Viktor Zimin has been added to the list of governors by firing squad. Expiration term
The head of Khakassia was included in the lists of governors for departure. For the second time in a year, political scientists predict the head of the republic major changes in his career. Such is the fate of officials - the stripe is white, the stripe is black ... Today they will praise, tomorrow they will show the door.
More than ten governors of Russian regions have taken a wait-and-see attitude, preparing for resignations. Personnel decisions are not ruled out in the summer, as it was a year ago, and the regional media even named the name of the first candidate for departure. But the main wave of reshuffles can cover the governor's corps in the fall: before the presidential elections it will be strategically profitable to do it, - writes "FederalPress".
According to Dmitry Elovsky, General Director of the Actor Communication Agency, “potential retirees” can be divided into three groups. The first group is those "whose resignation is necessary on the eve of the presidential elections in March 2018, either because of weak work in the region, or as a ritual sacrifice."
The second group of potential retirees includes those who will end their term next year. Their appointment as an interim "give the opportunity will allow them to strengthen their position." Elovsky includes the leaders of Khakassia in this group. Viktor Zimina and the Moscow region of Andrey Vorobyov, to Some can either leave their posts for nowhere, or get a new job.
As one of the readers of the site rightly noted, in Russia it is always like this: first with a caress, then with a stirrer. We will remind, despite all the black marks on the political figure of Zimin, he was included in the renewed composition of the Presidium of the State Council of Russia. Prior to that, the head of Khakassia for several months was not only in the conflict zone, aalsowas a candidate for resignation... In April, the next "Kremlin rating" of Russian governors was published, compiled by the Center for the Development of Regional Policy:
"In 2018, the term of office of the head of Khakassia, Viktor Zimin, expires, given the low rating of the authorities in the republic (38% in the elections to the State Duma), the question arises about the advisability of replacing it. "
Nevertheless, as the Agency for Political and Economic Communications later reported in its report on regional policy following the results of May, the head of Khakassia was included in the State Council and removed from the "standby mode".
No matter what political scientists predict, the head of Khakassia himself is not going anywhere. He intends to stay in the republic for at least the next six years. The 2018 election is a pure formality for visible compliance with the law. At one of the sessions of the Supreme Council of Khakassia, he said that he would remain in the region for another six years: for a year before the upcoming elections and for one term after. With such a decisive attitude, he returned from Moscow, where he met with the president.
Finally, the third group, which Dmitry Elovsky spoke about, is the governors who have fallen under the hood of law enforcement agencies, such as Vladimir Miklushevsky (Primorsky Territory) and Viktor Nazarov (Omsk Region).
“But the actions of the investigators are difficult to predict - they have their own logic, which does not take into account political processes,” concluded Dmitry Elovsky.
Vologda almost fell ...
Just the other day, the media published information about the resignation of the Governor of the Vologda Region Oleg Kuvshinnikov, expected from day to day. In the region he is called the "lord of the region", "shaky governor", "hardened embezzler." One of the compelling reasons for the resignation may allegedly be the inaction of the authorities in solving the problems of defrauded equity holders. At the same time, starting in 2011, when Kuvshinnikov headed the region, he proved his ability to successfully balance - not “offend” key donors of the regional budget, and at the same time, at the very least, solve existing economic issues.
Kuvshinnikov's term ends in 2019. But political scientists consider his position rather shaky: he failed to noticeably improve the socio-economic situation in the region, and conflicts with municipalities now and then arise.
Oleg Kuvshinnikov's not the best positions are confirmed by the ratings of research companies. The last of them - the rating of influence of the heads of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, prepared by the Agency for Political and Economic Communications (APEC) at the end of June - showed the fall of Kuvshinnikov: he lost four positions and was only in 64th place.
Who should pack their bags
For the most part, in the expert circles and the media environment, the same surnames are called. The "execution list" includes the head of the Omsk region, Viktor Nazarov. The names of the governor of the Krasnoyarsk Territory Viktor Tolokonsky, the head of Altai Alexander Berdnikov, the head of the Nenets district Igor Koshin, the governor of the Omsk region Viktor Nazarov and the head of Karachay-Cherkessia Rashid Temrezov are also named.
According to the director general of the Center for the Development of Regional Policy Ilya Grashchenkov, in the foreseeable future at least 12 heads of regions are threatened with resignation. In addition to the figures already mentioned, the political scientist names the governors of the Nizhny Novgorod region Valery Shantsev, the Kursk region Alexander Mikhailov, the Kemerovo region Aman Tuleyev. In addition, the political future of those "who could be removed because of the low electoral rating of the authorities" is under threat: the Governor of the Murmansk Region Marina Kovtun, the head of the Khabarovsk Territory Vyacheslav Shport and a number of others. The resignation of Samara Governor Nikolai Merkushkin will also be read.
The future career of the Governor of the Moscow Region Andrei Vorobyov, who has lost two positions in the APEC June rating, is in doubt. At the same time, it takes more than a worthy 9th place.
The Governor of Stavropol, Vladimir Vladimirov, also found himself in a very difficult situation. At the end of June, the Stavropol head took only 38th place in the APEC rating.
A FederalPress source close to the presidential administration also names the head of the Lipetsk region, Oleg Korolev, one of the old-timers of the governor's corps.
Emergency resignations
Political scientists are in no hurry to completely rule out the possibility of gubernatorial resignations by the end of the summer. At the same time, according to political scientist Ilya Grashchenkov, they are possible only in one case: if "they pass according to an emergency scenario."
“For example, in connection with the arrest of the heads. In general, the expert noted, the planned resignations will begin as part of the continuation of the cleanup of the regions for the presidential elections. They will try to replace weak, low-rated governors, those who have been sitting in their place for too long (age), and those who are in a state of serious elite conflict. "
Political scientist Roman Kolesnikov adheres to a similar position, who believes that in the “dead time for politics” resignations are possible only in case of some extraordinary events. But in the fall, the heads of the regions will begin to leave their posts one of the other.
“Resignations are, among other things, the presidential election program, so they should be expected closer to the main event of 2018 - late autumn or even winter,” the expert explained. “Due to various trends in their posts, many regional leaders risk losing their positions, I think that the Presidential Administration has already partially decided on the“ candidates for relegation ”.”
Political analyst Abbas Gallyamov believes that "there is no sense in the summer resignations, since their effect will wear off before the presidential elections."
“It is necessary to change governors in the fall. Then, in those regions where this happens, the desired feeling of "fresh air" will be achieved, which will have a beneficial effect on the results of the presidential elections, the expert believes.
A group of experts led by the head of the Civil Society Development Fund Konstantin Kostin prepared the first integral rating of governors. The work of the heads of the regions was assessed based on the indicators of the economic situation of the subject, the assessment by the federal and regional media of the activities of the head of the region, the opinion of the expert community, according to the results of sociological research. The data on the ratio of monetary incomes and expenditures of the population were also taken into account (for more details, "Methodology for compiling a rating"). The Public Opinion Foundation, the Federal State Statistics Service, and the National Monitoring Service were involved in the work on the rating. The heads of regions were divided into four groups - "very high rating", "high rating", "average rating", "rating below average".
Leaders
The group of the most effective includes 23 governors, these are those who scored over 75 points. The list is headed by the head of the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug Dmitry Kobylkin - 95 points. He is followed by the head of the Kaluga region Anatoly Artamonov - 93 points.
The first place of Kobylkin is largely due to the high economic indicators of the region. In addition, the breakthrough of the head of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug was facilitated by progress in the implementation of the Northern Latitudinal Railway project, the formation of the infrastructure of the Yamal LNG project, as well as high assessments of the prospects for the international seaport of Sabetta, the importance of which was noted by Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin ranked sixth with a score of 88 points. The capital's government refused to assess the rating of the governors, despite the fact that the capital's mayor was among the most effective managers.
We believe that it would be incorrect on our part to assess our own performance. It is the business of experts and political scientists: to study and assess these indicators, - said the press secretary of the mayor Gulnara Penkova.
But the governor of the Kaluga region Anatoly Artamonov did not refuse to comment on the results of the rating.
There are many conditions, including natural ones, that can make a particular governor higher on this list. I don't really understand how you can compare the indicators, for example, of the Vladimir region and the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug. These are completely different territories. But for similar regions of neighbors, these indicators can become an incentive for more efficient work, the governor said. - In addition, you need a motivational moment, you need perspectives that open up when you take a certain place. This will further increase the competition between the heads of the subjects.
A high indicator, despite the fact that the region is still subsidized, was also demonstrated by the head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov, who lost only three points to Sobyanin. Kadyrov is in 8th place with 85 points. The top ten with equal positions are closed by the governors of the Magadan and Tyumen regions (all have 84 points).
The head of the Chechen Republic believes that every leader should believe in what he is doing and be responsible for what he calls for.
The governor must be accountable to God, to the people and to the leadership of the state for what is happening in his region. And if he does not feel responsibility, then he is no longer a leader, - Kadyrov told Izvestia.
The rating is integral. Various factors are taken into account - the results of opinion polls, media research, statistics. If we talk about the republics of the North Caucasus, then the level of social well-being there is quite high. People, answering the questions of sociologists, expressed optimism. Chechnya is developing rapidly, on the rise. It doesn't matter what became the driver of development. Anyone who has been there notes the skyscrapers that have appeared, and the neatness, and the construction of new residential quarters, ”explained the high position of the head of Chechnya, one of the compilers of the rating, the head of the Political Expert Group, Konstantin Kalachev.
