Day of Electronic Warfare Troops. Aviation, land and sea complexes of the RB. Electronic warfare maritime complexes
Many are interested in the question of why the date of the celebration of the Day of the Electronic Warfare Specialist was chosen on April 15. You ask, we answer. On May 3, 1999, the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation signed order No. 183: “On April 15, 1904, during the Russo-Japanese War, electronic warfare was first used. the beginning of the formation and development of electronic warfare as a form of support for combat operations of the Armed Forces. I order: to establish in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation the Day of the Electronic Warfare Specialist, which is celebrated annually on April 15. Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Marshal of the Russian Federation I. Sergeev. "
For 100 years, electronic warfare (EW) has gone a long and difficult way from a single incident of radio interference to the most important type of support for combat operations of any scale.
Today, electronic warfare, on the one hand, includes the purposeful impact of electromagnetic radiation on radio-electronic objects in the enemy's command and control systems for the destruction of useful information circulating in them, and on the other hand, the protection of their radio-electronic systems from the effects of enemy forces and means of electronic warfare.
Electronic warfare today
When, if not on the Day of the Electronic Warfare Specialist, April 15, to talk about the importance of electronic warfare during periods of hostilities.
In modern military operations, electronic warfare is one of the main types of operational (combat) support for military operations. The experience of local wars and armed conflicts shows that the use of electronic warfare forces and means can lead, for example, to an increase in the combat potential of ground forces by 1.5 - 2 times, a decrease in aviation losses in the air by 4 - 6 times, and combat ships by 2 - 3 times. The contribution of electronic warfare to the solution of such an important operational task of troops as the disorganization of the enemy's troops and weapons control systems can reach 70%. Electronic warfare is of significant importance in the system of complex destruction of the enemy, the protection of its troops and objects from high-precision weapons, and information confrontation.
Electronic warfare, like any other type of military activity, is in constant development and improvement. The directions and rates of development of electronic warfare depend on a number of conditions. The most significant of them include the implementation of reforms in the military and economic spheres, the transformation of the military-industrial complex, the spread of electronic warfare to the areas of application of civilian radio-electronic means.
The growing role of electronic warfare in operations and combat operations makes it go beyond the type of operational (combat) support and grow into a specific type of combat operations. Troops (forces) equipped with modern electronic warfare weapons will be able to independently carry out combat missions to disrupt the enemy's troops and weapons control systems and protect their own troops' control systems.
In the future, electronic warfare can represent a set of measures and actions of troops to open radio-electronic objects in the control systems of troops (forces) and weapons of reconnaissance and electronic warfare of the enemy, their electronic destruction, as well as to identify the state of radio-electronic means in the command and control systems of their troops and their electronic protection. Perhaps, in the near future, electronic warfare will be conducted with the aim of disorganizing the systems of command and control of troops (forces) and weapons, reconnaissance and electronic warfare of the enemy and ensuring the stability of their similar systems. The main means of disrupting (disrupting) the functioning of radio-electronic systems and means of the enemy, possibly, will be means of functional destruction, as well as means of creating active and passive interference.
Reducing the effectiveness of deliberate interference and ensuring the electromagnetic compatibility of their radio electronic systems and assets will be carried out by the troops (forces) of a complex of organizational and technical measures (measures). New forms and methods of combat employment of electronic warfare troops (forces) will appear. The most important of these will be electronic fire and electronic strikes.
Integration processes in the construction and use of the Armed Forces will determine the transition to the creation of an electronic warfare system of the RF Armed Forces as a multifunctional and multipurpose system of electronic destruction of the enemy in all spheres (in space, air, on the ground and at sea), to the entire depth of the formation of his troops (forces), as well as on the electronic protection of their troops (forces) in peacetime and wartime.
The general direction of the development of the electronic warfare system will be the creation of electronic warfare equipment based on non-traditional, new principles, first of all, the means of functional destruction of radio-electronic means and high-precision weapons. The use of such weapons on the battlefield together with traditional electronic warfare equipment will increase the effectiveness of electronic warfare by more than 3 - 5 times.
Electronic warfare history
On the Day of the Electronic Warfare Specialist, April 15, I want to remember how it all began. What is the history of electronic warfare in Russian military affairs?
