13th odshbr captain voropaev. The difference between the DShB and the Airborne Forces: their history and composition. An idea makes its way
The rapid and coordinated entry of troops into Czechoslovakia led to the fact that within 36 hours the armies of the countries Warsaw Pact established complete control over the Czechoslovak territory.
However, despite the obvious military success, it was not possible to achieve political goals. The leaders of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and after them the XIV Extraordinary Congress of the Party, already on August 21, condemned the introduction of allied troops. Representatives of the conservative-minded group of delegates at the congress were not elected to any of the leadership positions in the HRC.
On October 17, 1968, a phased withdrawal of allied troops from the territory of Czechoslovakia began, which was completed by mid-November.
By a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated February 22, 1969, the 80th Airborne Regiment of the 104th Guards Airborne Division was awarded the Order of the Red Star for the successful completion of combat missions in restoring order in Czechoslovakia.
PARATROOPERS
In the mid-60s, due to the active development of helicopters (with their amazing ability to land and take off almost anywhere), the idea of creating special military units that could land by helicopters behind enemy tactical lines in order to assist the advancing ground forces was born. Unlike the Airborne Forces, these new units were supposed to land only by landing, and unlike the Special Forces of the GRU, they had to operate with fairly large forces, including using armored vehicles and other heavy weapons.
To confirm (or refute) the theoretical conclusions, it was necessary to conduct large-scale practical exercises that would put everything in its place.
In 1967, during the Dnepr-67 strategic exercises, an experimental 1st air assault brigade was formed on the basis of the 51st Guards PDP. The brigade was led by the head of the combat training department of the Airborne Forces, Major General Kobzar. The brigade landed on helicopters on the bridgehead on the Dnieper and completed the task assigned to it. According to the results of the exercises, appropriate conclusions were drawn, and starting from 1968, the formation of the first air assault brigades in the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal military districts began as part of the ground forces.
On the basis of the directive of the General Staff of May 22, 1968, by August 1970, the 13th Air Assault Brigade was formed in the settlements of Nikolaevna and Zavitinsk, Amur Region, and the 11th Air Assault Brigade in the village of Mogocha, Chita Region.
Again, as in the very first airborne unit (airborne assault detachment of the Leningrad Military District), the "ground" unit received aviation under its control - two helicopter regiments with an air base each, which included an airfield support battalion and a separate Division of Communications and Radio Engineering.
The structure of the air assault brigades of the first formation was as follows:
Brigade management;
Three air assault battalions;
Artillery battalion;
Anti-aircraft artillery division;
Combat helicopter regiment with an air base;
Transport Helicopter Regiment with Air Base;
The rear of the brigade.
The air assault units mounted on helicopters were able to land in the form of a landing assault on any sector of the operational-tactical theater of operations and solve the assigned tasks on their own with fire support from combat helicopters. Experimental exercises were conducted with these brigades to develop tactics for the use of air assault units. Based on the experience gained, the General Staff gave recommendations for improving the organizational and staffing structure of such units.
It was assumed that the air assault brigades would operate in the tactical defense zone of the enemy. The range at which the battalions of air assault brigades were supposed to land did not exceed 70-100 km. In particular, as a confirmation, this is evidenced by the range of the communications equipment that entered service with the air assault formations. However, if we consider the specific theater of operations in which the brigades were deployed, it can be assumed that the purpose of the 11th and 13th brigade was to quickly close the poorly guarded section of the border with China in the event of a Chinese military invasion. Helicopters of the brigade's units could be landed anywhere, while the motorized rifle regiments of the 67th motorized rifle division located in that area (from Mogocha to Magdagachi) could only move on their own along the only road, which was very slow. Even after the helicopter regiments were withdrawn from the brigades (at the end of the 80s), the task of the brigades did not change, and the helicopter regiments were always deployed in close proximity.
In the early 70s, a new name for the brigades was adopted. From now on, they began to be called "airborne assault".
On November 5, 1972, by directive of the General Staff, and on November 16, 1972, and by order of the commander of the Transcaucasian Military District, by February 19, 1973, it was decided to form an air assault brigade in the Caucasian operational direction. In the city of Kutaisi, the 21st separate airborne assault brigade was formed.
Thus, by the mid-70s, the so-called Airborne Forces of the ground forces included three brigades:
11th brigade (military unit 21460), ZabVO (settlement of Mogocha, Chita region), consisting of: 617th, 618th, 619th brigade, 329th and 307th OVP;
13th Airborne Brigade (military unit 21463), Far Eastern Military District (settlement of Magdagachi, Amur Region), consisting of: 620th, 621st (Amazar), 622nd Airborne Brigade, 825th and 398th OVP ;
21st brigade (military unit 31571), ZakVO (Kutaisi, Georgia), consisting of: 802nd (military unit 36685, Tsulukidze), 803rd (military unit 55055), 804th (in / h 57351) odshb, 1059th oadn, 325th and 292nd ovp, 1863rd one siRTO, 303rd obo.
An interesting fact was that the battalions in these formations were separate units, while in the Airborne Forces separate part was only a regiment. From its inception to 1983 parachute training these brigades were not provided for and were not included in the combat training plans, in connection with which the personnel of the air assault brigades wore the uniform of motorized rifle troops with the corresponding insignia. form Airborne assault parts received only with an introduction to their combat training skydiving.
In 1973, the air assault brigades included:
Management (in the state of 326 people);
Three separate air assault battalions (according to the state, each battalion has 349 people);
Separate artillery battalion (171 staff members);
Aviation group (only 805 people in the state);
Separate division of communications and radio-technical support (190 employees);
A separate battalion of airfield technical support (410 people in the state).
New formations began active combat training. Not without accidents and disasters. In 1976, during a major exercise in the 21st brigade, a tragedy occurred: two Mi-8 helicopters collided in the air and crashed to the ground. As a result of the disaster, 36 people died. Similar tragedies occurred from time to time in all brigades - probably this was the terrible tribute that had to be paid for the possession of such highly mobile military units.
The experience gained by the new brigades turned out to be positive, and therefore, by the end of the 70s, the General Staff decided to form several more air assault brigades of front (district) subordination, as well as several separate air assault battalions of army subordination. Since the number of newly formed units and formations was quite large, in order to complete them, the General Staff went to the disbandment of one airborne division.
On the basis of the directive of the General Staff of August 3, 1979 No. 314/3/00746 by December 1, 1979, the 105th Guards Airborne Vienna Red Banner Division (111th, 345th, 351st, 383rd Guards PDP) , stationed in the city of Fergana, Uzbek SSR, was disbanded. The 345th regiment was reorganized into a separate airborne regiment and left in the southern operational direction. The personnel of the disbanded regiments and separate units went to the formation of air assault units and formations.
Air assault troops of the USSR
"... The nature of war can have a significant impact on the ratio of various branches of the military."
K. Clausewitz, "On War"
From the author
In this article, the author tried to summarize his knowledge of the airborne assault units Soviet army and, briefly formulating, lay them out for public viewing and study. Please note that this study is not definitive. First of all, this is due to the fact that there is still not a single official open (i.e. not secret) publication on the history of the DShV, their combat strength, not to mention their organizational and staffing structures, methods and methods of combat use, etc. Everything you read here was collected bit by bit, from many different sources - the vast majority of the work is based on surveys of veterans of the DShV, people who came into contact with them by the nature of their service, as well as a number of official documents.
Therefore, I ask you to judge me strictly, but fairly, because "... if in this book it is written by my rudeness or negligence, I pray you: do not look down on my reproach, do not curse, but correct, it was not an angel of God who wrote, but a sinful person and full of ignorance..."
The author expresses his deep gratitude to everyone who helped him by providing his memory and took the time to answer.
The author will be grateful to everyone who will express their opinion about the article, point out inaccuracies, inaccuracies, or vice versa, will be able to confirm the author's analysis (which was indispensable).
ON THE ESSENCE OF AIRDRESSING
Moment of the idea airborne assault, how the sending of military formations to the rear of the enemy by air arose, it is not known when. However, for a long time it had a strictly fantastic character, and only during the First World War, was it able to receive at least some material basis in the form of the creation of an air vehicle - an airplane-airplane. And if at first, the idea was exclusively of a sabotage and reconnaissance nature, then soon, in connection with the rapid development of aviation during the war years, with the creation of fairly reliable and roomy aircraft, began to take on a larger-scale logical view, which led to Mitchel's idea of \u200b\u200blanding in the rear of the German troops, first a division, and then an entire "airborne" army. However, we can only guess whether this project would have been realized, whether the war would have lasted another year or two, or not. In any case, after the end of the war, this idea, although it did not receive a serious material embodiment, continued to soar in the air, exciting the minds. The "positional nightmare" of the Western Front was in full view, and many innovative military theorists (or who consider themselves so) were persistently looking for innovative ways to prevent such a situation in the future.
Thus, for the airborne troops (VDV), the main, defining goal was immediately revealed - to assist the advancing groupings of ground forces. Almost the entire subsequent history of the use of airborne assaults (AD) confirms this thesis *.
* A special position is occupied by the VD to the islands. As a rule, they are carried out as part of assistance to amphibious assaults or in general as part of various-scale military operations at sea. That is, the role of the Ground Forces in this case is played by the Navy.
The absolute exception is the scandalous Cretan VD operation (VDO), which did not have a rigid link with the actions of either ground or sea forces; thus having a strictly independent character. However, if linkage with the Ground Forces was not possible for completely understandable and objective reasons, then weak communication with the fleet was forced.
Within the framework of such a goal, the Airborne Forces were also assigned the task, which consisted, as a rule, in capturing a certain area of \u200b\u200bthe terrain (usually behind the line of contact) and then holding it for a while (for example, until the approach of advancing ground forces).
A specific combat mission determines the methods and methods of action of the Airborne Forces, which consist in landing (dropping, disembarking), offensive (attack, assault) and defense.
