped with 150 vehicles and 15 armored personnel carriers. The battalion was formed and underwent reduced training and instruction in 6 weeks.
Both the simple structure of the contingent (headquarters, headquarters company, five motorized rifle companies), and light weapons and the absence of communications, reconnaissance, and reinforcement units indicated that Russia did not have adequate experience in participating in force peacekeeping operations and was preparing for “classic” peacekeeping, in which weapons are used only for "show of force". But the real situation civil war in Yugoslavia forced during the UNPROFOR operation, even before the transition to SFOR, to change the rules of combat contact and strengthen the combat power of the contingent. The battalion requested and received from Russia 54 more modern BTR-80 armored personnel carriers, 82mm artillery guns, mobile anti-tank missile launchers and portable anti-aircraft systems. “Separating” the warring parties required action according to the rules of a serious war.
In 1994, the 554th Separate Motorized Rifle Battalion was reinforced by the 629th Separate motorized rifle battalion, and the total number of Russian military personnel in Yugoslavia reached 1,500 people. on 95 armored combat vehicles.
When on December 15, 1995, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1031 on the former Yugoslavia, the Russian contingent received a new status and changed its structure (brigade) and scale. First of all, in connection with the adoption in the Russian Federation in the same year of a new law on the participation of Russian contingents in peacekeeping operations, the issue of the participation of Russian peacekeepers in the UN operation was brought up for discussion in the Russian parliament. The Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation confirmed the decision on Russia's participation in the operation, and in mid-February 1996. The President of the Russian Federation by his decree increased the permitted number of troops to 1,600 people.
The Russian brigade received an area of responsibility in Yugoslavia of 1,750 square kilometers, which included a line of separation of the warring parties 275 kilometers long. An American brigade, a Turkish brigade, and a joint brigade “North”, consisting of peacekeeping contingents from Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway and Poland, served in close proximity to the Russian peacekeepers.
The tasks carried out in Bosnia by the Russian contingent also included control at five checkpoints, patrolling of numerous roads and territories, reconnaissance, search and inspection of facilities. During its participation in SFOR/IFOR operations in 1997-1999, in which NATO forces played a leading role in agreement with the UN, the Russian brigade was not involved in mass battles. The losses of 4 people killed and 11 wounded occurred mainly as a result of mine explosions.
A matter of political significance was the establishment of a chain of command. For “ideological” reasons, it was considered wrong to agree to the direct subordination of the Russian contingent to the command of NATO structures, although it was the NATO command, in accordance with the UN mandate, that carried out the overall coordination of operations. Through diplomatic channels, a military-political agreement was agreed special condition: the commander of the Russian brigade, General L. Shevtsov, received the status of Deputy Commander of the entire operation in the former Yugoslavia and reported directly to the Commander-in-Chief of NATO ground forces in Central Europe.
The Russian command group at NATO's Supreme Headquarters in Europe (SHAPE) solved problems not only of a military, but also of a political and diplomatic nature. Among them, in particular, is the coordination of the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreements with the Bosnian military-political leadership, as well as the organization and holding of meetings of joint reconciliation commissions, in which representatives of the Bosnian political forces and the military leadership of the SFOR operation participated.
By March 1999, when the NATO air operation in the FRY, which began without UN Security Council authorization, led to the freezing of Russia-NATO relations and the formal withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from the NATO-led operation in Bosnia, the overall result of cooperation between Russian peacekeepers and the military of the coalition countries was generally positive. The crisis was not caused internal factors development of the operation itself in Bosnia, but became a projection into the sphere of peacekeeping of “macropolitical” tension in Russia-NATO relations.
Political complaints about NATO's actions in the FRY can be summarized as follows:
- The alliance violated the UN Charter by launching a coercive operation on the territory of a sovereign state against the will of the legally elected government of the country and without a UN Security Council mandate;
- The operation was carried out outside NATO's area of direct responsibility, limited, in accordance with the Washington Treaty of 1949, to the territory of member countries;
- The operation was exceeding the limits of necessary use of force, since not all channels of political influence have been exhausted;
- Operation violates prerogatives regional organizations , because, firstly, the OSCE as the leading regional organization collective security was pushed aside by NATO and the OSCE mandate was also absent, secondly, NATO itself never recognized itself (and was not recognized by the UN) as a regional security organization and, thirdly, operations with elements of coercive action (bombing and blockade) fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the UN Security Council rather than regional organizations and agreements;
- The operation is controversial from the point of view of being categorized as a “humanitarian motivated intervention”, since the fact of genocide of the Albanian population of Kosovo (which could be the basis for such an intervention) was not recorded and confirmed by the UN or OSCE, and the flow of refugees from Kosovo after the start of the intervention (bombing) the flow of refugees significantly exceeded before the operation;
- Finally, NATO and Western powers have set a dangerous precedent by openly ignoring Russian protests and the position of powers such as China and India, which, among others, have spoken out at the UN against forceful intervention.
