Thrice loyal general. The last secret of Andrei Vlasov. Traitor or decent soldier
In the issue for 2004, an article by V. Ryzhov “The Man from the Quagmire” was published, dedicated to General A.A. Vlasov, whose image, despite numerous studies and publications, is still controversial. Their participants are often extremely categorical. For some, A.A. Vlasov is an unconditional traitor, for others - a knight, a fighter with Stalinist regime. But in life, as you know, everything is much more complicated. That is why the editors, having received material that corrects and supplements the opinion of V. Ryzhov, who traditionally considers General A. A. Vlasov a traitor, decided to publish it. It seems to us that a different opinion, confirmed by facts and references to historical sources, deserves attention and will be of interest to history teachers, who may be able to form their own opinion about the infamous general. Therefore, it seems to us that an open discussion of V. Ryzhov's point of view will be useful both for its supporters and opponents.
When viewing one of the issues of the newspaper "History", the attention of the author of these lines was attracted by the publication of Valery Ryzhov "The Man from the Quagmire", dedicated to the fate of the deputy commander of the Volkhov Front and the commander of the 2nd Shock Army, Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov. By the nature of my activity, I have to professionally deal with the history of the Vlasov movement and the problem of the participation of citizens of the Soviet Union in hostilities on the side of the enemy during the Second World War, which is why in the course of reading the publication a number of serious comments and additions arose that may be of interest to readers. The undoubted advantage of the article is the author's desire to avoid traditional, Soviet-era, stereotypical assessments. In this respect, the article compares favorably with the vast majority of journalistic essays about Vlasov, which periodically appear on the pages of the press. However, unfortunately, due to insufficiently deep knowledge of the subject of research or any other reasons, but V. Ryzhov made a number of serious factual errors that require corrections and clarifications. In addition, he voluntarily or involuntarily kept silent about the plots and events that are most directly related to the fate of General Vlasov and the fate of those who shared his fate.
Let's start with what surprises the list of literature recommended to readers in the "We advise you to read" section. The literary prose of N.M. Konyaev and Im. Levin (“Two faces of General Vlasov” and “General Vlasov on this and that side of the front line”) has nothing to do with historical research. The appearance of such near-historical consumer goods in large editions - as a result of the publication in 1973 of the once famous novel by Arkady Vasiliev "At one o'clock in the afternoon, Your Excellency ...", and the low historical culture, alas, characteristic of our modern society. A primitive compilation of selected judgments and testimonies from the "Vlasov" literature published in the West, diluted with their own fantasies and falsifications - this is what the work of both Konyaev and Levin is. With no less success, one could advise the readers of History to get acquainted with national history exclusively with the help of the works of the notorious V. Pikul, although Pikul, of course, is undoubtedly more talented than the mentioned publicists. Palchikov's lone article "The History of General Vlasov", which appeared in 1996, is closer to the genre of historical research, but it also contains factual absurdities, which the limited scope of this publication does not allow to write about in detail. In addition, Palchikov's work does not stand up to any competition in comparison with a number of valuable monographs, which are not reflected in the aforementioned list of references given by Ryzhov. Brochure A.N. Kolesnika ("General Vlasov - a traitor or a hero?") was the first in a series of large-circulation publications about the general. Of undoubted interest is the protocol of the so-called "trial" of Vlasov and senior officers of his army published in it. But this document, extracted from the archival funds of the USSR Ministry of State Security, is so specific and requires such a special reading that it hardly makes sense to use it as a source of information about the Vlasov movement itself. It is sad that V. Ryzhov missed several really professional works devoted to the problem of Soviet military-political collaborationism, which were published in Russia for last years.