This leads to common definition combat capabilities of the airborne formation, which are:
1. in the ability to capture a certain territory (a piece of land, an object), incl. attack and destroy (knock out) the enemy located there;
2. in the ability to organize an effective defense of the captured territory (object) for a certain period;
3. but, all this is subject to the condition of having the ability to be airlifted.
I needed such a lengthy introduction so that the reader (perhaps a completely outsider, but interested in the issue) immediately grasped the essence of the combat use of airborne assault forces.
BACKGROUND
The appearance of DShV is tightly linked with the appearance of helicopters, more precisely, with the creation of samples with the necessary set of properties. This has already happened in military history, when technological progress brought new types and types of armed forces to the arena of battles. However, there was another forerunner, which consisted in the peculiarities of the forms of combat use of the VD, expressed in their use as an integral part of operations on an operational-tactical scale.
... Alas, but apparently it is worth recognizing that the first air assault operations (actions) associated with the landing of relatively small landing forces were carried out by the Germans during the Second World War. Here is their list of some of them: Vordingborg Bridge (Denmark, 1940), Fort Eben-Emael (Belgium, 1940), bridges over the Albert Canal (Belgium, 1940), a complex of bridges across the Meuse (Holland, 1940), bridges through Zap. Dvina and Berezina (USSR, 1941). All of them fully fall under the definition of air assault operations, although they were carried out by the forces of the German Airborne Forces and special forces. All of them were carried out within the framework of the macro goal - to ensure the fastest possible advance of our ground troops, to block (detain) enemy troops in their positions, etc. The methods of landing at the same time were very different: parachute, landing on gliders, landing on airplanes. But in the subsequent years of the war, such landings were not actually used. The belligerents became interested in larger-scale VDOs, which, by themselves, are capable of influencing the overall operational-strategic situation at the front. In the same vein, post-war development continued, incl. and Soviet, the theory of the use of the Airborne Forces.
The reasons why the Soviet military command did not conduct tactical airborne assaults during the offensives of 1944-45. are not clear. There are likely three main factors involved.
Firstly, the failures of large-scale VDO somewhat undermined faith in the effectiveness of landings in general (in any case, with the existing material and technical base and general level organizations).
Secondly, the very idea of small landings probably seemed wrong; them possible results they were not seen as effective (although they were provided for by the "Instructions for the Combat Use of the Airborne Forces" of 1943 *).
Thirdly, the command simply did not consider it necessary to use them - i.e. believed that it was better to manage with tried and tested purely ground-based methods.
But this is all just speculation. Personally, it seems quite possible to the author to single out several dozens of excellent military transport aircraft Li-2 and S-47 from the many hundreds already available by 1944 (more than 1000 units by 1945) and throw them along the same paths along the parachute battalion supplies or to capture river bridgeheads - in some cases this could already significantly facilitate the actions of ground forces. But what was, was.
... In the late 1940s, unexpectedly for everyone, helicopters just burst onto the scene - a new class of aircraft. Helicopters (which at this moment reaches a level of technical excellence sufficient for combat use) have successfully proven themselves in the Incheon Maritime landing operation(MDO) and in the subsequent actions of US troops in Korea. Hurrying domestic designers present a rather successful car - the Mi-4 - which starts from 1953. enlist in the army en masse.
Already in 1954, the first large-scale experimental landing was carried out from 36 infantry helicopters with vehicles and artillery. A number of experimental exercises were also carried out (including with the real use of nuclear weapons) to land helicopter landings of a battalion and regimental scale behind enemy lines ... However, the matter died out on that. That is, no organizational measures for the creation of specialized formations were adopted.
The reasons for this appear to be the following:
Firstly, negative role the "Khrushchev-rocket" factor played.
Secondly, the overdimension of the Airborne Forces - they were in the first half of the 1950s. have as many as 15 divisions; and to have some other airborne units is already impudence, especially since the "Khrushchev" general reduction of the Armed Forces has begun.
Thirdly, the nuclear paranoia that had finally struck the world by this time did not leave a place in the battle formations for clean (without the protection of armored personnel carriers) riflemen-infantry; the helicopter was seen as too "fragile" compared to the armored personnel carrier.
Fourth, in addition to the paratrooper units of the Airborne Forces, there were in abundance until 1957 and rifle divisions, units of both of them, could, if such a task was set, be parachuted from helicopters behind enemy lines.
And finally fifth, brought up on the power of tank armored fists to Soviet military leaders, clumsy, slow and poorly protected flying cuttlefish with a propeller on top (this is in the age of "jet speeds" and swift licked aerodynamics!) Did not seem to be the means that could give the troops new hitherto unseen opportunities.
TRIAL STEP
Capitalists
In general, the Americans had a similar situation with the theory of VDO. The following phrase of the American Airborne Forces General James Gavin from his book "Airborne Warfare" can serve as a better illustration: "...<воздушно-десантные>troops should be used en masse, not in small groups. and only where their actions can have a decisive influence, and not in many points where they can only reach local tactical successes." However, their experience of the war on what later became known as the "poorly equipped theater of operations", i.e. on the Korean Peninsula, made the American command think about it and act more flexibly. The helicopter showed itself to be a very promising means of transportation in mountainous conditions. wooded area and lack of roads.The number of helicopters jumps strongly - by the end of the war, in the composition army aviation there were already 1140 units, while at the beginning there were only 56 units. The American command is also creating an experimental formation - the 11th Air Assault Division (Air Assault Division). On its basis and on the basis of two more formations (10th Air Transport Brigade and 2nd Infantry Division) in July 1965, the 1st Cavalry (Airmobile) Division - Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was created (more precisely, reorganized from the existing one). A significant innovation was the fact that helicopters were also introduced into the composition of its combat units for the first time as a transport and combat vehicle. total number up to 434 (428 according to other data) units. The division was deployed to Vietnam at the end of the same month. And even despite the lack of a proper theoretical study of airmobile (helicopter-landing) operations, not to mention the corresponding practical exercises, it showed itself from the best side. Of course, not only this division had helicopters. All American divisions in Vietnam had a large number of helicopters. So if in ser. 1967 was ok. 2000 units, then in 1968 their number reached 4200 units!
Generally speaking, if in Korea helicopters only announced their existence and their prospects were rather vague, then the Vietnam War elevated the helicopter to the zenith of fame and popularity. Until that time, they were still perceived rather as a kind of exotic, purely auxiliary purposes. The Americans fell in love with helicopters so much that some hotheads began to argue about the decline of parachute (from aircraft) landing as such.
We have
Such an active and such a successful use of helicopters made an impression on the Soviet command. The idea is being revived - in the course of the Dnepr-67 strategic exercises, mainly on the basis of the 51st Guards. PDP formed an experimental consolidated 1st airborne brigade under the command of the beginning. Department of Combat Training of the Airborne Forces Major-General Kobzar. It is used to capture a bridgehead across the Dnieper, where a motorized rifle battalion deployed by helicopters with attached self-propelled guns also participates. In a specially created working group at the General Staff, theoretical developments and experiments are carried out. And now, according to the results of these works, no later than the end of 1967. a decision is made to form completely new military formations for the Soviet Army - separate air assault brigades (ovshbr). Based on the directive of the General Staff of May 22, 1968. in June 1968, the formation of the 11th (ZBVO) and 13th (FAR) brigades begins. By mid-July, the brigades had already been formed. (According to other data, the 13th brigade was finally formed only by July-August 1970). In 1973, a third brigade was added to them - the 21st in Kutaisi (WKVO).
Brigades were formed, as they say, with " clean slate". Officers and soldiers from the districts were sent to staff them, and officers from the Airborne Forces were appointed only to the positions of specialists in the airborne service (VDS) and to the positions of brigade commanders (for example, the former commander of the 51st Guards PDP Colonel Reznikov).
But even here, a number of subjective factors of the peculiarities of Soviet military thought played a role. Due to the distrust of the Soviet military leadership in the infantry, the underestimation of its combat capabilities, especially on an operational scale, such brigades were considered not strong enough to operate on EuroTVD. That is why they were deployed in directions with a lesser threat compared to the western one - it was considered expedient to have them only for operations on mountainous-wooded (taiga) terrain, difficult for ground equipment, where the focality of hostilities was inevitable. Both Far Eastern brigades were intended not so much to carry out landings behind enemy lines in the usual way, but to cover a large section of the Soviet-Chinese border. (There was even a poster of visual propaganda with a somewhat surreal inscription: "Attack paratrooper - time limit".) The aviation component of each of the brigades was represented by an air group consisting of two full-time helicopter regiments. At the same time, the air and ground components had different administrative subordination: the ground component - to the High Command of the Army, and the air - to the High Command of the Air Force; which inevitably created a number of serious problems in the organization of interaction.
For the implementation of air operational-tactical and tactical landings on EuroTV, it was planned to involve ordinary paratroopers or motorized rifle units (companies and battalions), pulling them out of airborne and combined arms divisions.
A little about terminology should also be said here. It is not good to use the terms created by the capitalists, and by 1971, domestic names and terminology were selected; brigades and their battalions; as well as the methods of their combat use were renamed air assault. Thus, the American terms "air assault" and "airmobile" gradually ceased to be applied to the Soviet DShCh and began to be mentioned in official documents only in relation to foreign formations of this type.
By the end of 1971, all existing brigades were reorganized into air assault brigades with changes in the organizational and staffing structure (OShS).
IDEA PAVES THE WAY
"Volumes"
In the 70s. behind the thick walls of the buildings of the General Staff, the Ministry of Defense and research institutions, a scientific discussion, clearly serious in its intensity and extremely important in its consequences, was unfolding, combined with an undercover and behind-the-scenes struggle of opinions, calculations and ambitions ...
In 1975, a working group led by Lieutenant General I. Yurkovskiy put forward the idea of creating a new type of operation - the so-called. "bulk operation" instead of, as they claimed, the obsolete concept of "deep operation". Its essence was not to "gnaw through" the enemy's defense, but to "jump" over it, bypassing the infection zones and defense nodes - thus the pace of the offensive increased sharply. The idea was supported by some military leaders (lieutenant generals I. Dzhordzhadze and G. Demidkov) and deepened. The question was raised about the global change of the entire theory of operations; the creation of a fundamentally new "air echelon" of ground troops.