Back in January 1902, the report of the Russian Maritime Technical Committee stated: "... Wireless telegraphy has the disadvantage that a telegram can be caught at any foreign station and, therefore, read, interrupted and confused by extraneous sources of electricity." And two years later, on April 15, 1904, during an artillery attack by the Japanese squadron on the inner roadstead of the city of Port Arthur, the radio stations of the Russian battleship Pobeda and the coastal post Zolotaya Gora seriously hampered the transmission of telegrams from enemy spotter ships. Rear Admiral Ukhtomsky testified about the effectiveness of the first case of radio jamming in his report to Admiral Alekseev: “The enemy fired more than 60 large-caliber shells.
Thus, the beginning of the use of radio equipment for reconnaissance and jamming during the Russo-Japanese war is considered the moment of the birth of electronic warfare.
In 1911, Petrovsky, professor of radio engineering at the Naval Academy, was the first to theoretically substantiate the methods of creating radio interference and protecting radio communications from them. They have been practically tested in the Black Sea Fleet. At the same time, measures were developed that would allow "... to get away from enemy interference during radio communications." Training began on creating radio interference and training radio operators in jamming conditions on the ships of the Baltic Fleet of Russia.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the created radio equipment was mainly used to provide communication, identify enemy communication channels and intercept information transmitted through them. However, during the First World War, radio interference began to be used to disrupt radio communications between the headquarters of armies, corps and divisions, as well as between warships. True, this happened only sporadically, since the preference was given to the interception of radio transmissions, and not to their disruption. At the same time, special radio interference stations appeared in the German army even then.
In the period between the First and Second World Wars, along with the significant development of radio communications, radio direction finding, radio telecontrol and radar equipment appeared. As a result, the methods of combat employment of the forces and means of the ground forces, the Air Force and the Navy changed radically, and the effectiveness of combat operations increased sharply. This naturally evoked a response, that is, led to the further development of methods and techniques for countering enemy radio-electronic means.
For example, the idea of creating radar interference was first expressed in 1937 by Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences M.A. One of the first applications for an invention in the field of radar countermeasures was filed in May 1939 by an engineer Kabanov and was called "Method and device for implementing interference of the" Pseudo-object "type to the operation of radio range finders.
Electronic warfare during the Great Patriotic War
On the holiday of April 15, on the Day of the Electronic Warfare Specialist, it is necessary to note the historical significance of the EW troops for our country during the Great Patriotic War.
In the pre-war years in the Soviet Union, prototypes of the Storm radio interference stations in the ultrashort-wave, Storm-2 in the medium-wave and Thunder in the short-wave ranges were manufactured to suppress radio communication channels. Academician Shuleikin, Professor Klyatskin and others took an active part in their development. In the process of testing, these stations showed high efficiency, however, until the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, they were not launched into serial production.
The prototype of the "Thunder" jamming station was first used on September 6-12, 1941, when our troops launched a counterattack near Yelnya. In addition, in the first year of the war, the enemy's radio communications were widely and actively counteracted by jamming with the help of standard military radio stations. So, in 1942, at the beginning of the Battle of Stalingrad, a special suppression group was successfully operating, created on the basis of the standard radio stations of the Communications Directorate of the Red Army. Their aiming at the enemy's frequencies and the determination of radio communication violations were carried out by the radio reconnaissance units of the General Staff Reconnaissance Directorate.
For the purpose of the radio blockade, when the 6th field army of Paulus is surrounded, a special radio reconnaissance and radio suppression group is formed as part of the Don Front. She had several powerful radio stations that were aimed at the enemy's radio networks with the help of the 394th separate reconnaissance radio battalion. To misinform the headquarters of the 6th Army, a special radio station was allocated with the call signs of the headquarters of Manstein's troops, who were trying to unblock the encircled grouping of Field Marshal Paulus.
After conducting a detailed analysis and summarizing the results of the first experience of creating radio interference during the battles at Stalingrad and making sure of their high efficiency, in early December 1942 the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria sent a memorandum to the State Defense Committee, which, in particular, noted: " The NKVD of the USSR considers it expedient to organize a special service in the Red Army to jam German radio stations operating on the battlefield. "
On December 16, 1942, the State Defense Committee issued decree No. GOKO-2633SS "On the organization in the Red Army of a special service for jamming German radio stations operating on the battlefield", which set practical tasks.