High efficiency, but already in the top twenty, was shown by the leaders of the Khabarovsk Territory, the Komi Republic and the Krasnodar Territory. Moscow, Vladimir and Nizhny Novgorod regions share the 13th, 14th and 15th lines - the heads of these regions received 81 points each.
The head of the Moscow region, Andrei Vorobyov, got the problem region both in socio-economic and political terms. The oblast's municipal elites are more autonomous and independent than other regions, and corruption flourished in the oblast. In the first year of his leadership, Vorobyov made a number of resignations, began to fight the dominance of illegal migrants, and also began to solve the problem of the regional budget deficit. Judging by the results of the rating, he succeeded.
Dagestan should also be noted - the head of the republic, Ramazan Abdulatipov, took 19th place with 78 points. The leader of the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug Natalya Komarova (77 points, 21st place) and the heads of the Kamchatka Territory and the Karachay-Cherkess Republic (76 points each, 22nd and 23rd places) close the group of leaders in terms of efficiency.
As for Dagestan, this is a kind of advance payment, a credit of trust to Abdulatipov. His high place is the result of surveys of the population and experts, says Kalachev.
Between heaven and earth
The second group ("high rating") included twenty governors who scored from 75 to 65 points. It was not enough for them to take a place in the "major league". The second group is opened by the Governor of the Amur Region Oleg Kozhemyako (75 points, 24th place). Heads of Ingushetia Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and the Republic of Bashkortostan Rustem Khamitov are on a par, taking 30th and 31st places, gaining 71 points each. The governor of the Pskov region, Andrey Turchak, who got rid of real estate in Nice in 2013, earned 70 points, as did the heads of Yakutia and the Irkutsk region (32th, 33rd, 34th places).
Governor of the Tambov Region Oleg Betin (66 points, 40th place), who was in the second group with high rates, believes that such studies often lack objectivity.
The rating is largely subjective. It all depends on what tasks are set for you and what indicators are assessed. It is difficult to assess everything at once - both summer and winter, and the average annual temperature. In addition to experts, statistical data are often used, which sometimes do not reflect the real processes that are taking place in the region. Many experts do not know the situation from the inside, - he says. - For example, they often talk about criminals in Tambov, remind of the Tambov group that operates in St. Petersburg. Let them be sorted out with her in St. Petersburg, we did not have her and no one knows these people. Tambov has one of the best indicators in terms of living conditions and safety of people.
On the verge of a foul
The third group with an “average rating” (65-50 points) includes 26 governors. Here are all the regional leaders who represent or previously represented the opposition: Konstantin Ilkovsky, a representative of Fair Russia (head of the Trans-Baikal Territory) - 61 points, 49th place, a member of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia Alexei Ostrovsky (Smolensk Region) - 56 points, 61st place, as well as ex-leader of the Union of Right Forces Nikita Belykh (Kirov region) - 53 points, 64th place.
Sergei Bozhenov, the head of the Volgograd region, which was rocked by terrorist attacks on the eve of the New Year, shares 68-69 with his colleague from the Astrakhan region Alexander Zhilkin (51 points).
It can be seen that governors from this group are closer to the “risk group” than to those who can keep the leaders company.
"Group of death"
But the lowest indicators, in the rating are referred to as “below average” (from 50 points and below), were received by 12 regional leaders. The list is opened from 70th place by the head of North Ossetia Taimuraz Mamsurov - 50 points. Behind him, in 71st place with 49 points, is the Governor of the Krasnoyarsk Territory Lev Kuznetsov, who was recently robbed at his own villa in France. It is likely that this incident caused Kuznetsov not only property damage of 200 thousand euros, but also reputational damage. Governor of the Krasnoyarsk Territory Lev Kuznetsov declined to comment on his place in the ranking.
The head of the Perm Territory, Viktor Basargin, who resigned from the post of Minister of Regional Development, it seemed, with his experience, should have brought the region to high places, but in the rating he occupies only 72nd line - 47 points. The Governor of the Sakhalin Region, Alexander Khoroshavin, has even lower indicators - 43 points, 76th place.
The story of the attack on Kuznetsov in France is only part of the problem. You can recall the poor performance of United Russia in the elections to the City Duma, you can look at the social well-being. Kuznetsov is not one of the popular governors. The region has great potential that is not being used. People feel it harshly. There is no consensus in the region's elites, there is strong oppositional sentiment, - said Konstantin Kalachev.
As for Khoroshavin, the political scientist continues, there is a noticeable conflict between the governor and the mayor of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, who had overseas property and a US green card. The governor has problems with the ONF due to dubious spending on personal needs. Representatives of the All-Russian Popular Front said that state funds are going to meet the personal needs of Sakhalin Governor Alexander Khoroshavin. As Vyacheslav Lysakov, the head of the Central Auditing Commission of the ONF, told Izvestia earlier, the first link in this chain was the purchase of Mercedes for the head of the region for 8 million rubles. It has now been revealed that the administration of a constituent entity of the Federation is buying two helicopters for almost 1 billion rubles and spends 680 million rubles on the image of the governor.
Part of the elite of Perm against Basargin. He is a stranger to the Perm Territory, a Varangian, he could not set up a relationship. The intrigues continue. There is talk about who will be after him. There is a conflict with Uralkali. This region, like the Krasnoyarsk Territory, has a very large potential, and the efficiency of using the potential is extremely low, Kalachev assures.
The top five outsiders, completing the rating, are opened by the head of the Yaroslavl region Sergey Yastrebov (42 points, 77th place). He is followed by the heads of the Tver region Andrey Shevelev (41 points, 78th place), Karelia Alexander Khudilainen (40 points, 79th place), Udmurtia Alexander Volkov (38 points, 80th place). The governor of the Kurgan region Oleg Bogomolov closes the rating (37 points, 81st place).
The experts did not include in the general list two former heads of regions who were dismissed on the eve of the rating release. So, the head of Kabardino-Balkaria, Arsen Kanokov, who resigned on December 6, 2013, scored 44 points - 75th place. But the ex-head of the Chelyabinsk region Mikhail Yurevich had good results - 79 points, 19th place.
You can be an effective, but unpopular governor - you do everything on the rise, while breaking everyone over the knee. Efficiency at any cost is wrong. At all costs, you demonstrate authoritarianism and toughness where you need to demonstrate compromises. Yurevich - with a difficult character, despite the 19th place, - said the head of the "Political Expert Group".
A source in the Presidential Administration told Izvestia that among the compilers of the product there are many specialists who have worked for a long time in the Department of Internal Policy.
These specialists are well acquainted with the criteria and methods for evaluating and processing data, adopted in the analytical departments of public authorities. One of the leading sociological services, the Public Opinion Foundation, was also involved in the work. All these factors indicate that this study is of the highest quality and reflects the real picture in the regions, - says the interlocutor of the publication.
Different regions have different requests - updating or preserving what is, some need a diplomat, others an authoritarian politician. But the situation must also be viewed through the prism of economics - the governor must be able to work with economic elites and prevent conflicts. With the return of elections for heads of regions, the ability to work with public opinion and engage in one's own popularity is becoming an extremely important factor. The heads of the subjects of the Federation must fight dependency. Governors who lived in grand style, spent tens of millions of rubles on their security, hundreds of millions on personal PR, on charters - this is already an anachronism, this is yesterday. Therefore, they received low marks, - the expert summed up.
Political scientists announced the need to create an independent rating back in October last year due to the fact that there are a number of expert funds that make ratings that do not correspond to the actual state of affairs. From this it is concluded that some representatives of the subjects of the Federation through their channels could influence the formation of ratings through monetary relations with representatives of political centers. In order to exclude possible corruption and to avoid unverified and unfounded assessments of the governors' activities, a new research product was drawn up under the leadership of FORGO.
On the methodology for compiling the Governors' Performance Rating
First module- basic (plays a decisive role in the formation of the final result - maximum 75 points out of 100 possible). It is based on the results of a study by the Georating Public Opinion Foundation for November 2013 (56,900 respondents were polled, margin of error is 1%). It includes the population's answers to questions related to the assessment of the activities of the head of a particular constituent entity of the Federation, the state of affairs in the region.
Modules from the second to the sixth are marker (play a corrective role in the formation of the final result - a maximum of 5 points out of 100 possible).
Second module based on data on the ratio of cash income and expenditures of the population in a particular region. The data are taken from the report "Socio-economic situation in Russia" for January-November 2013, prepared by the Federal State Statistics Service. Contribution to the bottom line - maximum 5 points.
Third module based on the position of a particular region in the second edition of the Rating of social well-being of Russian regions, compiled by FORGO in cooperation with the Public Opinion Foundation in December 2013. Contribution to the bottom line - maximum 5 points.
Fourth module based in part on the results of a study by the GeoRating Public Opinion Foundation, using responses to the question of whether the region's authorities are promoting business development. Contribution to the bottom line - maximum 5 points.