The implementation of such an idea required a radical change in priorities in military development and fundamentally pushed back the positions of the supporters of armored armadas who dominated the military leadership. However, instead of an objective assessment of the military perspective, instead of an understanding of the dialectics of development, departmentalism and inflexibility prevailed, and the "volumes" were crushed...
New wave
And yet, the "traditionalists" still had to make room a little - painfully interesting arguments were presented by the "volumizers". In the middle of 1978 the new head of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, it was decided to form, in addition to the already existing three brigades (11th, 13th and 21st), a second wave of air assault units of two types.
Firstly, eight separate air assault brigades of district (group) subordination:
July 11, 1968 Trans-Baikal Military District Mogocha and Amazar (Chita region)*
July 13, 1968 Far Eastern Military District Magdagachi (Amur Region)*
21 odshbr 1973 Transcaucasian Military District Kutaisi and Tsulukidze (Georgia)
35 Guards. odshbr december 1979 group Soviet troops in Germany, Cottbus (GDR)**
36 odshbr December 1979 Leningrad VO township. Garbolovo (Leningrad region)
December 37, 1979 Baltic Military District Chernyakhovsk (Kaliningrad region)
38 Guards. Vienna December 1979 Belarusian Military District Brest (Belarus)
odshbr
December 39, 1979 Carpathian Military District Khyrov (Ukraine)
40 odshbr December 1979 Odessa Military District with. Velyka Korenikha - Nikolaev (Ukraine)
56 Guards. odshbr December 1979 Turkestan Military District settlement. Azadbash (district, Chirchik, Uzbekistan) ***
57 odshbr December 1979 Central Asian VO town. Aktogay (Taldy-Kurgan region, Kazakhstan)
Notes:
* Elements of the air groups of these brigades could be deployed separately.
** Literally ok. month, the brigade was originally referred to as the 14th Guards, and only in January 1980 received the 35th number.
*** Formally, the 56th Guards. the brigade is considered to be formed in Chirchik on the basis of 351 guards. pdp. However, de facto, its deployment for entry into Afghanistan was carried out separately in four centers (Chirchik, Kapchagay, Fergana, Iolotan), and brought together into a single whole just before the entry into Afghanistan in Termez. The headquarters of the brigade (or officer cadre), as its formal cadre, was originally stationed in Chirchik.
Secondly, twenty separate LH battalions:
48 odshb December 1979 Turkestan Military District,
1st AK / 40th OA (*) location unknown
139 odshb December 1979 Baltic Military District,
11th Guards. OA Kaliningrad (Kaliningrad region)
145 odshb December 1979 Far Eastern Military District,
5th OA settlement Sergeevka (Primorsky Territory)
899 odshb December 1979 Group of Soviet troops in Germany,
20th Guards OA Burg (GDR)
900 odshb December 1979 Group of Soviet troops in Germany,
8th Guards OA Leipzig - Schinau (GDR)
901 odshb December 1979 The Central Group of Forces in the district of the settlement. Riechki (Czechoslovakia)
902 odshb December 1979 Southern Group of Forces of Kecskemét (Hungary)
903 odshb December 1979 Belarusian Military District,
28th OA, Brest (Southern), since 1986 - Grodno (Belarus)
904 odshb December 1979 Carpathian Military District,
13th OA Vladimir-Volynsky (Ukraine)
905 odshb December 1979 Odessa Military District,
14th OA, Bendery (Moldova)
906 odshb December 1979 Trans-Baikal Military District,
36th OA settlement Khada-Bulak (Chita region, district of Borzya)
907 odshb December 1979 Far Eastern Military District,
43rd AK / 47th OA Birobidzhan (Jewish Autonomous Region)
908 odshb December 1979 Kyiv Military District,
1st Guards OA of Konotop, since 1984 - town. Goncharovo (Ukraine, Chernihiv region)
1011 odshb December 1979 Belarusian Military District,
5th Guards TA Art. Maryina Gorka - Pukhovichi (Belarus)
1044 odshb December 1979 Group of Soviet troops in Germany,
1st Guards TA city of Neuss-Lager (GDR, in the region of Königsbrück)
1156 odshb December 1979 Carpathian Military District,
8th TA Novograd-Volynsky (Ukraine, Zhytomyr region)
1179 odshb December 1979 Leningrad Military District,
6th OA, Petrozavodsk (Karelia)
1151 odshb December 1979 Belarusian Military District,
7th TA Polotsk (Belarus)
1185 odshb December 1979 Group of Soviet troops in Germany,
2nd Guards TA Ravensbrück (GDR)
1604 odshb December 1979 Trans-Baikal Military District,
29th OA of Ulan-Ude (Buryat Autonomous District)
Notes:
* Literally a few months after the formation, 48 odshb (or, presumably, the 148th) was merged into the 66th brigade (omsbr) in Afghanistan. In general, as part of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces (OKSV) in Afghanistan, there were two brigades of a special organization known "to the people" as the 66th and 70th separate motorized rifle (but in reality bearing the name "detachment combined arms brigade" - brig.) . In their composition there was one odshb.
During August-December 1979, these units were basically created.
In 1984, 83 odshbr and two individual regiment- 1318th and 1319th odshp for full-time Operational-maneuvering groups (OMG) - they are also - the so-called. Separate army corps (UAC). And in 1986, several more brigades were formed - the 23rd, 128th and 130th.
23 odshbr 1986 High Command of the South-Western Direction (GK YuZN) Kremenchug (Ukraine)
58 odshbr 1986 (assumed) Kyiv Military District Kremenchug (Ukraine)
83 odshbr 1984 Northern Group of Forces Bialogard (Poland)
128 odshbr 1986 (assumed) High Command of the Southern Direction (GK YUN) Stavropol (Stavropol AK)
130 odshbr 1986 (assumed) High Command of the Far East Troops (GK VDV) Abakan (Khakas Autonomous Okrug)
1318 odshp 1984 Belarusian Military District, 5th Guards. UAC Borovuha-1 - Borogla (Polotsk region, Belarus)
1319 odshp 1984 Trans-Baikal Military District, N-th KLA, Kyakhta (Chita region)
Thus, at the end of 1986, the Soviet Army had 16 brigades, 2 regiments and 20 detachments. battalions. The total staffing of DShCh for war time was 65-70 thousand people. However, in peacetime, the units were kept in a greatly reduced composition - an average of approx. 31-34 thousand people At the same time, along with well-equipped brigades and battalions, many had only a frame for mobilization deployment.
The principle by which the numbering of brigades and regiments was carried out is not known to me. But, it can be argued with a certain accuracy that it was the same for odshbr, obrSpN and omsbr - i.e. within all SWs. The differences in the numbering of the odshb are due to the three consecutive orders by which they were formed. However, these explanations I have heard seem insufficient.
Subordination
Many are interested in the question - were the DShCh included in composition of the Airborne Forces? In short, no, they didn't. DShCh were part of the High Command of the SV (GK SV). Does this mean in this case that the military personnel of the DShCh are not airborne? Does not mean. The organizational, administrative affiliation of the DShCh to the GK SV is simply a feature of the existing Soviet military organization. Being subordinate to the GK SV DShCh, they were directly subordinate to the command of combined arms formations - corps, armies, fronts in wartime, military districts and groups of troops - in peacetime. Moreover, the same situation was repeated with them as with special forces - there were such combat units, but there were no such troops. There was the command of the commander of the tank troops, motorized rifle, but there was no command of the commander of the air assault troops. Formally speaking, there were no such troops themselves, just as there were no special forces. This situation affected the DShV in the most unfavorable way. They became the stepson of two stepmothers at once - on the one hand, the Airborne Forces, and on the other hand, the Civil Code of the SV. "Second-class" (this was especially true in the first years of existence) position in the secret intra-army hierarchy led to corresponding backfire: worse attention to problems, worse supply, less attention to recruiting and training, etc. In the minds of the officers of both the Airborne Forces and the SV, their definition in the DShV was often considered a "link" (perhaps with the exception of units in groups of troops - there, all places, of course, were valued higher).
Operationally ( combat use), parts of the DShV were subordinate to the command of combined arms formations - armies and fronts (districts, groups of troops). The development of methods and forms of their combat use of DShV units and their training was in charge of the combat training department of the Civil Code of the SV together with the BP department of the Airborne Forces command. The general principles of the combat use of the DShV lay on the conscience of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.
In December 1989, a decision was made to transfer the LH units to the administrative and operational subordination of the Airborne Forces command.
This had two opposite consequences.
On the one hand, this had a positive effect in the sense that DShCh thus found a "father" instead of a suspicious stepfather and an evil stepmother, and their status immediately increased and acquired a "legitimate" look.
But on the other hand, the close interaction of the headquarters of the DShCh with the previously superior, and now unknown as related, headquarters of the combined arms formations was disrupted. DShV, designed to act in the interests of combined arms formations, ceased to obey their command, which, in my opinion, drastically reduced the effectiveness of their combat use. Apparently the best solution would be such a subordination scheme: administratively - to the commander of the Airborne Forces (manning, development of methods and forms of action, weapons and military equipment, uniforms and equipment), operationally (combat use) - to the commander of operational and operational-strategic formations in whose interests this formation expected to be used.