In pursuance of this resolution, the Chief of the General Staff, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR AM Vasilevsky on December 17, 1942, signed directive No. 4869948 "On the formation of a special group and special radio interference divisions."
In accordance with this document, two separate radio divisions (ORDN) for special purposes are created - the 131st (commanded by Major Petrov) and 132 (under the command of Major Bushuev), which became part of the Stalingrad and Don fronts, respectively. Later, in 1943 and 1944, the 130th (Captain Lukacher) and 226th (Major Konstantinov) special forces ORDN were formed on the Western and Leningrad fronts, respectively. To coordinate the combat use of these units, a radio mixing service was created at the General Staff, which was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Rogatkin, later Major General.
Each special forces radio division had from 8 to 10 car radio stations of the RAF-KV type, intended for setting radio interference in the HF range, 18-20 reconnaissance receivers of the Virage and Chaika type, 4 radio direction finders of the 55 PK-ZA type and " Corkscrew".
Radio jamming stations were usually located 20-30 km from the forward edge and 3-5 km from the command post (radio receiving center) of the battalion. The enemy radio networks were monitored around the clock, during which the main and reserve frequencies of enemy radio stations, their location, military affiliation and operating modes were revealed. In the 131st special purpose ORDN, in addition, there was a powerful Pchela radio jamming station, which was located on a railway platform and was intended to counter enemy aircraft radio compasses.
Separate special forces radio divisions took part in all front and army operations in 1943-1945, interfering and conducting radio reconnaissance, radio disinformation and radio demonstration in false areas of concentration of troops and breakthrough of enemy defenses. For example, during the Byelorussian operation in the summer of 1944, the 131st ORDN, while suppressing the radio communications of enemy groupings in the Vitebsk region and southeast of Minsk, disrupted the transmission of 522 urgent and 1665 simple radio messages. Particular attention was paid to the violation of artillery fire control and aviation operations. Simultaneously with the setting of jamming in radio control networks, attacks were made on command posts and radar posts of enemy troops.
Very successfully, with the help of radio interference, the control of German formations and large formations was disrupted in January - April 1945 during the East Prussian operation, in which the 131st and 226th special forces ORDN took an active part. They managed to prevent the enemy from establishing stable radio communications, although he had 175 radio stations operating in 30 radio networks and at 300 radio frequencies. In total, the reception of about 1200 was disrupted in the Königsberg enemy grouping, and in the Zemlandskaya - more than 1000 radiograms transmitted from higher headquarters.
At the end of the war, during the Berlin operation, electronic warfare reached perfection. It included radio reconnaissance, radio suppression, disinformation and fire destruction of radio equipment of command posts and control posts of the enemy. Radio suppression was carried out by the 130th and 132nd ORDN, which were part of the First Belorussian and First Ukrainian fronts, respectively. So, from April 25 to May 2, 1945, the 132nd radio division violated the radio communications of the headquarters of the encircled Berlin grouping of the enemy, as well as the headquarters of the 9th Army and 5th Army Corps, which were in the ring south of Berlin. Due to radio interference, German radio operators were forced to repeat the texts of the transmitted radio messages dozens of times. During the days of fierce battles, the 132nd ORDN disrupted the radio transmission of 170 urgent combat orders and orders that were not received by enemy formations and units, which significantly influenced the outcome of the operation.
It is also necessary to mention the special devices SOL-3 and SOL-ZA, which began to arrive in the Air Force units in 1942. With their help, it was determined that aircraft hit the enemy radar radiation zones. From about the middle of 1943, Soviet aviation interfered with the operation of the radar by means of dipole reflectors in the form of metallized paper strips scattered from jamming aircraft.
Thus, during the Great Patriotic War, for the first time in world military practice, special radio interference units - separate special forces radio divisions - were formed and widely used to support combat operations. A great deal of experience has been accumulated in conducting reconnaissance and creating radio interference, as well as protecting its own radio electronic equipment from enemy radio interference.
Unfortunately, soon after the end of the Great Patriotic War, all parts of the radio interference were reduced and disbanded, which, as subsequent events showed, was a big mistake. In other countries, the post-war period, covering 1945-1955, was characterized by the successful expansion of the fields of application of radio electronics in military affairs and even more decisive steps to strengthen the fight against radio electronic means during the preparation and conduct of hostilities.