Fifth module assesses the ratio of positive and negative information in the media about the activities of the head of a particular region. The data are taken from the index of media efficiency of heads of regions for October-December 2013, prepared by the National Monitoring Service. Contribution to the bottom line - maximum 5 points.
Sixth module based on an expert assessment of the effectiveness of the activities of the heads of regions. The expert pool includes: K. Kostin (Chairman of the Board of the FORGO), L. Davydov (Chairman of the Commission of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation for Regional Development and Federal Relations, head of the FORGO Expert Council), V. Ivanov (Head of the Center for Regional Studies of the FORGO), M. Vinogradov (President of the Petersburg Politics Foundation), K. Kalachev (Head of the Political Expert Group), E. Minchenko (President of the Minchenko Consulting Holding). Contribution to the bottom line - maximum 5 points.
report "Socio-economic situation in Russia" for January-November 2013, prepared by the Federal State Statistics Service.
rating of media efficiency of heads of regions for October-December 2013. The rating was prepared by the National Monitoring Service. It is built on the basis of an analysis of over 500 federal and 8000 regional publications (TV, radio, press, news agencies and Internet media). During the preparation of the rating, more than 530,000 information messages were analyzed.
Governors are rated on a scale from 1 to 100 points. Governors who received an assessment of over 75 points are enrolled in the first group of "very high rating", from 75 to 65 points - in the second group of "high rating", from 65 to 50 points - in the third group "average rating", less than 50 points - in the fourth group "rating below average".
As the basic criteria for dividing governors into groups, we used the results of respondents' answers to the following questions from the GeoRating study:
Generally speaking, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the state of affairs in our region (territory, republic, for Moscow and St. Petersburg - a city)?
Do you think the overall situation in our region (krai, republic, for Moscow and St. Petersburg - a city) is now improving, worsening or practically unchanged?
Do you think our region (krai, republic, for Moscow and St. Petersburg - the city) needs a new head or will it be better if the current leader remains the head?
Do you think the head of our region (region, republic, for Moscow and St. Petersburg - a city) works as the head of the region good or bad?
How would you today assess the state of the economy of our region (region, republic, for Moscow and St. Petersburg - a city) - as good, satisfactory or bad? And what do you think, is the state of the economy of our region (region, republic, for Moscow and St. Petersburg - a city) is currently improving, deteriorating or not changing?
The following four criteria were used as auxiliary criteria for the allocation of governors within the groups:
Expert review.
The total number of points is 100.
The maximum possible number of points for each of the five criteria of the main group is 15.
The maximum number of points for each of the subsidiary criteria is 5.
Grading the results of answers to the main questions
1. We are satisfied with the state of affairs in the region:
From 50% - 15 points.
From 30 to 50% - 10 points.
Below 30% - 5 points.
2. They note an improvement in the situation in the region:
From 30% - 15 points.
From 10 to 30% - 10 points.
Below 10% - 5 points.
3. The current leader should remain the head of the region:
From 50% - 15 points.
From 30 to 50% - 10 points.
Below 30% - 5 points.
4. The head of the region works well:
From 60% - 15 points.
From 40 to 60% - 10 points.
Below 40% - 5 points.
5. Assessment of the state of the region's economy:
Amount from 30% - 15 points.
Amount from 20 to 30% - 10 points.
Amount below 20% - 5 points.
Grading the results of the responsesto support questions
1. The ratio of cash income and expenses:
Cash incomes exceed expenses - 5 points.
Cash income is equal to expenses - 3 points.
Cash incomes are inferior to expenses - 2 points.
2. Position of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation in the second edition of the Rating
social well-being of Russian regions:
3. Regional authorities promote business development:
From 30% - 5 points.
From 15 to 30% - 3 points.
Below 15% - 2 points.
From 50% - 5 points.
From 20 to 50% - 3 points.
Index below 20% - 2 points.
12.12.2016
17th Governor's Political Survival Rating
Communication holding "Minchenko Consulting" and the "Petersburg Politics" Foundation and present the 17th edition of the Political Survival Rating of Governors
The rating has been published since 2007. It assesses the likelihood of keeping the current heads of regions in office over the next year on a 5-point scale (where 5 is the maximum score, 1 is the minimum).
Since the publication of the previous rating on November 26, 2015, 2 out of 3 governors have been replaced with a score of "2" - Vladimir Gruzdev (Tula region) and Andrey Shevelev (Tver region). In addition, Sergey Yastrebov (3-, Yaroslavl region), Konstantin Ilkovsky (3, Trans-Baikal Territory), Nikita Belykh (4-, Kirov region) have lost their posts. Nikolay Tsukanov (4, Kaliningrad region) was transferred to the post of plenipotentiary in the North-West Federal District. In February 2016, the head of North Ossetia, Tamerlan Aguzarov, died (rating 4-, in the comments to the Rating, the authors pointed to health problems).
Contrary to popular expectations, the elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation did not become a key test for the political survival of the governors. Since the federal government is trying to build a new agenda for the next presidential cadence, on which personnel policy directly depends, the electoral results obtained during the elections, as well as the recent passage through the elections, are not a guarantee of retention in office. From the point of view of the consequences of elections for the fate of governors, it is not the specific percentages and the number of elected deputies of different levels that are more significant, but the influence of the campaign on the intra-elite balances in the regions and the socio-political consequences (including the level of satisfaction of certain groups of the population with their results).
Meanwhile, other criteria that affect hardware survival are highlighted. Namely:
Technical - due to the need to make decisions on governors whose term of office is approaching the end. In 2017, we are talking about the heads of Adygea, Buryatia, Karelia, Mordovia, Perm Territory, Saratov, Sverdlovsk regions. For various reasons, they could not or did not want to achieve early elections in the region, which casts doubt on the electoral potential of most of them.
Symbolic - related to the possible desire of the new leadership of the Presidential Administration to demonstrate their political capabilities and implement at the regional level their intentions to restyle internal political approaches. As a result, regions that are historically important for the Center (Nizhny Novgorod Region), as well as heads of territories around which a negative media plume has been created in recent years (Samara Region, Pskov Region), fall into the risk zone. In addition, an intrigue is possible around the significance of the gubernatorial elections themselves. The signals received in early December about the possible division of governors into three “lists” based on the results of their work testify to the preservation of the previous practice of “pre-election” solution of key personnel issues. At the same time, there is room for maneuver here. The approaching presidential elections (which, judging by the leaks in the media, are planned to be held with a higher turnout and political mobilization) may motivate the federal authorities to demonstrate strong steps both in the resignation of heads of regions, and in stimulating the brightness and competitiveness of governor's campaigns, allowing until the fall of 2017 fill the agenda with striking regional cases (the Sverdlovsk region could be an example recognizable by a wide audience). As an interesting move, the appointment of technical acting governors can be used so that the governor, whose term of office has expired, was forced to participate in elections on a general basis. It is also possible to raise the question of the meaningfulness of the practice of providing governor posts to representatives of opposition parties (Oryol, Smolensk regions) - the constitutional majority of United Russia reduces the need for this. "Fair Russia" has already lost such a vacancy, and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation has demonstrated the ability to achieve victory for its candidates in direct elections.
Image - tied to the current ratings of support for the current heads of regions. The limiting factor here is the lack of publicity and public expertise of the currently conducted closed studies, as well as sometimes hard-to-explain sharp jumps in the level of support for heads of regions in sociological research.
Statistical - proceeding from the declared priorities of increasing attention to the economic results of the work of the heads of the regions. In the Appendix, we have attempted to summarize current economic statistics. Taking into account the incomparability of the potentials of the regions, the emphasis is placed on the data on the dynamics for the past year. The data obtained only partly overlap with the existing ideas about the effectiveness of the political systems existing in the regions.
Career - dictated by the expansion of the practice of transferring governors to federal positions, which often cannot be unambiguously interpreted as an increase or decrease (N. Tsukanov, E. Zinichev).
"Law enforcement" - taking into account the effectiveness of the practice of replacing the heads of regions on "anti-corruption" grounds (Komi, Kirov region, Sakhalin) and a series of attacks on them with the help of criminal cases against deputy governors and members of regional governments. This line can develop autonomously, regardless of the results of the work of governors in other areas. The activity of law enforcement officers meets with a different attitude of the heads of regions - from the open solidarity of the governor with the suspects (Kemerovo region) to self-elimination from the problem (Chelyabinsk region).
The reduction in the allocated resources intensifies the competition for richer regions, while the anti-corruption activity of the power structures makes the motivation of regional and federal politicians to fight for posts in depressed territories even lower.