However, when it began in 1989. In the collapse of the Soviet Armed Forces, all this already played little role. But that is another story…
Differences between the Airborne Forces and the DShV
If the Airborne Forces, according to the established opinion, are characterized by their use in the form of large-scale (1-2 airborne divisions) airborne operations (ADO) with goals and objectives of an operational and operational-strategic nature to a great depth (up to 100-150 km and more) , then the idea of \u200b\u200busing DShV lies in the field rather purely tactical or, at most, operational-tactical. If, for the Airborne Forces, the issue of organizing interaction with the Ground Forces (SV) is not tough - they are thrown out in the interests of at least the front (a group of fronts), and even the Supreme High Command (VGK), then for the DShV this is very urgent. As a matter of fact, DShCh do not even have their own goals, but only a task. (They operate within the framework of the goal set by their senior commander - the combined arms commander. This "macro-target" determines the "micro-target" of the landing forces, it also determines the task, composition of forces, method of application.) is produced in accordance with the goals and objectives of the ground combined arms command authority, as a rule, at the level of the army-corps, or, in some cases, even divisions. The hierarchically younger the command instance, the smaller, as a rule, the scale of the forces involved by the LH. If the Airborne Forces operate in divisions, then the DShV - in companies and battalions, less often - in a brigade / regiment.
Acquisition
To create and staff the "second wave" of the DShCh, it was decided to disband the 105th Guards. airborne division and 80th guards. pdp 104th airborne division. Officers and soldiers of military districts and groups of troops were sent for resupplying. So, the 36th brigade was formed on the basis of the 237th guards. PDP (he was framed) who singled out the officers and units of the Leningrad Military District; 38th Vienna - based on the staff officers of the 105th Guards. Airborne Forces, as well as officers and soldiers of the military unit of the Belarusian Military District.
In the DShCh military districts, most of the officers were from the military districts: for the odshb, only commanders were selected from the Airborne Forces, the rest from the districts; in the odshb groups of troops, the deputy battalion commander was added to the battalion commander, as well as, in part, the company commanders. To complete the newly created parts, in 1979. in military schools preparing officers for the Airborne Forces, recruitment was increased, and from 1983-84. already most of the officers went to the DShV being trained under the Airborne Forces program. Basically, they were appointed to the Oshbr of groups of troops, less often - to the Oshbr of districts, and even less often to the Oshb. In 1984-85. officers were shuffled in groups of troops - almost all officers were replaced in the DShV. All this increased the percentage of airborne officers (plus - replacements in Afghanistan). But at the same time, the most prepared graduates of military schools and academies were always distributed in the Airborne Forces. True, it was not without patronage, but this only concerned the distribution into groups of troops - there was a war in Afghanistan, airborne officers went there in the second circle, and the temptation to attach their own away was great.
With regard to recruitment by conscripts, the same medical requirements and other selection rules were applied to the DShCh as for the Airborne Forces. The most healthy and physically developed draft contingent was singled out. High selection requirements (height - not less than 173 cm; physical development - not lower than average; education - not lower than average, no medical restrictions, etc.) led to fairly high opportunities for combat training.
Unlike the Airborne Forces, which had their own large "Gayzhunai training" - the 44th Airborne Division; The DShVs were staffed by junior commanders and specialists who had mostly graduated from the training divisions of the Ground Forces and, to a lesser extent, by the Gayzhunay pupils.
Outfit and equipment
Due to the fact that the DShV were organizationally part of the Ground Forces, initially their uniforms, equipment and allowances almost completely corresponded to those in the motorized rifle troops. The command did not want to pay attention to the inconsistency of a number of elements of the combined arms uniform and equipment with the landing specifics, it did not take into account the moral factor either. In general, until ser. 1983, the entire l / s DShV went in the usual form of motorized riflemen - however, for a very obvious discrepancy, the standard duffel bags-sidors were replaced with RD-54 landing backpacks. However, at the same time, there were also "hazing" deviations from this rule. So, one could see airborne "birds" on red buttonholes, and those who were dismissed from active service tried to get a "normal" paratrooper uniform - with a vest and a beret - and in this form go "for demobilization". For parachute jumps, so-called. "Jump" overalls of the Airborne Forces.
In the summer of 1983, literally before the death of the Secretary General of the CPSU L.I. Brezhnev, it was decided to normalize the situation and transfer the DSHV to supply standards and airborne uniform, which was done by the spring of next year almost everywhere. Both soldiers and officers willingly put on blue berets and vests, quickly getting rid of the hateful and despised "red color".
For a combat situation, you can outline standard view soviet paratrooper. Underwear including and a vest (a T-shirt, with a long sleeve and a double-knit vest, that is, insulated); so-called greenish-olive jumpsuit; a head-hugging cloth helmet (in winter - insulated with a lining), boots with side lacing (or, less often, with belts); finally - camouflage KZS (protective mesh suit) or a special camouflage suit. In winter, a warm suit was worn, consisting of a short jacket and trousers; all khaki. Equipment (ammunition) - depending on the specialty. Mandatory for everyone - the backpack of the paratrooper RD-54. In addition to it, there could be: additional combined-arms pouches for AK magazines, a pouch for magazines for SVD sniper rifles, cases for carrying shots for RPGs, etc. For parachute jumps, special cases were used under weapon and cargo container GK-30.
Also, in Ser. In the 80s, to supply the DShV, a BVD transport and unloading vest was developed that was structurally reminiscent of the GeDeer landing vest. However, he never entered the army en masse.
ORGANIZATION AND WEAPONS
Speaking about the organizational and staffing structure (OShS) and the equipment of subunits and units of the DShV with weapons and equipment (AME), the following reservations should immediately be made. Firstly, the same rules and features apply to the DShV that were characteristic of the entire SA, namely, some differences in the OShS and equipment of weapons and military equipment from part to part. Secondly, changes over time - the OShS and the equipment of weapons and military equipment gradually changed. This applied both to the lower divisions and the general structure of the units. Thirdly, the author has not yet been able to establish the OSH with 100% accuracy in accordance with time periods and local features; which is connected with the notorious regime of secrecy in force in the USSR Armed Forces.
All this makes the problem of restoring the historical OShS DShV quite problematic and requires a separate serious study. Below, I give only the principal structure of the ODSHBR and ODSHB.
Unfortunately, in detail, the initial organization of the air assault brigades is not known to me. Therefore, we will have to limit ourselves only to the general structure. Structurally, the brigade consisted of: an air group consisting of two helicopter regiments - combat (bvp) and transport-combat (tbvp), a total of 80 Mi-8T, 20 Mi-6A and 20 Mi-24A; three paratroopers (airborne standard for the Airborne Forces OShS) and one air assault (the airborne assault had the original OShS reinforced compared to the airborne assault rifle) battalion. The brigades also had artillery, anti-tank, anti-aircraft and special units. It is believed that the brigades had a fairly powerful composition, in general, not typical for the Soviet landing units of that period. The brigade had the status of a tactical association - i.e. was equal to the division.
Organizational structure of the 11th, 13th and 21st divisions for the 1970s:
brigade management
- three air assault companies(SPG-9D, AGS-17, PK, RPG-7D, RPKS, AKMS)
- anti-tank battery (SPG-9MD)
- platoons: reconnaissance, anti-aircraft missile (MANPADS Strela-2M), communications, support, first-aid post.
- an air group (until 1977, from this year - only a helicopter regiment), consisting of:
- combat helicopter regiment (Mi-24, Mi-8)
- transport and combat helicopter regiment (Mi-8 and Mi-6)
- a separate battalion of airfield technical support (two companies of communications and RT support, two technical units, a security company)
- mortar battery (120 mm M PM-38)
- anti-tank battery (12 anti-tank systems "Malyutka", later - "Fagot")
- jet battery (140-mm MLRS RPU-16) - soon disbanded
- reconnaissance company
- communication company
- engineering sapper company
- repair company
- commandant's platoon
- orchestra.
Notes:
1. Battalions, air group and helicopter regiments had their own numbers:
- in 11 odshbr: 617, 618 and 619 dep. air assault battalions; 211 air group consisting of 307 and 329 helicopter regiments (until 1977, from this year - only 329 helicopter regiments).
- at 13 odshbr: ..., ... and ... dep. air assault battalions, ... an air group consisting of 825 and ... helicopter regiments (until 1977).
- in 21 odshbr: 802, 803 and 804 dep. air assault battalions, 1171 air groups consisting of 292 and 325 helicopter regiments (until 1977, from this year - only 325 helicopter regiments).
2. In addition to those indicated in the brigade, there were also the following units: a company of young soldiers (RMS), a club, a special department of the KGB with a security platoon, economic structures.
Organizational structure of the 23rd, 35th Guards, 36th, 37th, 38th Guards, 39th, 40th, 57th, 58th and 128th Airborne Brigade for 1979-88 :
brigade management
- three airborne companies (ATGM "Metis", 82-mm M, AGS-17, RPG-16, PK, AKS-74, RPKS-74)
- platoons: anti-aircraft missile (Strela-2M / -3), communications, support, first-aid post.
- one (4th) air assault (in armored vehicles) battalion:
- three air assault companies (BMD-1 / -1P, BTRD, 82-mm M, RPG-16, PK, AKS-74, RPKS-74)
- from 1981 - a mortar battery (120-mm M PM-38) was added, and from the beginning. 1983 it is replaced by a self-propelled artillery battery (120 mm SAO 2S9 Nona) *
- platoons: grenade launcher (AGS-17), anti-aircraft missile (Strela-2M / -3), communications, support, first-aid post.
- reactive battery (122-mm MLRS BM-21V Grad-V)
- mortar battery (120 mm M)
- anti-aircraft missile division (in some brigades since 1982) **:
- two anti-aircraft missile batteries (SZRK Strela-10M)
- anti-aircraft missile battery (MANPADS Strela-3)
- platoons: management, support.
- anti-aircraft missile and artillery battery (ZU-23, Strela-3) - until 1982.
- anti-tank battery (BTR-RD, Fagot)
- reconnaissance company (BMD-1, BTRD, SBR-3)
- communication company
- engineering sapper company
- landing support company
- automobile company
- medical company
- repair company
- transport and economic company (since 1986)
- a platoon of radiochemical reconnaissance, and since 1984, in part of the brigades - a company of radiochemical and biological protection
- command platoon of the chief of artillery
- commandant's platoon
- orchestra.
Notes:
* Initially (1979-81), there was no minbatr in the dshb.
** The anti-aircraft division was in the majority of the odshbr since 1983. For some time, the ZSU-23-4 "Shilka" was also in the 35th guards odshbr.