It was then that the first domestic scientific works on electronic suppression of well-known Soviet scientists and engineers Berg, Shchukin, Kotelnikov, Vvedensky, Shuleikin, Leontovich, Mints appeared. Under the leadership of designers Organov, Vorontsov, Brakhman, Altman, Popov, airborne aircraft jamming stations SPS-1, SPS-2 and ground ones - SPB-1 ("Alpha"), SPB-5 ("Beta"), SPB-7 (" Rosehip ") to suppress airborne radars.
The troops are beginning to receive new radio countermeasures, and jamming transmitters onboard radars are being replaced by active jamming stations. Radar passive jamming devices are also entering service: dipole reflectors in all wavelengths, automatic devices for scattering them from aircraft, corner reflectors and radio-absorbing materials to reduce the visibility of military equipment. To ensure effective control of radio countermeasures, radio and radio intelligence means RPS-1, -3, -5, -6 and POST-2, -3, -ZM appear. The development of control and management devices for regular communication radio stations is resumed in order to use them as radio communication and radio navigation jamming stations, as well as special ground and air-based radio jamming stations.
We sincerely congratulate all the inhabitants of our vast country of Russia on the holiday of April 15, the Day of the Electronic Warfare Specialist. And we wish the military, whose fate is connected with the EW troops of our Motherland - family well-being, happy relatives, loved ones and friends, good health and a peaceful sky overhead. May tomorrow be always confident, and love be mutual and strong!
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The date of the professional holiday of specialists in electronic warfare (EW) is associated with a real historical event. On April 15, 1904, Japanese ships made an attempt to cross-fire the fortifications and the Port Arthur raid. One of the enemy ships was correcting fire by wireless telegraph.
The telegraph operators from the station on Zolotoy Gora and the battleship Pobeda, having assumed such a development of events, began to interrupt the enemy message with a large spark. Such a signal has great power and is able to suppress the frequency of the enemy. The idea of the Russian sailors was crowned with success - the shooting of Japanese ships was ineffective.
The actions of military telegraph operators confirmed the development of Alexander Popov, who in 1903 proposed methods of conducting radio reconnaissance and jamming. This forced the military command to look differently at the capabilities of wireless telegraph.
The tasks of intercepting callsigns with subsequent use for their own purposes and jamming enemy transmissions were simplified due to the technical imperfection of the equipment of that time. The same principle of operation and the construction of the transmitters (sometimes the components of the same company) made it possible to operate with a big spark.
Modern means of electronic warfare have changed dramatically, new functions and capabilities have appeared. Despite the technical superiority of today's technology, it solves practically the same problems as a hundred years ago. In the conditions of constant technical development of all means of defense and attack, the EW faces strategically important tasks for the country. Our specialists, using their equipment, are capable of:
collect and store military information, including targeting;
transfer information to space objects;
use homing objects with increased pointing accuracy;
accurately hit pre-selected targets;
create active and passive interference and much more.
Effective electronic warfare against the enemy is impossible without modern technical means and highly qualified specialists. EW servicemen are constantly improving their skills in using standard electronic countermeasures.
The number of trainings and exercises exceeds a hundred per year. Exercises are conducted for units directly aimed at performing the main tasks. Specialists of electronic intelligence take part in all major exercises of the army and navy, ensuring the tasks set by the command.
Complexes "Krasukha-4S", "Murmansk", "Moscow" have shown their high efficiency not only in covering friendly units, but also in the rapid suppression of a conventional enemy's SUV. The developments of our specialists allow disrupting the operation of control systems at a distance of up to 5000 km. Murmansk-BN suppresses up to 20 targets simultaneously at such a distance.
The modern history of the holiday began in 2006 with the signing of the corresponding Decree by the President of the Russian Federation. The leadership of our country in electronic warfare is recognized by foreign military experts.
The feats and merits of EW specialists are not noticeable, but this does not make them less significant. Happy holiday to all servicemen and veterans!
The modern army is full of technologies that give a tactical advantage in conflicts. An example of such is the means of communication and their suppression, by means of jamming or physical destruction. In Russia, specialists of this military direction have their own professional holiday.