Region |
Chapter |
Assessment (on a 5-point scale, in parentheses - the assessment in the previous rating) |
Strengths |
Weak sides |
Year of commencement of work at the head of the region |
Expiration term |
|
Adygea |
Aslan Tkhakushinov |
It is possible to maintain stability in the region at an acceptable level in comparison with the “Central Caucasus” level. Competitors do not show high public activity, and the abolition of direct elections makes it easier to lobby for an extension of powers on the sidelines without reference to the current ratings. |
The flip side of the abolition of direct elections may be the lack of transparency in resolving the issue of the candidacy of the head, including for the current republican authorities. The short term of office requires the federal authorities to make an operative decision, which, given the republic's relative peripherality, for the Center may be spontaneous. |
|||
|
Altai Republic |
Alexander Berdnikov |
He is one of the record holders for political survival. Although he is not a full-fledged leader of public opinion, good economic indicators (including the development of tourism), as well as the development of a special sector of VIP tourism, facilitate communication with the country's top leaders and presentation of the results of their work. |
The attitude of the elites towards the figure of the head remains rather restrained. Although A. Berdnikov won direct elections, it cost a lot of effort and did not give him a big political advantage. |
|||
|
Bashkortostan |
Rustem Khamitov |
On the whole, he preserved socio-political and economic stability in a traditionally significant region, avoiding serious excesses, including in interethnic relations. |
The change in the owner of Bashneft creates budgetary risks and, at the same time, makes the republic one of the priority territories for Rosneft. In this regard, theses about the managerial weakness of the head, a decrease in lobbying weight, insufficient authority among local elites, irregularities in the elections to the State Duma, and the loss of the energy sector that has arisen with the replacement of M. Rakhimov can be updated. |
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Buryatia |
Vyacheslav Nagovitsyn |
For many years the republic has remained relatively peripheral for the federal government, and the activity of lobbyists claiming control over the republic is low. In addition, it is possible to avoid the occurrence of resonant conflicts in interethnic relations. |
Numerous conflicts with local elites will be the focus of attention due to the need to make a personnel decision due to the end of the term of office. |
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Dagestan |
Ramazan Abdulatipov |
After the change of power in the republic, it was possible to achieve a decrease in terrorist activity and the intensity of counterterrorist operations. At the same time, in situations that were significant for the Center, he did not interfere with the actions of federal power structures. |
In the event of an aggravation of the situation, the thesis of insufficient controllability, incomplete readiness to build complex inter-clan and inter-ethnic balances can be revived. Also, the issue of power in the republic can become a projection of the balance of power between federal business groups with interests in Dagestan (S. Kerimov, Z. Magomedov). In addition, there is an increase in the public activity of M. Magomedov, who previously held the post of head of the republic. |
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Ingushetia |
Yunus-Bek Evkurov |
The significance of a counterbalance to R. Kadyrov in the North Caucasus, realizing an alternative to the Chechen model of building a socio-political balance. |
It was not possible to overcome the problem of the lack of socio-economic self-sufficiency of the republic. Criticism of nepotism in power from the opposition. |
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Kabardino-Balkaria |
Yuri Kokov |
Against the background of relative stability, the federal center has no reason to be actively involved in the situation within the republic and take responsibility for a serious change in the balance of power. |
People from the republic continue to periodically figure in conflicts around illegal armed groups. |
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Kalmykia |
Alexey Orlov |
Allows the federal government not to get involved in the internal republican situation, avoiding a serious exacerbation of the lines of political tension. |
Due to the peripheral position of the republic, the thesis of the lack of positive dynamics can always be presented as a counterargument. |
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Karachay-Cherkessia |
Rashid Temrezov |
Recent reassignment amid the ability to position itself as a "modern" manager. |
The Federal Center is weakly involved in the intra-republican situation, however, any violation of the interethnic and inter-clan balance in the republic, which is difficult from the point of view of national relations and elite configuration, may prompt a rethinking of the policy results of recent years. |
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Karelia |
Alexander Khudilainen |
He managed to neutralize most of the opponents who were unable to convert ratings into positions of power. He is able to mobilize not only political, but also power resources. Contrary to forecasts, campaigned for the State Duma elections with relative ease. |
As the end of the term approaches, there is a lack of positive arguments in favor of its extension. The final decision will be determined to a greater extent by the position and alignment of forces of the federal lobbyist groups, and not by the situation in the republic itself. |
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Komi |
Sergey Gaplikov |
Strives to preserve the effect of a federal appointee who has taken over the "heavy legacy" of the previous leadership. He was able to reduce the influence of a number of business groups and, if necessary, call them "culprits" in the event of a worsening economic or infrastructural situation. |
The "Gaizer case" paralyzed the system of government that existed in the republic, and the continuation of a series of criminal cases strengthened the "fear factor" among the top and middle management. Building a new managerial configuration to replace the destroyed one is still at the starting stage. |
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Mari El |
Leonid Markelov |
Demonstrated the ability to win direct elections despite high anti-rating and electoral fatigue. For certain subsectors in the economy, there is an improvement in indicators due to an increase in defense orders. For potential external competitors, the republic remains an unattractive asset. |
Re-election for a new term came with a creak. In addition, the thesis about the gradual loss of connection between the head of the republic and reality is being steadily promoted. |
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Mordovia |
Vladimir Volkov |
Social and political stability is preserved in the republic. Preparation for the 2018 World Cup remains one of the priorities and at the same time drivers of infrastructure development. The gradual distancing of the current elites from N. Merkushkin reduces the risks that may arise if the Samara governor is replaced. |
V. Volkov refrained from attempts to initiate early direct elections for the head of the republic, which creates an intrigue on the eve of the end of his term. A high level of debt burden remains a problem for the region (although, according to a number of experts, we are talking mainly about budget loans, which the federal center has informally promised to restructure). |
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Sakha |
Egor Borisov |
Leads a self-sufficient region that provides favorable economic statistics and does not shape a negative agenda at the federal level. No claims from the Federal Center. Support from Alrosa. |
Like any closed administrative system, the republic's administrative system remains vulnerable to criticism, including for its rigidity and elements of ethnocracy. The problem for E. Borisov was also the uncontested nomination of one of the key opponents, F. Tumusov, to the State Duma. Additional uncertainty may be created by the change of the federal curator of Alrosa. |
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North Ossetia |
Vyacheslav Bitarov |
Retains carte blanche thanks to recent inauguration. |
Personnel decisions on North Ossetia have been made very chaotically recently and have not been able to overcome the split of the elites in the republic. |
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Tatarstan |
Rustam Minnikhanov |
The republic is considered one of the "exemplary" regions in terms of both economics and political governance. This is supported by strong lobbying positions, as well as the Center's unwillingness to play its own game in republican politics. In addition, in the Muslim world, Minnikhanov is able to partially balance the activity of R. Kadyrov and get involved in important diplomatic issues (including in relation to relations with Turkey and other Turkic countries), is an element of balance within the Muslim clergy of Russia. |
Some of the experts point to the disproportion between the politically independent position of the republic and the relatively weak interest in politics on the part of R. Minnikhanov, who prefers to concentrate more on economic issues. At the same time, the republic is not protected from outbursts of irritation from some of the federal elites in connection with its emphasized autonomy, as well as the periodic advancement of resonant initiatives (for example, the extension of a new agreement on the delineation of powers with the federal center). |
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Tuva |
Sholban Kara-ool |
Recently he won the elections for the head of the republic. The strong point remains the support of S. Shoigu, whose positions in Siberia after the appointment of S. Menyailo as plenipotentiary strengthened. |
The republic remains a non-self-sufficient region with a weak economy, dependence on the federal budget and a high potential for exacerbating interethnic tensions. |
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Udmurtia |
Alexander Soloviev |
He managed to avoid the weakening of the administrative system in the republic, whose positions in the economy are improving due to the growth in the volume of defense orders. |
The results of the work remain unrecognizable at the federal level, where there is no clear idea of the degree of success of the chapter's work. |
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Khakassia |
Victor Zimin |
He knows the situation in the republic well, relying on the support of the business groups represented here, as well as federal political allies. |
In recent years, it has often come under attack, including in connection with anti-corruption investigations and the growth of budgetary debts. |
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Chechnya |
Ramzan Kadyrov |
He is positioned as an emphatically uncontested figure with record lobbying opportunities, thanks to which he managed to preserve the direct election of the head and prevent budget cuts. |
The flip side of the public style of behavior and lobbying success is the accumulation of conflict potential in relations with federal agencies. At the same time, the federal authorities often do not have the ability to assess the real level of stability in the republic and the strength of the created administrative structure. |
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Chuvashia |
Mikhail Ignatiev |
He managed to "sit out" several attacks from opponents and contenders for the post of head of the republic, avoiding open involvement in public conflicts. |
Has not built a reputation for being a strong manager with a strong track record of success. |
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Altai region |
Alexander Karlin |
He managed to harmonize relations with key business groups, prevent the emergence of strong opponents, and stabilize the situation in Rubtsovsk. |
Relatively low popularity and emphasized tough management style increase the number of opponents and make them vulnerable to criticism. |
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Zabaykalsky Krai |
Natalia Zhdanova |
4 (3) |
Recently won the elections using the resource of federal support. |
The coming to the post of governor is regarded by many as accidental. The possibilities of withdrawing the region from the historically depressive economic situation are not yet obvious. |
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Kamchatka Krai |
Vladimir Ilyukhin |
I managed to avoid the formation of a negative agenda. |
Like the neighboring chapters, it remains a hostage between the proclaimed priorities for the development of the Far East and the little-obvious results of this policy. |
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Krasnodar region |
Veniamin Kondratyev |
Gradually moved on to the formation of his own management team. He managed to keep the attention of the federal authorities to the development of the region, including in connection with the holding of the World Cup. |
Critics point to a gradual decline in political manageability, periodic bursts of social discontent, the gradual formation of an opposing pole of influence around A. Tkachev, the governor's dependence on relations between large federal departments, as well as the threat of a decrease in the Center's interest in investments in tourist facilities in the region in connection with the priority development of Crimea. ... |
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Krasnoyarsk region |
Victor Tolokonsky |
Despite the existing skepticism in the region regarding the political capabilities of the governor, he managed to defeat A. Bykov's supporters during the elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation. Balanced relations with key business groups and constructive dialogue with the traditionally influential AO also play in the governor's favor. |