The total number of the brigade deployed in wartime states reached 2.8-3.0 thousand people.
Some brigades had a structure different from the one presented above. So, the organizational structure of the 83rd brigade was distinguished by the presence of only two paratroopers (1st and 2nd) and one airborne assault (3rd) battalions. And the organizational structure of the 56th Guards. brigade fought in 1980-89. in Afghanistan, it was distinguished by the presence of three airborne assault (1st, 2nd, 3rd) and one paratrooper (4th) battalions. The brigade had a non-standard organization, moreover, changing over time.
Organizational structure of the 11th, 13th and 21st divisions for 1979-88:
brigade management
- three (1st, 2nd, 3rd) separate air assault (foot) battalions:
- three air assault companies (82-mm M, ATGM Fagot, AGS-17, PK, RPG-7D, RPKS-74, AKS-74)
- anti-tank battery (ATGM Fagot, SPG-9MD)
- mortar battery (82 mm M)
- platoons: reconnaissance, anti-aircraft missile (MANPADS Strela-3), communications, support, first-aid post.
- transport and combat helicopter regiment (Mi-8 and Mi-6) - until 1988.
- howitzer artillery battery (122-mm G D-30)
- mortar battery (120 mm M)
- mountain gun battery (76-mm GP 2A2 arr. 1958)
- anti-aircraft battery (23 mm ZU-23, MANPADS Strela-2M)
- reconnaissance company
- communication company
- engineering sapper company
- landing support company
- brigade medical center
- repair company
- transport and economic company
- radiochemical reconnaissance platoon
- command platoon of the chief of artillery
- commandant's platoon
- orchestra.
Notes:
* Battalions and helicopter regiments had their own numbers:
in 11 odshbr: 617, 618 and 619 dep. air assault battalions; 329th Helicopter Regiment (withdrawn from the brigade at the beginning of 1988).
at 13 odshbr: ..., ... and ... dep. air assault battalions, ... a helicopter regiment (at the beginning of 1988 it was withdrawn from the brigade).
in 21 odshbr: 802, 803 and 804 dep. air assault battalions, 325 helicopter regiment (withdrawn from the brigade at the beginning of 1988).
For some time there were no ZRVs in the battalions - the ZROs were part of the DSHR.
The 802nd (1st) odshb 21 odshbr had a different organization from the standard.
The organizational structure of the ODSHP differed from the brigades by the presence of only two battalions: the 1st paratrooper (foot) and the 2nd airborne assault (on BMD), as well as a somewhat reduced composition of the units of the regimental set. The total number of the regiment deployed in wartime states reached 1.5-1.6 thousand people.
The organizational structure of the odshb on the European theater of operations and the Far East theater of operations was generally similar to the OShS of the infantry brigade of brigades, but also included a fourth company - an airborne assault (on a BMD) and a platoon (either with a BMD or on a UAZ-469), and in a mortar battery the number of trunks increased to 8 units. The total number of battalions deployed in wartime states reached 650-670 people.
In the winter-spring of 1988, organizational changes began, which were completed by the summer of 1990, i.e. by the time when the brigades were renamed airborne and reassigned to the command of the USSR Airborne Forces. The brigade was significantly lightened by removing all armored vehicles from there and removing the airborne assault battalion on the BMD / BTRD from its composition.
Organizational Structure for 1990-91:
brigade management
- three (1st, 2nd, 3rd) airborne (foot) battalions:
- three airborne companies (ATGM "Metis", 82-mm M, AGS-17, RPG-7D, GP-25, PK, AKS-74, RPKS-74)
- anti-tank battery (ATGM Fagot, SPG-9MD)
- mortar battery (82 mm M)
- platoons: anti-aircraft missile (Strela-3 / Needle), communications, support, first-aid post.
- howitzer artillery battalion:
- three howitzer batteries (122 mm G D-30)
- platoons: management, support.
- mortar battery (120 mm M)
- anti-aircraft missile and artillery battery (ZU-23, Strela-3/Igla)
- anti-tank battery (ATGM "Fagot")
- anti-aircraft battery (23 mm ZU-23, MANPADS Strela-2M)
- reconnaissance company (UAZ-3151, PK, RPG-7D, GP-25, SBR-3)
- communication company
- engineering sapper company
- landing support company
- automobile company
- medical company
- repair company
- material support company
- radiochemical biological protection company
- command platoon of the chief of artillery
- commandant's platoon
- orchestra.
Organizational structure of 224 UTs for 1990-91:
brigade management
- 1st training paratrooper battalion:
- three training paratrooper companies (RPG-7D, GP-25, AKS-74, RPKS-74)
- training reconnaissance company (PK, AKS-74, SVD)
- 2nd training paratrooper battalion:
- 1st training automobile company (for Ural-4320)
- 2nd training automobile company (for GAZ-66)
- training medical company
- training company connections
- training artillery battalion:
- training howitzer battery (122-mm G D-30)
- training mortar battery (120 mm M)
- training anti-tank battery (ATGM Fagot, SPG-9MD)
- training anti-aircraft missile and artillery battery (ZU-23, Strela-3 / Needle)
- a company of training vehicles (Ural-4320, GAZ-66)
- communication company
- medical company
- repair company
- material support company
- landing support platoon
- commandant's platoon
- orchestra.
HELICOPTERS ARE THE MAIN PROBLEM
Domestic DShV had many problems, both internal and external. One of these third-party problems that directly and most strongly influenced the combat effectiveness of the DShV was to provide them with an aviation component, in other words, helicopters.
Massively formed in 1979 "second wave" DShN consisted only of the ground component - i.e. unlike their older counterparts - the "first wave" brigades - there were no helicopter regiments in their composition. This situation can be explained by several theses.
Firstly, this was contrary to the doctrine of the use of helicopters. The Soviet military command believed that helicopter regiments were a means of operational and operational-strategic unification (armies and fronts). This means that organizationally they should be included in their composition for centralized management of them with a concentration of efforts for use in the chosen direction. Theoretically, apparently, the right desire to give helicopter forces to each association, in fact, led to the dispersion of helicopters over very numerous formations in view of the overall immensity of the SA. Here it was necessary either to eliminate unnecessary (or not superfluous?) associations, or to deprive some of them of a significant number of helicopters, or to force the production of helicopters in order to saturate the troops with them to the maximum.
Secondly, the production of helicopters, like any other type of weapon, depends on the doctrine prevailing at the moment. As mentioned above, the "volumizers" who advocated the creation of a rise in the air of part of the ground forces, and therefore a sharp increase in the number of air vehicles needed for this, were defeated in the fight against the supporters of the traditional doctrine. And although the production of helicopters increased by the beginning. 80s, however, this was a consequence of rather objective prerequisites, the objective course of development of the country's Armed Forces, and not a doctrinal stage-by-stage revolution.
Thirdly, the very fact of combining air and ground components in a tactical formation caused, apparently, many military leaders objections - and not only subjective, but also quite justified. Being part of such a formation, the helicopters would actually be withdrawn from the reserve of the commander of the operational formation, "attached" exclusively to ensuring the actions of the airborne troops. It seems to the author of the article that the high military command incorrectly assessed the dependence of the airborne troops on helicopter support, considering it to be similar to the support of the airborne forces by military aircraft, not paying attention to the specifics expressed in a much closer and mandatory symbiosis of the landing force with helicopters without which the effectiveness of the first falls. Moreover, according to operational calculations and the experience of the exercises, it turned out that about 70% of the resource of transport helicopters was supposed to be used for landing missions in any case. And what could prevent the use of these helicopters if they do not participate in the DSHO / DShD?
Finally, fourthly, as is commonly believed, the number of helicopters themselves was also insufficient in order to, like the Americans, equip all the formations with which they can come in handy, and even have a reserve. However, there seems to be a lot of confusion here. Namely. Consider the production of Mi-8 helicopters in the USSR. According to official figures, 11,000 units were manufactured between 1962 and 1997. Moreover, the absolute majority (up to 90%) in the period 1966-91. According to the authors' calculations, this means that at least 5,500 of these helicopters should have been delivered to the Armed Forces during this period, only counting transport and transport-combat modifications. There is no official domestic data on the Mi-8 fleet in the open press. The authoritative magazine "Military Balance" for 1991 gives the number of transport and transport-combat modifications of the Mi-8 for 1990/91. respectively 1000 and 640 units. Let the losses in Afghanistan and in the disasters amount to 400 units, let 1000 machines that have exhausted their resources be disabled, but then where did the remaining 2500 units go? In general, as they say, the topic is waiting for its researcher.
So, theoretically, air assault brigades, being an ideal means, with a focal (non-linear) nature of hostilities, due to the lack of an aviation component that imparts maneuverability in their composition, sharply reduced their potential, becoming, in fact, parts of light infantry. A fundamental way out of the current situation could be the creation of special operational-tactical formations - air assault corps of brigade-regimental composition - subordinated to front-line departments in wartime. This connection would include a ground component (DShCh from the SV or Airborne Forces) and an air helicopter component (from the DIA). Such a construction scheme would make it possible to achieve high combat effectiveness and, at the same time, all interested departments "keep their own sheep."
Let's look at an example of how helicopters were supposed to be distributed for DShV. We take standard conditions as initial conditions - a front-line offensive operation of four armies. The grouping consists of one transport and combat helicopter regiment (otbvp), six combat helicopter regiments (obvp), as well as one detachment. air assault brigade (3rd battalion) and three det. air assault battalion. In addition, in each of the combined arms divisions, one motorized rifle battalion was trained to act as part of the TakVD. An analysis of the possible content of the operation and the tasks characteristic of airborne assaults in the course of it show that within the framework of the DShD in 10 days it may be necessary to land an airborne brigade as an ATIA and eight to ten TakVD as part of an airborne assault brigade and reinforced small and medium armored personnel carriers.
The average allocation rates for troop-carrying helicopters are: ATS - up to four regimental sorties (p / a) rebvp*; TakVD as part of the odshb - one p / in otbvp; reinforced SSB - one p / b bvp without a squadron (ve). In addition, a detachment of escort combat helicopters is needed.