The content of the article
When celebrate
Day of the specialist in electronic warfare is celebrated on April 15. The holiday is not a day off. It was established by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 549 of May 31, 2006 "On the establishment of professional holidays and memorable days in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation." The document was signed by President V. Putin.
Who is celebrating
All employees of the electronic warfare (EW) troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, regardless of their position, rank, length of service, are related to the celebrations. The holiday is considered by the support staff, cadets, professors of specialized higher educational institutions, soldiers and officers who have ever been in the ranks of these units. The events are attended by engineers and developers of communication products and its suppression, their relatives, friends, relatives and close people.
History and traditions of the holiday
The day of a specialist in electronic warfare of the Russian Federation begins on May 3, 1999, with the publication of Order of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation No. 183. In it, April 15 was defined as the date of honoring specialists of this type of troops. Their importance in the defense of the country, a responsible role in achieving strategic objectives was emphasized by Defense Minister I. Sergeev, who signed the document. After 7 years, the President added the event to the list of memorable days in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
By tradition, fellow officers gather at the festive table, toasts are made, congratulations, wishes of health, peace and success in a responsible profession sound to the sound of glasses. Activities continue with family, friends and loved ones. Here plans for the future are shared, innovations are discussed, stories from everyday work are told.
The command awards employees with certificates of honor, medals, orders. Records of gratitude are entered into personal files. The Day of the Electronic Warfare Specialist 2020 in Russia is accompanied by promotions in ranks and positions for outstanding achievements. The so-called washings of the stars are carried out, which will soon appear on the shoulder straps. Traditionally, the air of radio and television stations mentions the holiday, broadcasts stories about the profession, the history of the formation of the military branch.
About the profession
Experts in electronic warfare are engaged in the development and application of measures to prevent the use of communications by the enemy, determine their coordinates, conduct reconnaissance actions through information communication channels. They arrange sources of interference, identify the location of transmitters and, using their own forces or attached units, destroy enemy equipment.
The path to the profession begins with a fixed-term or contract service, as well as obtaining an education in higher military educational institutions. Officers and soldiers study the materiel in service, acquire theoretical knowledge and practical handling skills about them.
The range of tasks performed is so wide that units are always used as part of other branches of the army. Employees belong to the Ground Forces of the Russian Federation and can be among separate brigades, regiments, and electronic warfare battalions. Before being admitted to the equipment, officers must pass certification, and soldiers must be trained in a special center. It features training samples used in land, sea and air units.
general characteristics
Subdivisions of electronic warfare troops carry out measures to gain dominance in the air, to protect their strategic control systems of troops and weapons from deliberate enemy interference, as well as to disrupt the operation of the enemy's strategic command and control systems, to reduce the effectiveness of the use of his combat assets through the spread of electronic interference.
History
The first attempt in world history to conduct electronic warfare (EW) was successfully undertaken during the war with Japan by the commander of the Pacific squadron, Vice-Admiral S.O. Makarov on April 15, 1904. Then it was possible to disorganize the channels of fire control of the artillery of Japanese ships by radio interference and successfully repel an enemy strike. During the First World War, radio interference was used to disrupt communications between the headquarters of armies, corps and divisions, as well as between warships. To create interference, conventional radio communications were used, and only in the German army there were special radio interference stations.
During the Second World War, electronic warfare was already carried out non-episodically, but continuously, with the use of specially developed means of electronic suppression and protection of radio-electronic means (RES).
In the second half of the 20th century, the rapid development of electronic warfare was observed. One of the main tasks is the electronic suppression of means and systems of radio communication, radio navigation and radar of the enemy, including onboard radar systems of combat aircraft and ships with weapons with radar homing heads. At the same time, the need arose to protect their RES from electronic suppression of the enemy and mutual radio interference. In this regard, the formation of radio countermeasures services in the USSR Armed Forces begins and the creation of special means of jamming enemy radio communications for them.
The first means of radio countermeasures (dipole and corner radio reflectors, training jammers) of industrial production entered the troops by 1950. At the same time, a special electronic warfare service was created in the Soviet army.
On August 30, 1989, the Minister of Defense of the USSR, by his order, created on the basis of the integrated technical control unit (CPC) and a special laboratory of the General Staff the Center for Integrated Technical Control of the General Staff with a location in Moscow. The Center has created a multi-position automated receiving and direction finding network in the Moscow zone.