It still poorly fits into the local mentality, remaining poorly understood by both citizens and elites, who are used to building complex combinations. Lobbying opportunities at the federal level remain subtle. Risks are possible in connection with the upcoming indirect elections of the mayor of Krasnoyarsk. |
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Perm Territory |
Victor Basargin |
The region's economic performance remains favorable, and the fall elections have weakened the positions of intra-elite opponents. Maintaining control over the regional parliament increased the likelihood that by the time of the elections the opponents would not be at their peak, and a broad anti-governor coalition would not be created. |
The second change of the political team during the year creates the impression that there is no clear strategy. As the end of powers approaches, there will be attempts to actualize the themes of weak political control, disorganization of management, intra-elite split, and numerous criminal cases against employees. The power structures perceived ambiguously the alliance of the governor with the Perm city group. |
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Primorsky Krai |
Vladimir Miklushevsky |
Thanks to the successful holding of major events and forums, he has created for the region the image of a "showcase" of Russian policy in the Far East. The arrest of the mayor of Vladivostok I. Pushkarev weakened the positions of intra-elite opponents. |
The arrest of I. Pushkarev increased the level of administrative disorganization and increased the risks associated with the active participation of law enforcement agencies in the political life of the region. A risk factor could be a lack of consensus on the success of the governor in office. |
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Stavropol region |
Vladimir Vladimirov |
He managed to break the tradition of frequent replacement of governors in the region. The economic indicators of the region are generally favorable; the general level of depression among the population has been somewhat reduced. |
The problem of economic and other expansion from neighboring regions has not been resolved and continues to worsen. |
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Khabarovsk region |
Vyacheslav Shport |
He consolidated his position, minimizing the negative agenda and creating expectations from the region in the context of the development of oil and gas and defense projects. |
Problems remain in relations with both the embassy and the authorities of Khabarovsk. This is superimposed on a deficit of recognized achievements and a general accumulation of fatigue. |
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Amurskaya Oblast |
Alexander Kozlov |
Despite the random nature of the appointment, he managed to repel the first attacks on himself and began to try to build his own configuration. |
There is an almost insoluble problem of non-winning positioning in comparison with the predecessor O. Kozhemyako. The lack of personal popularity is superimposed on the weak positions in the elites and vulnerability to attacks by opposition parties. |
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Arkhangelsk region |
Igor Orlov |
He managed to "hold out" for a long time in the governor's office - also due to the passivity of competitors and the absence of a consensus candidate for replacement. |
The weakening of the lobbying potential at the federal level may become an impetus for the next exacerbation of conflicts in the political life of the region. |
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Astrakhan region |
Alexander Zhilkin |
Political longevity made it possible to develop significant ties (including through the organization of VIP tourism), as well as to position the region as an “outpost” of Russia on the border with the Muslim world. |
The general accumulation of elite and electoral fatigue is accompanied by a worsening budget situation. |
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Belgorod region |
Evgeny Savchenko |
He has built up a reputation as an effective manager and political long-liver, having created a scheme of strict political control and capitalizing on the position of the border region with Ukraine and the topic of import substitution in agriculture. |
Assessing the real strength of the political regime (including the prospects of the opposition and general electoral and elite fatigue) is difficult due to the fact that the regional political system last faced stressful challenges in 1999. The difficult debt situation also plays a negative role for the regional authorities. |
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Bryansk region |
Alexander Bogomaz |
Against the backdrop of corruption scandals of past years, he has created a reputation as an "inconspicuous" region, while at the same time squeezing out the previous elites thanks to a criminal case against his predecessor. |
The tasks of presenting achievements and managerial competencies remain unresolved today. |
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Vladimir region |
Svetlana Orlova |
She was able to break the external resistance of the regional and municipal elites, while at the same time raising public expectations from the actions of the authorities. |
The problems of “adopting” the governor's management style have not been completely resolved, and public hyperactivity often causes irritation and irony both within the region and among federal observers. |
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Volgograd region |
Andrey Bocharov |
He was able to reduce the influence of law enforcement agencies on the political life of the region and formed a pool of single-mandate candidates in the State Duma. Took a series of steps to attract investment. |
The problems of general social depression and intra-elite disagreements remain unresolved. Some of the governor's moves are vulnerable to conflicting and scandalous interpretations. |
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Vologodskaya Oblast |
Oleg Kuvshinnikov |
Demonstrated the ability to balance between solving current economic problems and interaction with key donors of the regional budget. He strengthened his position in the regional center. |
The deterioration of the socio-economic situation has not been overcome; conflicts with municipalities periodically take place. |
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Voronezh region |
Alexey Gordeev |
4-/4 (5-) |
He is one of the most influential heads of regions at the federal level. Wide elite connections make it possible to ignore local excesses and neutralize the actions of opponents. |
The elections to the State Duma took place in conflict, and the struggle that began after them to abolish direct elections for the mayor of Voronezh actualized intra-elite contradictions and worsened the media background. |
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Ivanovo region |
Pavel Konkov |
Support from M.Menya. The relative importance of the region for the federal government, taking into account the "pless" factor. |
The region is one of the record holders in criminal cases against representatives of the management elite. |
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Irkutsk region |
Sergey Levchenko |
It retains the symbolically significant status of a “model” politician who personifies the competitiveness of governor elections. I have built relationships with leading business groups, avoiding aggravating relations with the federal center. |
The main risk factors are aggravated relations with municipalities and conflicts within the team. |
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Kaliningrad region |
Anton Alikhanov |
4 (4) |
Against the background of several decrees on the appointment of N. Tsukanov as acting head of the region in 2015 and the short duration of the governorship of E. Zinichev, the federal government has a request for the emergence of certainty with the person of the head of the region. |
The problems associated with weak rootedness in the region, as well as the need for an electoral rating and managerial experience have not been overcome. |
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Kaluga region |
Anatoly Artamonov |
Despite the negative situation, the effect of the reputation of an effective manager and the author of the "economic miracle", accumulated in previous years, remains. |
The downturn in investment-intensive industries and the lack of positive dynamics in the automotive industry call into question the reputation of an "investment innovator" and actualize the topic of the accumulation of electoral fatigue. |
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Kemerovo region |
Aman Tuleyev |
Demonstrated a tough attitude to resist "anti-corruption" attacks on the regional administration. I put myself in a position in which I am not ready to write a letter of resignation, and dismissal from office “out of distrust” remains unlikely for the federal authorities for political and psychological reasons. |
He became the target of attacks by law enforcement agencies and began to try to design a "post-Tuley" configuration of forces that could expose the friction between the governor and key business groups. |
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Kirov region |
Igor Vasiliev |
4 (4-) |
The recent value, coupled with the interaction with law enforcement and experience at the federal level, creates an effect of expectations from the new governor. |
Weak rootedness in the region is complemented by the anxiety of local elites, who, due to fears of further "anti-corruption" steps, are not active and cannot serve as a full-fledged support. |
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Kostroma region |
Sergey Sitnikov |
I managed to get out of conflict situations without making obvious mistakes. Attention to the region by external stakeholders remains low. |
Until he created his own history of managerial and political success. |
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Kurgan region |
Alexey Kokorin |
Taking into account the traditionally low expectations from the region's economy, it demonstrates managerial will and a desire for change. |
Opportunities for presenting managerial success remain limited. |
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Kursk region |
Alexander Mikhailov |
He holds the record for political survival. Although this record is considered difficult to explain, the period of major problems was over and the attacks on Mikhailov were repulsed. |
The unexplained phenomenon of A. Mikhailov's political survival at any moment can make him a target for criticism, lead to his positioning as a “manager of the old formation” and a person who attracts electoral fatigue. |
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Leningrad region |
Alexander Drozdenko |
He found himself in the role of one of the most successful appointees of 2012. Achieved increased diversification of the economy, which allows using both the transit position of the region (development of ports, modernization of infrastructure ahead of the 2018 FIFA World Cup) and periodic waves of self-isolation (development of agriculture, etc.). |
The region remains extremely attractive for potential interested parties, including in the context of resolving the issue of power in St. Petersburg. |
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Lipetsk region |
Oleg Korolev |
Despite its economic attractiveness, the region is almost absent from the federal agenda. On the whole, relations with the Novolipetsk Metallurgical Plant have been stabilized, and serious mutual irritation is not accumulating. |
The region is interesting for competitors. The flip side of the lack of a region on the agenda may be the lack of a stable reputation of the governor as a successful manager who has achieved powerful results. |
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Magadan Region |
Vladimir Pechenyi |
Does not allow the formation of a negative agenda. Maintains a high level of control over both the economic and political life of the region. |
The success of the governor's office was almost not a subject of discussion. As a consequence, there are opportunities for both positive and negative interpretation of the results of his work. |
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Moscow region |
Andrey Vorobyov |
All-federal fame combined with the image of a modern and promising governor, focused on building a strong team. This is supported by federal ties and high public activity. |
Relations with the elites within the region are often tense - while the disaffected part has ample opportunity to translate its interpretations to the federal authorities. A new reason for this may be the municipal reform that has begun. |
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Murmansk region |
Marina Kovtun |
She avoided using the election campaign to weaken her positions, demonstrating further growth in claims to influence regional elites. |
The "cleansing" of Murmansk from A. Weller did not lead to the formation of a pro-governor configuration in the city. Conflicting style of interaction with elites can create additional tension. |
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Nizhny Novgorod Region |
Valery Shantsev |
The governor is a "heavyweight" with great federal ties, who managed to ensure his own political dominance in the region and impart dynamics to its economic development. |
The protracted conflict over control of Nizhny Novgorod has become a serious breach in the image of the "omnipotent" governor. Uncertainty about the strategies of the current and former heads of the plenipotentiary mission in relation to the region remains traditionally high. |
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Novgorod region |
Sergey Mitin |
Able to effectively promote the results of his work when communicating with federal officials. Some experts point out that lobbying potential is facilitated by interaction with the Valdai dacha community. |