Estimated composition: otbvp - 40 Mi-8T / MT, 20 Mi-6A; obvp - 40 Mi-24V / P and 20 Mi-8T / MT.
* Here it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that the presence of one of the battalions on armored vehicles in the odshbr sharply increased the required outfit of helicopters for transportation, and especially heavy Mi-6A. Transport ok. 60 units BTT occupied the lion's share in the total number of Mi-6A helicopter sorties and in real life Mi-6 squadrons would need to make more sorties. Only mass production of Mi-26 helicopters capable of taking on board 2 units. BTT class BMD / BTRD (for the Mi-6A only 1 unit) changed the situation for the better. In general, the author doubts the possibility of transferring the entire BTT dshb by Mi-6A helicopters.
It would be superfluous to prove that landing three flights, let alone four, of the ATMO is tantamount to suicide. It is necessary to ensure the transfer by no more than two flights (echelons). And here it is impossible to do without the withdrawal of transport and combat helicopters from the air force for the period of its operations (total for 1-2 p / a), i.e., they will have to be left without Mi-8T / MT.
The duration of the disembarkation of the ATC in two flights is, as a rule, 12-16 hours. Taking into account the subsequent training of helicopters, only a day later, one can count on their repeated actions (in the same Afghanistan, helicopters made much more conclusions, but calculations were made based on only two sorties per day). During the specified time, the air defense units remain without the Mi-8 and support the troops without their participation. If during the same day it is required to land at least one or two more TakVDs as part of a battalion, then practically all the air defense forces are left without troop-carrying helicopters. Taking into account the duration of the operation and the recovery time of the combat capability of the odshbr, the re-landing of the airborne division is practically not feasible.
In the remaining nine days of the operation, it is possible to land eight or nine more TakVDs as part of the special air defense unit / us.msb. However, modern experience shows that up to 30% of the flight resource of transport helicopters will have to be spent on solving tasks not related to landing. Consequently, only armies in the direction of the main attack will be able to use landings. This was considered an acceptable norm for the decentralized application of TakVD.
Although not quite. Nevertheless, it was necessary to involve transport aircraft of the VTA Air Force for the landing of the DShV - mainly An-12. This created additional inconvenience. So, the dshb on the BTT had to independently follow to such an initial landing area, where there were airfields capable of ensuring the rise of aircraft with troops on board.
Quality
A certain problem was the suitability of domestic helicopters of the Mi-8 and Mi-6 family for air assault operations and, more broadly, for airborne landing in general. In the future, a separate article will be devoted to this.
RESULTS
As mentioned earlier, in 1989-90, in connection with the transfer of LH units to the composition of the Airborne Forces, major changes were made. Most of the air assault brigades are being reorganized into airborne brigades that are greatly lightened in terms of armament (the actual process of lightening was started earlier); at the same time, several brigades are disbanded (the 57th and 58th), and the 39th is transformed into the 224th training center of the Airborne Forces. Separate air assault battalions, it was decided to disband all. In the summer of 1990, all major changes had already been made. The brigades have been reorganized, and most of the battalions have been disbanded. As of November of this year, only 5 battalions remained from the former.
The overall picture of the transformation can be seen in the data below:
11 airborne brigade of the city of Mogocha and Amazar (Chita region) * In 1988, the helicopter regiment was withdrawn from the composition. And by 1 Aug. 1990 transferred to the states air-dec. brigades.
13th Airborne Brigade of the city of Magdagachi (Amur Region) * In 1988, a helicopter regiment was withdrawn from the composition. In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states of air-dec. brigades.
21 Airborne Brigade Kutaisi and Tsulukidze (Georgia) In 1988, the helicopter regiment was withdrawn from the structure. In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states of air-dec. brigades.
23 odshbr Kremenchug (Ukraine) In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states of air-dec. brigades.
35 Guards. odshbr city of Cottbus (GDR) ** In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states of air-dec. brigades.
36 odshbr village Garbolovo (Leningrad region). In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states of air-dec. brigades.
37 odshbr city of Chernyakhovsk (Kaliningrad region). In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states of air-dec. brigades.
38 Guards. Vienna city of Brest (Belarus) In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states of air-dec. brigades.
odshbr
39 airborne brigade Khyrov (Ukraine) In the spring of 1990, it was reorganized into the 224 training center of the Airborne Forces.
40 odshbr s. Velyka Korenikha - Nikolaev (Ukraine) In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the state air-dec. brigades. And completely relocated to Nikolaev.
56 Guards. odshbr pos. Azadbash (district of the city of Chirchik, Uzbekistan) *** In the winter of 1989, it was bred from Afghanistan to the city of Iolotan (Turkmenistan). In the summer of 1990 transferred to the states
air - des. brigades.
57 odshbr town. Aktogay (Taldy-Kurgan region, Kazakhstan) Transferred to the village. Georgievka, Semipalatinsk region (Kazakhstan) and disbanded there in 1989.
58 odshbr Kremenchug (Ukraine) Disbanded in December 1989.
83 odshbr Bialogard (Poland) Transferred to Ussuriysk (Primorsky Territory) in 1989. In the summer of 1990 transferred to the states
air-dec. brigades.
128 odshbr Stavropol (Stavropol AK) Disbanded in the beginning. 1990.
130 odshbr Abakan (Khakass Autonomous Okrug) Disbanded at the beginning. 1990.
1318 odshp Borovuha-1 - Borogla (Polotsk region, Belarus) Disbanded in August 1989.
1319 odshp city of Kyakhta (Chita region) Disbanded in March 1988.
FROM separate battalions acted as follows: in 1989 (maximum beginning of 1990) they disbanded all battalions with PPD on the territory of the USSR, while simultaneously redeploying to the USSR those in groups of forces in Europe. Then, before the beginning 1991 they were also disbanded. Only the 901st battalion survived.
139 odshb city of Kaliningrad (Kaliningrad region) Disbanded no later than 1989.
145 odshb pos. Sergeevka (Primorsky Territory) Disbanded no later than 1989.
899 odshb city of Burg (GDR) In 1989 he was transferred to the town. Bear Lakes (Moscow region). Disbanded no later than early 1991.
900 odshb city of Leipzig - Schinau (GDR) Withdrawn to the territory of the USSR in 1989 and disbanded.
901 odshb in the district of the settlement Riechki (Czechoslovakia) In 1989 he was transferred to the city of Aluskene (Latvia). In the beginning. 1991 disbandment began, but,
soon, the battalion was re-deployed * and in May 1991 was transferred to Abkhazia (the city of Gudauta).
902 odshb city of Kecskemét (Hungary) In 1989 he was transferred to the city of Grodno (Belarus).
903 odshb Grodno (Belarus) Disbanded no later than 1989.
904 odshb Vladimir-Volynsky (Ukraine) Disbanded no later than 1989.
905 odshb Bendery (Moldova) Disbanded no later than 1989.
906 odshb pos. Khada-Bulak (Chita region, district of the city of Borzya) Disbanded no later than 1989.
907 odshb Birobidzhan (Jewish Autonomous Region) Disbanded no later than 1989.
908 odshb town. Goncharovo (Ukraine, Chernihiv region) Disbanded no later than 1989.
1011 odshb st. Maryina Gorka - Pukhovichi (Belarus) Disbanded no later than 1989.
1044 odshb city of Neuss-Lager (GDR, in the region of Königsbrück) Transferred in 1989 to the city of Tuarage (Lithuania). Disbanded no later than Jan. 1991.
1156 odshb Novograd-Volynsky (Ukraine, Zhytomyr region) Disbanded no later than 1989.
1179 odshb city of Petrozavodsk (Karelia) Disbanded no later than 1989.
1151 odshb city of Polotsk (Belarus) Disbanded no later than 1989.
1185 odshb Ravensbrück (GDR) Transferred in 1989 to Võru (Estonia). Disbanded no later than Jan. 1991.
1604 odshb city of Ulan-Ude (Buryat Autonomous Okrug) Disbanded no later than 1989
Notes:
* By this time, it was already referred to as a separate paratrooper battalion.
Thus, at the beginning of 1991, the former airborne assault units as part of the Airborne Forces were represented by eleven separate airborne brigades.
In 1989, it was decided to transfer the main part of the helicopters from the Air Force to the SV and, thus, significantly improve the capabilities of the air assault troops. However, following this, at the beginning of December 1989, an order was issued to reassign the DShV to the command of the Airborne Forces, thus leveling the formation of army aviation that was positive for the DShV. Coordination between the air assault formations and the command of the combined arms formations in the interests of which they were supposed to act turned out to be broken. The reasons for the transfer of the Airborne Forces to the administrative and operational subordination of the Airborne Forces are not clear. Without a doubt, the existing similarity in acquisition and training does not explain everything. It is possible that the reason lies (as often happens) in non-military matters proper. The inattention of the command of the Airborne Forces to the development of the doctrine of the use of helicopter landings in the early and middle stages (60s-early 80s) resulted in a kind of "envy" of the "competitor"; all the more so since the successes of the "helicopter landing" doctrine were on the face, both with us and with NATO. In principle, the logical (and theoretically correct) decision to concentrate all airborne forces under one administrative command was unjustifiably supplemented by their operational unification. The command incorrectly assessed the dependence of the DShV on helicopter support, considering it to be similar to the support of the airborne forces by VTA aircraft and not paying attention to the mandatory symbiosis of the landing force with helicopters, without which the effectiveness of the landing drops sharply.
Abbreviations and abbreviations
VDV - airborne troops
SW ̵
Airborne troops are one of the strongest components of the army Russian Federation. In recent years, due to the tense international situation, the value of VDV increases. The size of the territory of the Russian Federation, its landscape diversity, as well as the borders with almost all conflict states, indicate that it is necessary to have a large supply of special groupings of troops that can provide the necessary protection in all directions, which is the air force.
In contact with
As air force structure extensive, the question often arises of the Airborne Forces and the DSB are the same troops? The article analyzes the differences between them, the history, goals and military training of both organizations, the composition.