In the early and mid-1990s, the Electronic Warfare Directorate of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces faced the need not only to ensure the functioning of existing and the development of new electronic equipment, but also to establish interaction with the radio frequency authorities of the post-Soviet states, to agree on the coordination of the use of the radio frequency spectrum with NATO and Western countries. Europe, to determine a new procedure for the use of the radio frequency spectrum of radio electronic devices for various purposes.
Structure
The basis of the EW forces is made up of ground, aviation units and EW subunits, which are part of the formations and formations of the branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms. EW means are combined into an EW weapons system, a set of EW equipment of electronic warfare units and subunits, as well as on-board EW means intended for individual protection of weapons and military equipment (missile systems, combat aircraft, helicopters, ships,
On April 15, Russia annually celebrates the Day of an EW (electronic warfare) specialist. Like many other military holidays of the Russian Federation, the calendar appeared on the basis of presidential decree No. 549 of May 31, 2006 "On the establishment of professional holidays and memorable days in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation."
April 15 was chosen as the date of celebration of the Day of the Electronic Warfare Specialist in connection with the events that took place 112 years ago. On this day, back in 1904, the Japanese battleships Kassuga and Nissin attempted to shell the forts and the inner raid of the Port Arthur fortress. At the same time, there was a continuous telegraph exchange between the Japanese ships.
Japanese armored cruiser "Nissin"
Russian forces at the Zolotoy Gora station and the battleship Pobeda carried out effective opposition to the Japanese telegraph exchange.
Telegraphing was disrupted by the so-called "big spark". This is the name of a signal that surpasses and at the same time suppresses the enemy's frequency signal in its power. Subsequently, the Japanese themselves admitted that the interference by the Russians did not allow them to exchange information over the used radio channel with the required efficiency.
It is noteworthy that about a year before this event, an outstanding Russian engineer, inventor of radio, Alexander Popov, described theses on the high probability of conducting radio reconnaissance and jamming to disrupt the enemy's radio exchange. According to his version, which later found its confirmation, a more powerful signal at the enemy's frequency (or very close to it) is able to minimize the effectiveness of radio traffic. And if initially not everyone in the military command understood the productivity of this kind of counteraction to the enemy, then the above-mentioned events in Port Arthur in April 1904 demonstrated the real significance of "frequency battles" and the correctness of A.S. Popov.
One of the activities of military specialists in "frequency battles" was the direction associated with the interception of enemy telegrams. The tasks of the commanders of the groups working on the interception of information included the definition of, as they would say now, the call signs of the enemy with the possibility of using these call signs for their own purposes, including the goals of disorienting the enemy on the air.
Many years have passed since then, and electronic warfare systems have significantly transformed, adding several orders of magnitude in functionality, however, many of the tasks that were posed to the specialists of the prototype of electronic warfare then remain quite relevant today.
Constant training of specialists in electronic warfare allows improving the skills of using electronic countermeasures to a conventional enemy. During recent exercises, servicemen have worked out the skills of using electronic warfare systems of several models. These are "Krasukha-4S", "Leer-3", "Murmansk", "Moscow". With the help of these complexes, not only electronic protection of their troops is carried out, for example, from strikes of corrected aerial bombs and missiles, but also the suppression of enemy command and control systems.
Complexes "Murmansk-BN" are used to intercept enemy signals, suppress them in the short-wave range. In this range, for example, reconnaissance aircraft operate. In March last year, these systems were successfully used for the first time in the North of the Russian Federation. In the course of training maneuvers, the Murmansk-BN was used to disorganize the command and control of the imaginary enemy's troops at a distance of over 2,000 km. The maximum range of this complex is 5 thousand km with the possibility of simultaneous suppression of more than 20 targets.
The use of the "Krasukha-4S" complex makes it possible to cover command posts, groupings of troops, air defense systems, and important objects of industrial and administrative significance. The complex is capable, based on the analysis of the enemy's signal, to respond to his radar station with jamming radiation.
The number of annual trainings of the EW troops in "field" conditions goes to hundreds, which seemed impossible 10-15 years ago.
Voennoye Obozreniye congratulates specialists in electronic warfare of the RF Armed Forces on the holiday!