The approaching expiration date of the term of office actualizes the negative agenda - including the unresolved issue of power in the regional center and criminal cases against the governor's entourage. |
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Novosibirsk region |
Vladimir Gorodetsky |
The election results turned out to be higher than expected, thanks in part to the ability to form an elite coalition under the auspices of United Russia. |
The lack of personal charisma is especially noticeable against the background of rivalry with the mayor of Novosibirsk A. Loktem. |
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Omsk region |
Victor Nazarov |
3+/4- (4) |
During the elections to the State Duma, he achieved good results, not allowing the strengthening of the position of the Communist Party. Able to build interaction with individual federal business groups, including Sberbank. |
In a region with high internal competition, he remains an apolitical figure, as a result of which he may not have time to respond to the possible formation of a negative agenda for the governor (as it almost happened in the elections in 2015). |
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Orenburg region |
Yuri Berg |
The alignment of relations with key business groups in an economically self-sufficient region makes it possible to maintain dominance in the region. Attempts to consolidate dissatisfaction with the authorities around opposition figures ended in failure. |
There is a hidden intra-elite opposition - especially in the regional center, where it was not possible to establish a full-fledged "chemistry" in relations with the elites and part of the inhabitants. |
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Oryol Region |
Vadim Potomsky |
The offensive style and the status of a political appointee from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation make it possible to wield political initiative within the region and develop an offensive against opponents. |
Critics have portrayed the governor as an eccentric and impulsive figure who prefers to work on a conflicting agenda. The exhaustion of the resource of the model of "coalition governors" can play against V. Potomsky. |
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Penza region |
Ivan Belozertsev |
Managed to confirm the idea of a stable position in the region. The death of ex-governor V. Bochkarev made it possible to prevent the formation of a parallel center of political influence. |
The region's relative lack of visibility for the federal government creates a shortage of lobbying resources. |
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Pskov region |
Andrey Turchak |
Repeatedly demonstrated the ability to get out of the blow and correct the direction of negative "underwater currents" for himself. For a long time, the position of one of the "allergens" in the eyes of the liberal opposition contributed to the preservation of office in the face of an anti-liberal trend. |
The motivation for continuing a career in the region is relatively low. At the same time, the Pskov region may turn out to be a convenient platform for demonstrating the reset of relations between the authorities and the opposition by replacing the most controversial persons in terms of public image. |
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Rostov region |
Vasily Golubev |
It successfully positions the region as a border region (which stabilizes relations with law enforcement agencies), and also uses the topic of import substitution in agriculture. I have built balanced relations with the federal elites. |
The real level of tension within the elites is not fully clear. The region is attractive to external players. |
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Ryazan Oblast |
Oleg Kovalev |
Successfully overcome past crisis situations associated with the threat of replacement. One of the reasons for this was the low attractiveness of the region for external players. |
The approaching end of office is putting the health deficit back on the agenda. |
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Samara Region |
Nikolay Merkushkin |
Managerial experience, combined with federal ties, creates a certain margin of safety, especially given the difficulty of finding and agreeing on a replacement candidate. |
Public hyperactivity irritates elites of different levels and excessive all-Russian recognition. There are problems around the legitimacy of voting in the elections to the State Duma. |
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Saratov region |
Valery Radaev |
2+/ (3+) |
Historically overshadowed by federal politicians. It helps prevent the formation of a negative agenda around the region. |
The lack of political subjectivity makes a vulnerable figure for opponents and lowers value for supporters. |
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Sakhalin Region |
Oleg Kozhemyako |
Has a significant credit of trust at the federal level due to the experience of working in previous regions. Was able to create expectations among the population. Able to implement federal initiatives related to the redistribution of finances between the Far Eastern regions. |
Previous experience can underestimate the risks associated with elite discontent. Within the region, there are questions about the quality of the management team. |
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Sverdlovsk region |
Evgeny Kuyvashev |
He was engaged in building a configuration with local elites, temporarily reducing the severity of the split. The activity of business groups capable of opposing is gradually decreasing. |
The near-term end of office raises the question of being selective in competitive elections, given the lack of charisma and low popularity. The decision to head the regional government may attract electoral risks. |
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Smolensk region |
Alexey Ostrovsky |
The political status of the LDPR appointee, taking into account V. Zhirinovsky's attempts to position himself as the main supporter of the current government among opposition parliamentary parties. The attractiveness of the region for external players is low. |
The lack of positive dynamics prevented the creation of a full-fledged success story, making it a figure vulnerable to criticism and a hostage to the viability of the configuration with opposition governors. |
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Tambov Region |
Alexander Nikitin |
The federal credit of trust remains. Demonstrates activity to attract investments. |
Until he created a powerful wave of expectations around himself. A recent attempt to nominate a candidate for the RAS elections could be used against the governor. |
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Tver region |
Igor Rudenya |
4+ (2) |
Recent election amid substantial federal support. |
Weak rootedness in the region. Conditional legitimacy in connection with winning non-competitive elections. Weak image positioning. |
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|
Tomsk region |
Sergey Zhvachkin |
I was able to reduce the degree of social and political activity in the region. Can rely on the support of Gazprom. |
He failed to secure early elections, which, given the imminent end of his term, would be read as weakness. |
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Tula region |
Alexey Dyumin |
5- (2) |
He won direct elections with demonstrative federal support. |
So far, he is only developing operational management skills at the regional level, without being able to fully rely on the local elites. |
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|
Tyumen region |
Vladimir Yakushev |
He strengthened his position in relations with the autonomous okrugs, including by relying on established ties with oil and gas companies and the federal lobbying resource. |
The region remains attractive to external players, and attempts to pursue a policy of enlarging regions may carry additional risks. |
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Ulyanovsk region |
Sergey Morozov |
Despite the activity of his opponents, he managed to achieve an extension of his term and won the gubernatorial elections. We managed to stabilize our positions at the federal level. |
Risks remain associated with frequent team rotation and intra-elite tensions. |
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Chelyabinsk region |
Boris Dubrovsky |
Lack of obvious candidates for replacement. |
Lack of managerial and political competencies against the background of increased activity of law enforcement agencies and the presence of a large number of hidden opponents in the elite. |
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Yaroslavskaya oblast |
Dmitry Mironov |
4 (3-) |
Recent appointment, promoting the reputation of an official with a federal background. He took prompt steps to recruit his own team. |
Lack of alignment with local elites against the background of the need to develop managerial skills. The sustainability of the tradition of competition in local politics. |
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Moscow |
Sergei Sobyanin |
Trust of the President. Absence of serious restrictions on the part of the Moscow City Duma, local elites, political parties. Ability to build balanced relationships with federal elite groups. Lack of harsh pressure from the security forces. |
Low efficiency of managing media campaigns (when solving technical situations, you have to spend personal political capital). The lack of a political risk management system is exacerbated by a lack of personal charisma. |
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St. Petersburg |
Georgy Poltavchenko |
He managed to prevent the growth of protest moods in the city. The difficulty of agreeing on a replacement candidate ensures career longevity. |
Personal motivation to stay in office is relatively low against the background of talk about the possibility of moving to the federal level. The negative information background is created by scandals around the preparations for the World Cup, attracting the attention of law enforcement agencies. |
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Jewish Autonomous Region |
Alexander Levintal |
The relatively recent appointment has created additional expectations inside and outside the region - especially if the investment attraction policy and the creation of a priority development area are successful. |
We have to act in the face of a worsening budgetary situation, to overcome the problems of staff shortages and the inertia of perception as “non-local”. |
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Nenets Autonomous Okrug |
Igor Koshin |
Initiative. Activity. The presence of allies at the federal level. Discussion of hypothetical scenarios for unification with the Arkhangelsk region under the dominance of the NAO. |
The abolition of direct elections has created a threat of a decrease in political subjectivity, which is significant given the traditions of high dynamics of intra-elite life. The tasks of creating a successful management case have not yet been solved. |
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|
Natalia Komarova |
She managed to build relationships with some of the oil companies. The cancellation of direct elections reduced the political weight of the governor, but helped to avoid electoral risks. |
There is a high level of conflict at the district, municipal and regional levels, which can make the governor a target for attacks, given the high attractiveness of the region for any challengers. |
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Chukotka Autonomous District |
Roman Kopin |
The district does not pose a problem to the federal agenda. |
There is no sustainable management reputation of either positive or negative content. |
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|
Dmitry Kobylkin |
Heads one of the "showcase" regions in terms of socio-economic policy. At the same time, it is successfully building relations with Gazprom and Novatek. |
The cancellation of direct elections makes relations with the Tyumen region unbalanced. Periodically nominated as a candidate for federal posts. |
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|
Crimea |
Sergey Aksenov |
4 |
He acted as one of the leaders in the process of joining Crimea to Russia. Successfully uses the priority of the Crimea topic for the federal authorities |
He gets into periodic conflicts with federal departments. There is a risk of nominating State Duma deputies from Crimea as alternatives to the current head. |
Sep 19 |
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|
Sevastopol |
Dmitry Ovsyannikov |
5- |
Successfully uses the image effect after replacing the unpopular governor. Concluded a situational alliance with A. Chaly. He achieved the return of direct elections. Can rely on federal business groups. |
Has insufficient experience in public policy. The task is to increase the electoral rating. It is possible to underestimate the acuteness of elite contradictions and protest potential in the city. |
Vrio |
List of experts
- Badovsky Dmitry, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Institute for Socio-Economic and Political Research;
- Vinogradov Mikhail, President of the Petersburg Politics Foundation;
- Gusev Dmitry, political strategist;
- Dachenkov Igor, General Director of the Agency for Mass Communications "Region Media";
- Konstantin Kostin, Chairman of the Board of the Civil Society Development Fund;
- Kuznetsov Gleb, Deputy Director of the National Institute for the Development of Contemporary Ideology;
- Kurbangaleeva Ekaterina, Director of ANO "Research Center" Special Opinion ";
- Oleg Matveichev, professor at the Higher School of Economics;
- Minchenko Evgeniy, President of the communication holding Minchenko Consulting;
- Roshkov Evgeniy, Managing Partner of Kesarev Consulting;
- Turovsky Rostislav, General Director of the Agency for Regional Studies;
- Shcherbakov Fyodor, political scientist.