Differences between troops
The differences lie in the names themselves. The DShB is an air assault brigade organized and specializing in attacks on the enemy's close rear in the event of large-scale military operations. Air assault brigades subordinate to the Airborne Forces - airborne troops, as one of their divisions and specialize only in assault seizures.
Airborne Forces are landing troops, whose tasks are the capture of the enemy, as well as the capture and destruction of enemy weapons and other air operations. The functionality of the Airborne Forces is much wider - reconnaissance, sabotage, assault. For a better understanding of the differences, consider the history of the creation of the Airborne Forces and the Airborne Forces separately.
History of the Airborne Forces
The Airborne Forces began its history in 1930, when an operation was carried out near the city of Voronezh on August 2, where 12 people parachuted from the air as part of a special unit. This operation then opened the eyes of the leadership to new opportunities for paratroopers. The following year, based Leningrad Military District, a detachment is being formed, which received a long name - airborne and consisted of about 150 people.
The effectiveness of the paratroopers was obvious and the Revolutionary Military Council decides to expand it by creating airborne troops. The order saw the light at the end of 1932. In parallel, in Leningrad, instructors were trained, and later they were distributed to the districts by special-purpose aviation battalions.
In 1935, the military district of Kyiv demonstrated to foreign delegations the full power of the Airborne Forces, arranging an impressive landing of 1200 paratroopers, who quickly captured the airfield. Later, similar exercises were held in Belarus, as a result of which the German delegation, impressed by the landing of 1,800 people, decided to organize their own airborne detachment, and then a regiment. In this way, The Soviet Union is rightfully the birthplace of the Airborne Forces.
In 1939, our landing troops there is an opportunity to show themselves in practice. In Japan, the 212th brigade was landed on the Khalkin Gol River, and a year later the 201st, 204th and 214th brigades will be involved in the war with Finland. Knowing that the Second World War would no longer pass us by, 5 air corps of 10 thousand people each were formed and the Airborne Forces acquired a new status - guards troops.
The year 1942 was marked by the largest airborne operation during the war years, which took place near Moscow, where about 10 thousand paratroopers were dropped into the German rear. After the war, it was decided to attach the Airborne Forces to the Supreme High Command and appoint the commander of the Airborne Forces of the USSR SV, this honor falls to Colonel General V.V. Glagolev.
Big innovations in airborne troops came with "Uncle Vasya". In 1954 V.V. Glagolev is replaced by V.F. Margelov and holds the post of commander of the Airborne Forces until 1979. Under Margelov, the Airborne Forces are supplied with new military equipment, including artillery mounts, combat vehicles, special attention is paid to work under the conditions of a surprise attack by nuclear weapons.
Airborne units took part in all the most significant conflicts - the events of Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, North and South Ossetia. Several of our battalions carried out UN peacekeeping missions in Yugoslavia.
In our time, the ranks of the Airborne Forces include about 40 thousand fighters, when conducting special operations - paratroopers form its basis, since the Airborne Forces are a highly qualified component of our army.
The history of the formation of the DShB
Air assault brigades began their history after it was decided to rework the tactics of the Airborne Forces in the context of the unleashing of large-scale hostilities. The purpose of such air defenses was to disorganize opponents by mass landings close to the enemy, such operations were most often carried out from helicopters in small groups.
Toward the end of the 60s in the Far East, it was decided to form the 11th and 13th brigades with helicopter regiments. These regiments were involved mainly in hard-to-reach areas, the first attempts at landings took place in the northern cities of Magdachi and Zavitinsk. Therefore, in order to become a paratrooper of this brigade, strength and special endurance were needed, since the weather conditions were almost unpredictable, for example, in winter the temperature reached -40 degrees, and in summer there was abnormal heat.
The location of the first DShB not just because the Far East was chosen. It was a time of difficult relations with China, which became even more aggravated after the clash of interests on the island of Damascus. The brigades were ordered to prepare to repel an attack from China, which could attack at any time.
The high level and significance of the DSB was demonstrated during exercises in the late 80s on the island of Iturup, where 2 battalions and artillery landed on MI-6 and MI-8 helicopters. The garrison, due to weather conditions, was not warned about the exercises, as a result of which they opened fire on the landings, but thanks to the highly qualified training of the paratroopers, none of the participants in the operation was injured.
In the same years, the DSB consisted of 2 regiments, 14 brigades, about 20 battalions. One brigade attached to one military district, but only to those who had access to the border by land. Kyiv also had its own brigade, 2 more brigades were given to our units located abroad. Each brigade had an artillery battalion, rear and combat units.
After the USSR ceased to exist, the country's budget did not allow the mass maintenance of the army, so there was nothing left to do but to disband some parts of the DSHB and the Airborne Forces. The beginning of the 90s was marked by the withdrawal of the DSB from the subordination of the Far East and the transfer to full subordination to Moscow. Air assault brigades are being transformed into separate airborne brigades - 13 OVDbr. In the mid-90s, the plan to reduce the Airborne Forces disbanded the composition of the 13th Airborne Brigade.
Thus, from the foregoing, it can be seen that the DSB was created as one of the structural divisions of the Airborne Forces.
Composition of the Airborne Forces
The composition of the Airborne Forces includes the following units:
- airborne;
- air assault;
- mountain (which operate exclusively on mountain hills).
These are the three main components of the Airborne Forces. In addition, they consist of a division (76.98, 7, 106 Guards Air Assault), brigades and regiments (45, 56, 31, 11, 83, 38 Guards Airborne). In Voronezh, a brigade was created in 2013, which received the number 345.
Personnel of the Airborne Forces prepared in educational institutions military reserve of Ryazan, Novosibirsk, Kamenetz-Podolsk, in Kolomenskoye. The training was conducted in the areas of paratrooper (airborne assault) platoon, commanders of reconnaissance platoons.
The school produced about three hundred graduates annually - this was not enough to satisfy the personnel requirements of the airborne troops. Consequently, it was possible to get into the military personnel of the Airborne Forces by graduating from the landing faculties in special areas of such schools as combined arms and military departments.
Preparation
commander DShB composition most often they were selected from the Airborne Forces, and battalion commanders, deputy battalion commanders, company commanders from the nearest military districts. In the 70s, due to the fact that the leadership decided to repeat their experience - to create and staff the DShB, the planned enrollment in educational institutions is expanding who trained future officers of the Airborne Forces. The mid-80s were marked by the fact that officers were issued for service in the Airborne Troops, having been trained according to the educational program for the Airborne Forces. Also in these years, a complete rearrangement of officers was underway, it was decided to replace almost all of them in the DShV. At the same time, excellent students went to serve mainly in the Airborne Forces.
To get into the service in the Airborne Forces, as in the DSB, you must meet specific criteria:
- height 173 and above;
- average physical development;
- secondary education;
- without medical restrictions.
If everything matches, then the future fighter begins training.
Particular attention is paid, of course, to the physical training of airborne paratroopers, which is carried out constantly, begins with a daily rise at 6 in the morning, hand-to-hand combat ( special program training) and ends with long forced marches of 30–50 km. Therefore, each fighter has a huge endurance and endurance, besides, guys who were engaged in any kind of sport that develops that very endurance are selected into their ranks. To check it, they pass an endurance test - in 12 minutes a fighter must run 2.4-2.8 km, otherwise there is no point in the Airborne Forces service.
It is worth noting that it is not for nothing that they are called universal fighters. These people can operate on various terrains in any weather conditions absolutely silently, can disguise themselves, own all types of weapons of both their own and the enemy, manage any type of transport, means of communication. In addition to excellent physical fitness, psychological training is also required, since the fighters have to overcome not only long distances, but also “work with their heads” to get ahead of the enemy throughout the entire operation.
Intellectual fitness is determined using tests compiled by experts. It is mandatory to take into account psychological compatibility in a team, the guys are included in a certain detachment for 2-3 days, after which the old-timers evaluate their behavior.
Psychophysical training is being carried out, which implies tasks with increased risk, where there is both physical and mental stress. Such tasks are aimed at overcoming fear. However, if it turns out that future paratrooper does not experience, in general, a feeling of fear, then he is not accepted for further training, since this feeling is quite naturally taught to control him, and not completely eradicated. Airborne training gives our country a huge advantage in the face of fighters over any enemy. Most of the VDVeshnikov lead an already familiar lifestyle even after retirement.
Armament of the Airborne Forces
As for the technical equipment, combined arms equipment and specially designed for the nature of this type of troops are involved in the Airborne Forces. Some of the samples were created during the USSR, but the bulk was developed after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
To cars Soviet period relate:
- landing combat vehicle - 1 (the number reaches - 100 units);
- BMD-2M (about 1 thousand units), they are used both in ground and in parachute landing methods.
These techniques were tested over many years and took part in multiple armed conflicts that took place on the territory of our country and abroad. In our time, in conditions of rapid progress, these models are outdated both morally and physically. A little later, the BMD-3 model came out, and today the number of such equipment is only 10 units, since production has been discontinued, they plan to gradually replace it with the BMD-4.
The Airborne Forces are also armed with armored personnel carriers BTR-82A, BTR-82AM and BTR-80 and the most numerous tracked armored personnel carrier - 700 units, and it is also the most outdated (mid-70s), it is gradually being replaced by an armored personnel carrier - MDM "Shell". There are also anti-tank guns 2S25 "Sprut-SD", an armored personnel carrier - RD "Robot", and anti-tank systems: "Competition", "Metis", "Fagot", and "Cornet". air defense represented by missile systems, but a special place is given to the novelty, which not so long ago appeared in service with the Airborne Forces - the Verba MANPADS.
Not so long ago, new models of technology appeared:
- armored car "Tiger";
- Snowmobile A-1;
- truck KAMAZ - 43501.
As for communication systems, they are represented by locally developed complexes electronic warfare"Leer-2 and 3", Infauna, system management presented air defense"Barnaul", "Andromeda" and "Flight-K" - automation of command and control.