At the same time, it is obvious that Russia was reacting not only and not so much to the events in the former Yugoslavia itself (although opposition to the bombing was consistent and supported by public opinion within Russia), but to ousting Russia from the process of making fundamental decisions on problems of pan-European security (which, undoubtedly, , related to the decision to bomb Yugoslav territory).
It should be realistically realized that the Russian leadership did not shy away from the use of military force in the Yugoslav conflict in general, and the recognition of the need for coercive actions, including in relation to the government of S. Milosevic, in particular. Political problem consisted primarily of the violation by the North Atlantic Alliance (and the leadership of a number of Western powers) of the rules and procedures for decision-making on the use of force in the international community. As soon as 11 weeks after the start of the bombing, the UN Security Council finally managed to adopt an agreed resolution regarding international operation in Kosovo and the FRY, the Russian military-political leadership persistently returned the Russian contingent to international forces intervention (the famous raid of paratroopers led by General Zavarzin from Bosnia to Pristina airport in Kosovo). Cooperation between Russia and NATO in peacekeeping was immediately unfrozen. At the same time, although the bombing as a type of influence on the government of S. Milosevic was stopped, other coercive elements in the operation (for example, a strictly controlled embargo on the supply of weapons to the parties to the conflict) remained.
The allocation of a zone of responsibility to the Russian contingent in Kosovo in the predominantly Albanian sector led to difficulties in carrying out peacekeeping functions and partial blocking of elements of the contingent by the local population. Nevertheless, Russia has returned to the number of countries actively participating in the peace process in the former Yugoslavia.
Some lessons from the complex of operations in the former Yugoslavia can be summarized as follows:
- There has been a certain “specialization” of various international organizations in conducting operations in conflict regions. The UN is failing modern conditions with the organization of force operations to establish peace (enforce peace), if the conflict has the scale of a real civil war. This requires a “working” integrated military organization. The involvement of NATO is generally assessed in UN circles as effective and, apparently, will continue to be practiced if there is consensus within the ranks of NATO itself. The WEU was unable to effectively establish itself even in the “hothouse” conditions of conducting elements of operations “under the wing” of NATO. The OSCE skillfully carries out activities to restore political infrastructure and hold free elections in conflict regions. The UN ensures general political coordination of the interests of powers regarding the conflict and intervention in it, and this function (coordination of the interests of major powers regarding the conflict) is becoming increasingly important.
- Yugoslavia demonstrated the stages of deterioration in interaction between organizations of the international community (UN. OSCE) and the great powers (the first such disarray occurred during the conclusion of the Dayton Agreements on Bosnia outside the UN and the OSCE, the second during the deployment of NATO actions in the FRY contrary to the position of a number of great powers) , and the stages of their coordinated interaction. Experience shows that, as before, in the international community, the positive involvement of the UN, OSCE, and other multilateral mechanisms in the peacekeeping process cannot be replaced by the will and strength of individual powers. The international community still considers it normal for “great powers” and “great organizations” to act together, rather than to pit their efforts against each other.
- At the same time, as a relatively new formula of interaction is developing (and, apparently, will expand in the future), the practice of transferring operations by the United Nations to created adhoc coalitions of powers. It is advisable for Russia to develop the practice of participating in such coalitions and apply it to the development of coalition participation in peacekeeping in the CIS.
Operations in the former Yugoslavia showed the need (and possibility) for close political interaction between broad groups of powers in real time as the conflict unfolded ( we're talking about not only about the relatively successful maintenance of consensus in ambiguous conditions by NATO countries, but also about the practice of agreeing on decisions in adhoc coalitions of countries that carried out operations in Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo). This is an important example for Russia, which needs to use the mechanisms of political consultations and maintaining consensus among the CSTO countries.
[i] Order dated February 26, 1992. Strictly speaking, due to well-known hopes for preserving a unified military infrastructure of the CIS, the contingent was not “Russian” at first; it represented the entire former Soviet Union, all CIS countries, and only later in Yugoslavia began to talk about separate Russian and separate Ukrainian contingents.
A year later, the “ceiling” was lowered to 1,400 people, and the real number in the late 90s. did not exceed 1340 people.