Appendix 1. Economic statistics of regions
Green Zone . 10th to 10th place. 2 points
Blue zone. 11 to 20 places. 1 point
Orange zone. From 66 to 75 places. Minus 1 point.
Red zone. From 76th to 85th places. Minus 2 points.
Appendix 2. High-profile criminal cases against high-ranking representatives of the teams of the current governors
|
Region |
Data on criminal cases, detentions, arrests of officials of regional governments and administrations |
|
|
Adygea |
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Altai Republic |
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Bashkortostan |
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|
Buryatia |
Manzyanov Alexander. Minister of Agriculture. In July 2016 he was sentenced to 2.5 years in prison on charges of abuse of power. Parole September 2016 Nikolay Krivosheev. Former head of the republican forestry agency. In May 2016, shortly after being dismissed of his own free will, he became a defendant in a criminal case for abuse of office. |
|
|
Dagestan |
Kazibekov Ibrahim. Minister of Construction and Housing and Utilities. In September 2016, a criminal case was initiated for failure to provide a resident of the republic with funds to buy housing. In response, he filed a lawsuit against the bailiff service, demanding 100 million rubles from it. for moral damage. Currently continues to perform duties |
|
|
Ingushetia |
Ruslan Kostoev. Minister of Agriculture. In October 2016, he was detained in a criminal case on charges of abuse of office. Suspended from office. |
|
|
Kabardino-Balkaria |
Eristova Lyana. Minister of Property and Land Relations. In November 2016, a criminal case was opened on charges of abuse of office and forgery. Temporarily removed from office. |
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|
Kalmykia |
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|
Karachay-Cherkessia |
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|
Karelia |
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|
Komi |
Elena Shabarshina. Chief of Staff of the Head of Komi, Elena Shabarshina. In June 2016, she was dismissed after the initiation of a criminal case on accepting a large bribe, and attempted suicide. A preventive measure in the form of a bail has been chosen |
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|
Mari El |
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Mordovia |
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Sakha |
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North Ossetia |
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Tatarstan |
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|
Tuva |
Tyt-ool Yuri. Deputy Head of the Republic, Former Minister of Agriculture and Food. In October 2016, he was dismissed after the initiation of a criminal case on misappropriation of budget funds |
|
|
Udmurtia |
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|
Khakassia |
Sergey Novikov. Minister of Construction and Housing and Utilities. He was imprisoned in a pre-trial detention center, but later released on recognizance not to leave, the case was re-qualified from fraud as abuse of office. Dismissed from office |
|
|
Chechnya |
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|
Chuvashia |
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|
Altai region |
Denisov Yuri. Former Deputy Governor, Head of the Main Department of Education. Soon after his release from office in March 2016, he became accused of accepting a bribe through the mediation of his wife. Both were placed in a pre-trial detention center. The term of arrest expires on January 4 |
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|
Zabaykalsky Krai |
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Kamchatka Krai |
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Krasnodar region |
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Krasnoyarsk region |
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|
Perm Territory |
Zakiev Almaz. Minister of Transport. In October 2016, a criminal case was opened on charges of lobbying the interests of a commercial structure. Suspended from the performance of official duties. Is under recognizance not to leave. Lyakh Pavel. Minister of Physical Culture and Sports. In October 2016, he was detained as part of the investigation into the embezzlement during the reconstruction of the Dynamo stadium. He is under house arrest. Baluev Evgeniy. Minister of Information Development and Communications. In June 2016, he was arrested on charges of fraud, later a case was initiated on illegal possession of weapons. In August, he was dismissed from the post of minister. The arrest has been extended until February. Fedorovsky Victor. Minister of Construction and Housing and Utilities. At the beginning of 2016, after the initiation of a criminal case on charges of illegal participation in entrepreneurial activity, he wrote a letter of resignation. The court declared that there were no grounds for criminal prosecution, and a fine of 145 thousand rubles was imposed. |
|
|
Primorsky Krai |
Yezhov Oleg. Vice-Governor. In early May 2016, he was detained by FSB officers on charges of abuse of office when paying for construction and installation work under a government contract. A few days before his arrest, he resigned. |
|
|
Stavropol region |
Lyamin Vasily. Minister of education. In October 2015 sentenced to 7.5 years on charges of bribery and extortion |
|
|
Khabarovsk region |
Ignatovich Sergey. Deputy Prime Minister. In February 2016, he was arrested, placed under house arrest (accused of embezzling a large sum during the construction of a residential complex). Released from his post. Skomorokhov Andrey. Minister of Construction. ... In February 2016, he was arrested, placed under house arrest (accused of embezzling a large sum during the construction of a residential complex). Released from his post. Davidenko Alexander. Former Minister of Property Relations. In February 2016, sentenced to 7.5 years in prison on fraud charges. In June 2016, the term was reduced to 6 years. Kravchuk Nikolay. Former Deputy Prime Minister. In December 2015, he was charged with abuse of office. He was put on the international wanted list. |
|
|
Amurskaya Oblast |
Vologdin Sergey. Former Minister of Agriculture. He was accused of fraud, illegal storage of ammunition, which caused the death of a person, violation of the traffic rules. Sentenced to a suspended sentence. |
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|
Arkhangelsk region |
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Astrakhan region |
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|
Belgorod region |
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|
Bryansk region |
Morozov Alexander. Former director of the regional department of architecture and construction. Sentenced to 300 hours of forced labor on charges of negligence. Alexander Morozov, found guilty of negligence, due to which the region lost subsidies to support entrepreneurship Poleschenko Dmitry. Former head of the property relations department. A criminal case was initiated on charges of abuse of office |
|
|
Vladimir region |
Dmitry Khvostov. Former Vice Governor of Construction. He left office in September. In October 2016, a criminal case was opened on charges of accepting a bribe on an especially large scale. An additional episode was added to the case in December 2016. He was detained in Krasnodar, is under arrest. |
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|
Volgograd region |
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|
Vologodskaya Oblast |
Sergey Tugarin... Former lieutenant governor. Sentenced to 2 years 10 months for abuse of power. The verdict was overturned in May 2016 after a cassation appeal. |
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|
Voronezh region |
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|
Ivanovo region |
Dmitry Kulikov. First Vice Governor. In May 2016, he was detained on charges of accepting a bribe from the former head of Ivanovo for resolving issues related to the turnover of land. Soon he was transferred to house arrest. In November 2016 released on bail. According to media reports, after that he returned to his duties. Kabanov Andrey. First Deputy Prime Minister. In August 2015, a criminal case was opened on charges of taking bribes. He was placed under house arrest, then the measure of restraint was changed to recognizance not to leave. In November 2016, the indictment was approved. The case has been referred to the court. The beginning of the trial is scheduled for December 20. |
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|
Irkutsk region |
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|
Kaliningrad region |
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|
Kaluga region |
Alexander Bolkhovitin... Former Minister of Construction and Housing and Utilities. Sentenced to 3 years in prison for embezzlement. |
|
|
Kemerovo region |
Alexey Ivanov. Danilchenko Alexander. Deputy Governor. In November 2016, he was detained in a criminal case on charges of extortion. He is under house arrest. |
|
|
Kirov region |
Anufriev Pavel. And about. Minister of Business Development, Trade and Foreign Relations. In September 2016, a criminal case was opened on charges of organizing theft. Placed under house arrest. |
|
|
Kostroma region |
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|
Kurgan region |
Sukhanov Pavel. And about. Director of the Department of Property and Land Relations. In September 2016, he was arrested on charges of forgery and fraud. The arrest period was extended until January 27, 2017. |
|
|
Kursk region |
Vadim Drozhenko... Head of the Regional Social Security Committee. Sentenced to 3 years in prison for abuse of office in the construction of housing for orphans |
|
|
Leningrad region |
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|
Lipetsk region |
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|
Magadan Region |
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|
Moscow region |
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|
Murmansk region |
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|
Nizhny Novgorod Region |
Gorelov Nikolay... Director of the Forestry Department. A criminal case was initiated on charges of abuse of office. The case is expected to go to court in January 2017. He is under house arrest. Alexander Makarov. Minister of Industry, Trade and Business. In April 2016 he was sentenced to 4.5 years in prison for abuse of office. |