Weapon represented by samples, for example, the Yarygin pistol, the PMM and the PSS silent pistol. The Soviet Ak-74 assault rifle is still the personal weapon of the paratroopers, but is gradually being replaced by the latest AK-74M, and the silent Val assault rifle is also used in special operations. There are both Soviet and post-Soviet parachute systems that can parachute large batches of soldiers and all of the above military equipment. Heavier equipment includes automatic grenade launchers AGS-17 "Flame" and AGS-30, SPG-9.
Armament DShB
DShB had transport and helicopter regiments which included:
- about twenty mi-24s, forty mi-8s and forty mi-6s;
- the anti-tank battery was armed with a mounted anti-tank grenade launcher 9 MD;
- the mortar battery included eight 82mm BM-37s;
- in the anti-aircraft missile platoon, there were nine Strela-2M MANPADS;
- also included several BMD-1s, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers for each airborne assault battalion.
The armament of the brigade-artillery group consisted of GD-30 howitzers, PM-38 mortars, GP 2A2 cannons, the Malyutka anti-tank missile system, SPG-9MD, and the ZU-23 anti-aircraft gun.
Heavier equipment includes automatic grenade launchers AGS-17 "Flame" and AGS-30, SPG-9 "Spear". Aerial reconnaissance is carried out using the domestic Orlan-10 drone.
One interesting fact took place in airborne history, for quite a long time, thanks to erroneous information from the media, special forces soldiers (SpN) were not rightfully called paratroopers. The fact, what is in the Air Force of our country in the Soviet Union, as well as in the post-Soviet Union, there were no special forces troops and there are no special forces, but there are units and units of the Special Forces of the GRU of the General Staff, which arose in the 50s. Until the 1980s, the command was forced to completely deny their existence in our country. Therefore, those who were appointed to these troops learned about them only after they were accepted into service. For the media, they were disguised as motorized rifle battalions.
Airborne Forces Day
Paratroopers celebrate the birthday of the Airborne Forces, like the DSB since August 2, 2006. This kind of gratitude for the effectiveness of the air units, the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation was signed in May of the same year. Despite the fact that the holiday was declared by our government, the birthday is celebrated not only in our country, but also in Belarus, Ukraine and most of the CIS countries.
Every year, veterans of the Airborne Forces and active fighters meet in the so-called "meeting place", in each city it has its own, for example, in Astrakhan "Brotherly Garden", in Kazan "Victory Square", in Kyiv "Hydropark", in Moscow " Poklonnaya Gora”, Novosibirsk “Central Park”. Demonstrations, concerts and fairs are organized in large cities.
11th brigade (military unit 32364), ZabVO, Mogocha;
13th brigade (military unit 21463), Far Eastern Military District, Magdagachi, Amazar;
21st brigade (military unit 31571), ZakVO, Kutaisi;
35th brigade (military unit 16407), GSVG, Cottbus;
36th brigade (military unit 74980), LenVO, Garbolovo;
37th brigade (military unit 75193), PribVO, Chernyakhovsk;
38th brigade (military unit 92616), BelVO, Brest;
39th brigade (military unit 32351), PrikVO, Khyrov;
40th brigade (military unit 32461), OdVO, Nikolaev;
56th brigade (military unit 74507), TurkVO, Azadbash, Chirchik;
57th brigade (military unit 92618), SAVO, Aktogay, Kazakhstan;
58th detachment of the KVO frame, Kremenchug.
New brigades were formed as lightweight, 3-battalion composition, without helicopter regiments. Now these were ordinary "infantry" units that did not have their own aviation. In fact, these were tactical units, while until that time the first three brigades (11th, 13th and 21st brigade) were tactical formations. From the beginning of the 80s, the battalions of the 11th, 13th and 21st brigades ceased to be separate and lost their numbers - brigades from formations became units. However, the helicopter regiments remained under the control of these brigades until 1988, after which they were withdrawn from the control of the brigades to the control of the districts.
The structure of the new brigades was as follows:
Management (headquarters) of the brigade;
Two parachute battalions;
One air assault battalion;
Howitzer artillery battalion;
Anti-tank battery;
Anti-aircraft artillery battery;
Communication company;
Reconnaissance and landing company;
RHBZ company;
Engineering and sapper company;
Company of material support;
Medical company;
Landing Support Company.
The number of personnel in the brigades was about 2800 people.
Starting from 1982-1983, airborne training began in the airborne assault brigades, in connection with which there were some organizational changes in the structure of the formations.
In addition to the brigades, separate air assault battalions were formed in December 1979, which were supposed to act in the interests of the armies and solve tactical tasks in the enemy's near rear. In the mid-80s, an additional formation of several more battalions took place. In total, more than twenty such battalions were formed, the full list of which I have not yet been able to establish - there were several cadre battalions, the numbers of which do not come across in the open press. By the mid-80s, the combined arms and tank armies of the Armed Forces of the USSR included:
899th odshb (military unit 61139), 20th guards OA, GSVG, Burg;
900th odshb (military unit 60370), 8th Guards OA, GSVG, Leipzig;
901st odshb (military unit 49138), TsGV, Riechki, then PribVO, Aluksne;
902nd odshb (military unit 61607), South GV, Hungary, Kecskemét;
903rd odshb 28th OA, BelVO, Brest (until 1986), then in Grodno;
904th odshb (military unit 32352), 13th OA, PrikVO, Vladimir-Volynsky;
905th odshb (military unit 92617), 14th OA, OdVO, Bendery;
906th odshb (military unit 75194), 36th OA, ZabVO, Borzya, Khada-Bulak;
907th odshb (military unit 74981), 43rd AK, Far East Military District, Birobidzhan;
908th odshb 1st guards OA, KVO, Konotop, since 1984 Chernigov, Goncharovskoye settlement;
1011th odshb 5th guards TA, BelVO, Maryina Gorka;
1039th odshb 11th guards OA, PribVO, Kaliningrad;
1044th odshb (military unit 47596), 1st guards TA, GSVG, Koenigsbrück, after 1989 - PribVO, Taurage;
1048th odshb (military unit 45476), 40th OA, TurkVO, Termez;
1145th odshb 5th OA, Far Eastern Military District, Sergeevna;
1151st odshb 7th TA, BelVO, Polotsk;
1154th odshb 86th AK, ZabVO, Shelekhov;
1156th odshb 8th TA, PrikVO, Novograd-Volynsky;
1179th ODShB (military unit 73665), 6th OA, LenVO, Petrozavodsk;
1185th odshb (military unit 55342), 2nd guards TA, GSVG, Ravensbrück, then PribVO, Vyru;
1603rd odshb 38th OA, PrikVO, Nadvirna;
1604th odshb 29th OA, ZabVO, Ulan-Ude;
1605th odshb 5th OA, Far Eastern Military District, Spassk-Dalniy;
1609th odshb 39th OA, ZabVO, Kyakhta.
Also in 1982, their own air assault battalions were created in the Marine Corps of the USSR Navy. In particular, on Pacific Fleet such a battalion was created on the basis of the 1st battalion marines 165th Marine Regiment, 55th Division. Then similar battalions were created in other regiments of the division and separate brigades in other fleets. These Marine air assault battalions received airborne training and parachute jumps. That is why I have included them in this story. The air assault battalions that were part of the 55th division did not have their own numbers and were named only according to continuous numbering within their regiment. Battalions in brigades, as separate units, received their own names:
876th odshb (military unit 81285) 61st brigade, Northern Fleet, Sputnik settlement;
879th odshb (military unit 81280) 336th guards brigade, BF, Baltiysk;
881st odshb 810th brigade, Black Sea Fleet, Sevastopol;
1st dshb 165th infantry regiment 55th dmp, Pacific Fleet, Vladivostok;
1st dshb 390th infantry regiment 55th dmp, Pacific Fleet, Slavyanka.
Based on the composition of weapons, individual air assault battalions were divided into "light", which did not have armored vehicles, and "heavy", which were armed with up to 30 infantry fighting vehicles or landing. Both types of battalions were also armed with 6 mortars with a caliber of 120 mm, six AGS-17 and several anti-tank systems.
The brigades were composed of three airborne battalions on infantry fighting vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles or GAZ-66 vehicles, an artillery battalion (18 D-30 howitzers), an anti-tank battery, an anti-aircraft missile battery, a mortar battery (six 120-mm mortars), a reconnaissance a company, a communications company, a sapper company, an airborne support company, a chemical protection company, a material support company, a repair company, an automobile company and a medical center. A separate airborne battalion of the brigade consisted of three paratrooper companies, a mortar battery (4–6 82-mm mortars), a grenade launcher platoon (6 AGS-17 grenade launchers), a communications platoon, an anti-tank platoon (4 SPG-9 and 6 ATGM) and a support platoon.
When passing airborne training the parachute service of the air assault battalions and brigades was guided by the documents of the PDS of the Airborne Forces.
In addition to brigades and battalions, the General Staff also tried another organization of air assault units. By the mid-80s, two army corps were formed in the USSR new organization. These corps were created for the purpose of their use in expanding the operational breakthrough (if something happened to break through). The new corps had a brigade structure and consisted of mechanized and tank brigades, and besides this, the air assault regiments of the two-battalion composition were included in the corps. The regiments were intended to be a tool for "vertical coverage", and in the corps they were used in conjunction with a helicopter regiment.
In the Belarusian Military District, the 5th Guards Combined Arms Army Corps was formed on the basis of the 120th Guards Motor Rifle Division, and in the Trans-Baikal Military District in Kyakhta, the 48th Guards Combined Arms Army Corps was formed on the basis of the 5th Guards Tank Division.
The 5th Guards Army Corps received the 1318th Air Assault Regiment (military unit 33508) and the 276th Helicopter Regiment, and the 48th Guards Army Corps received the 1319th Airborne Assault Regiment (military unit 33518) and the 373rd Helicopter Regiment. However, these parts did not last long. Already in 1989, the guards army corps were again folded into divisions, and the air assault regiments were disbanded.