|
|
Novgorod region |
Shalmuev Arnold. First Vice Governor. In April 2013, he was arrested on charges of embezzling budget funds. In March 2016 he was sentenced to 8 years and 10 months in prison. In November 2016, dismissed from office after the entry into force of the verdict. Nechaev Victor. Vice Governor. Arrested in August 2015 on charges of attempted fraud. In August 2016 he was sentenced to 3 years in prison. |
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|
Novosibirsk region |
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|
Omsk region |
Hamburg Yuri. First Deputy Prime Minister. In June 2014, he was arrested on charges of fraud with land plots committed while working in the Omsk administration. In June 2016 he was sentenced to 5.5 years in prison. |
|
|
Orenburg region |
Pivunov Oleg. Minister of Sports. In October 2016, a criminal case was opened on charges of abuse of power. Temporarily removed from office. He is under house arrest. |
|
|
Oryol Region |
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|
Penza region |
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|
Pskov region |
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|
Rostov region |
Elena Skidan. Former Minister of Labor and Social Development. A suspended sentence for abuse of office. Sergey Sokolov... Head of the Transport Department of the Regional Ministry of Transport. The criminal case on charges of abuse of power has been sent to court. |
|
|
Ryazan Oblast |
Andreev Dmitry. Deputy Prime Minister. In October 2015, he was arrested on charges of taking bribes. In March 2016, another criminal case was initiated for accepting a bribe. Is under arrest. |
|
|
Samara Region |
Nekrasov Roman... Deputy Minister of Agriculture. A criminal case is being investigated on suspicion of negligence. |
|
|
Saratov region |
||
|
Sakhalin Region |
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|
Sverdlovsk region |
Sidorenko Alexander. And about. Minister of Transport. In November 2016, searches were carried out as part of a criminal case on charges of illegal business activity. A few days later he was dismissed. |
|
|
Smolensk region |
Julia Novikova... Former head of the regional department for social development. Under house arrest, suspected of embezzlement |
|
|
Tambov Region |
||
|
Tver region |
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|
Tomsk region |
Trubitsyn Andrey. Former lieutenant governor. Charged with abuse of power. In August 2016 he was sentenced to 4 years of probation. Knyazev Alexey. Former lieutenant governor. Sentenced in September 2015 to 5 years of probation on charges of embezzlement while working at a university. In September 2016 he was sentenced to 5 years of probation. |
|
|
Tula region |
||
|
Tyumen region |
Mitrofanov Pavel. Former lieutenant governor. In October 2015, he was put on the international wanted list on charges of bribery. |
|
|
Ulyanovsk region |
||
|
Chelyabinsk region |
Sandakov Nikolay. Deputy Governor. In March 2015, he was arrested on suspicion of accepting a bribe, and charges were also filed for illegal access to computer information (then reclassified as fraud). In March 2016, he was released on bail, but a few days later he was detained on suspicion of taking a bribe from the director of a private security company, which provided security services to the regional authorities. In April 2016 he was transferred to house arrest. Serebrennikov Yuri... Former Minister of Sports. Sentenced to 5 years in prison for receiving multimillion-dollar bribes. |
|
|
Yaroslavskaya oblast |
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|
Moscow |
||
|
St. Petersburg |
Hovhannisyan Marat. Former lieutenant governor. In November 2016, he was arrested on charges of fraud during the construction of the Zenit Arena stadium. |
|
|
Jewish Autonomous Region |
Solntsev Victor. Chairman of the Property Management Committee. Released from office after being accused of abuse of power. |
|
|
Nenets Autonomous Okrug |
Drozdov Nikolay... Head of Property and Land Resources Department. Sentenced to 6 years in prison and a fine of 12.5 million rubles for accepting a bribe on an especially large scale |
|
|
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug |
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|
Chukotka Autonomous District |
||
|
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District |
Kucherenko Vyacheslav... Former head of the agro-industrial complex department. Provisional sentence for embezzlement Stepanov Vasily... Vice Governor. He resigned after searches in the framework of a criminal case of fraud, one of the defendants of which is his father, Deputy Director of the Microfinance Fund for Small Businesses Valery Stepanov |
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|
Crimea |
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|
Sevastopol |
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The governors are the only judge in Russia whose sweater is raised under the arches of the sports palace. He hangs in his native Ryazan for Viktor Mikhailovich, recalling his long and glorious career. The local club is taking care of the governors as best he can, in addition, he continues to travel around the country, inspecting the KHL matches. His refereeing career began in 1976 and included the matches of the union championship, world championships, Super Series and ended already in the Russian championship. On the eve of the anniversary, the KHL press service correspondent talked to the master.
When asked about my well-being, I usually answer: “You won’t wait,” laughs the Governors. - But seriously, everything is fine, thanks. Sometimes I go out on the ice when hockey legends come to us. I go out and remember ... Although, I did not forget anything. Because, having sued for 20 years, I am still in good shape, in good shape, I continue to work for the good of hockey.
Surely, in addition to work, it is also a pleasure to communicate with our famous players whom you know well.
Naturally. I worked at their matches when they were just starting their careers. Last week we opened a new ice palace in Ryazan; Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu came. The match with the participation of hockey legends was timed to coincide with this opening. By the way, I also inspected it, because there were three young judges, very promising guys. Good texture, skating. But the main thing is that there is a desire to work. This is the main thing.
- You inspect the KHL matches. How do you like the current championship?
Very strong and very interesting. Lots of good contact wrestling. As for the judges, I have known all these guys for a very long time. Many have come to our place in Ryazan for the annual pre-season tournament. Kostya Olenin, Lesha Ravodin, Lesha Anisimov. They ride with great pleasure. So, back to the championship and refereeing. We have very good guys working, and lately they have grown great, have improved their skills. They work objectively and honestly, competently. And it pleases.
- Nevertheless, in the media now there is just a wave of criticism of refereeing ...
Perhaps this is due to the fact that people do not understand the intricacies of hockey. It is clear that managers, heads of clubs are investing a lot of money. Everyone strives to be the first. But only one person can become a champion. Therefore, conversations begin: "Why was there a violation here, but not here?" You can't do without them, it's a living organism. But I also know the main thing - our judges have no bias. The pressure on them is tremendous, so the most persistent and most competent remained in the playoffs. But I can say that those who were not included in the number of judges serving the Gagarin Cup matches are ready to work at a high level.
- Give advice to colleagues: how can they resist such a press?
I always tell them: show character, no matter what.
In addition to the outside press, there were more controversies on the ice. Players and coaches alike often question the referee's decision. How did you deal with this?
I agree that there are indeed more disputes. The higher the status of the player, the more often he tries to talk to the referee. But here's Fetisov. So what was the authoritative player, the captain of the national team. And then he drove up to the judges only when they were allowed. And today they enter into polemics on any occasion. It doesn't paint players. Coaches also argue. I’m not saying that this was not the case in my time. I fined my dear Viktor Tikhonov immensely three times. For interfering with the actions of the arbiter. Then we talked, recalled these cases, and each remained unconvinced. But on the ice, the referee must, in principle, maintain his position. And do not swallow insults. Punish, regardless of titles and titles. If the judge is wrong, he will be dealt with. First of all, the inspector of the match. And then now there is a good technical equipment of the games. Any step of the judge can be examined under a microscope and the correct decision can be made. This is exactly what the department of refereeing does.
It is also frustrating that there is more simulation now. Yes, hockey is a traumatic sport. But guys, you don't play chess. I myself was a player, I know what injuries are. But to writhe and beg for a foul ... When, after a player has received a large penalty, the allegedly injured one comes out in the next shift - this does not paint a hockey player. And the judge also finds himself in an unpleasant situation, he feels that he may have made a mistake.
You mentioned technical innovations. In this playoffs, a coach's request procedure has been introduced, in which some decisions of the referees after viewing can be canceled. Are such innovations correct?
This is fine. This makes it possible for coaches, players and spectators to see the logic of the decision of the referees in a particular episode and, in the end, relieves tension. Technique is of great help to referees. After all, some centimeters can sometimes affect the outcome of the match. Here justice prevails, everyone is happy.
- What can you wish the referees who are going to work in the decisive playoff matches?
I will not wish for objectivity, since I have no shadow of a doubt about their honesty and professionalism. So good games and good work.