The author briefly introduced the reader to the main milestones of the biography and service career of A.A. Vlasov in the Red Army. However, he provided some facts with controversial remarks, and kept silent about something. For example, it is absurd to assert that Vlasov's career growth was associated with repressions against the command personnel of the Red Army in 1937-1938, especially since V. Ryzhov does not provide any evidence of this far-fetched connection. Vlasov received the rank of major in January 1936 (Order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0391). In 1935-37. he served in the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District, and in August 1937 he became commander of the 215th Infantry Regiment. Six months later (February 1938), Major Vlasov took command of the 133rd Infantry Regiment of the 72nd rifle division, and in April 1938 he was appointed assistant division commander. He became a colonel more than two years after being awarded the previous rank - in August 1938 (order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 01378). Thus, before the government trip to China, Vlasov was commander of a rifle regiment for 9 months and assistant division commander for 6 months. Please note that this is a standard job. And the commander of the 72nd division, Colonel Vlasov, short term became only in January 1940, when mass repressions in the Red Army had stopped for a year already. It would be nice for V. Ryzhov to note here that Vlasov received the Order of V.I. Lenin in the winter of 1941 precisely for a business trip to China.
Something is wrong with V. Ryzhov with knowledge of the history of the initial period of the war. For example, he writes that the counterattack on the 4th tank corps Major General A.A. Vlasov near Berdichev did not take place. Actually she took place in the period of July 9-16, 1941, as a result of which the 16th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht suffered significant losses. By the way, this is also evidenced in his well-known memoirs by G.K. Zhukov. Further, it is hardly legitimate to associate the encirclement of the Soviet armies near Kiev with the fact that Vlasov's 37th army firmly defended the city, because. Stalin insisted on holding Kyiv at all costs. V. Ryzhov humiliates Vlasov with the words that by November 1, 1941 he left the German encirclement only with his “field wife” A.P. Podmazenko. Fullness, a month and a half of wandering around the rear of the enemy with the undisguised hostility of the local population - this is not a tourist walk with barbecue. Recall that in the South-West direction in August-October 1941, Soviet generals K.L. Dobroserdov, P.G. Ponedelin, P.F. Privalov, Ya.I. Tonkonogov, brigade commander N.G. in general, they didn’t leave the encirclement - neither with the troops, nor with the “military field wives”. It's probably not their fault, but Vlasov got out. Once in the Russian Imperial Army, getting out of the encirclement alone behind enemy lines was considered a feat.
Using the fantasies of N.M. Konyaev, V. Ryzhov again sins against the truth, arguing that A.A. Vlasov was absent from the 20th Army of the Western Front entrusted to him in the first half of December 1941. The widespread assertion that he did not command the army on December 6-19 “due to inflammation of the middle ear” is nothing more than a legend. Firstly, Vlasov was mentioned in the summary of the Soviet Information Bureau in the list of distinguished Soviet generals already on December 13, and secondly, on December 16, Vlasov was interviewed by an American journalist L. Lesuer at the command post. Finally, in the archives of the 20th Army, stored in the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense in Podolsk (fund 373, inventory 6631), there are enough orders for the army for December 1941 - January 1942, signed by Vlasov. Including - on the categorical prohibition of executions of enemy prisoners of war, on the inadmissibility of submitting false reports and information about trophies to the army headquarters, etc. Another mistake - for the skillful control of the troops of the 20th Army during the Moscow counteroffensive, V. Ryzhov "awarded" Vlasov on February 22, 1942 with the second Order of Lenin. In fact, the general was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, and not on February 22, but on February 1.
Listing the names of the senior commanders of the 2nd Shock Army, V. Ryzhov casually remarks: “Army Chief of Staff Vinogradov died. The head of the Special Department, Shishkov, shot himself. Army Commissar Zuev died in a fight with a German patrol, trying to get out of the encirclement. Lieutenant General Vlasov surrendered. Still, it would be nice for the author of the article to read special literature before taking up a pen. The head of the Special Department of the Headquarters of the 2nd Shock Major of State Security was not called Shishkov, but A.G. Shashkov. Commissioner I.V. Zuev really shot himself during a fight with an enemy patrol, but this patrol was directed at the hiding commissar by local civilian workers who worked at around 105 km of the Babino-Torfyanoe railway section. (For some reason, commissars and political workers, when leaving the encirclement in 1941-1942, often found themselves in similar situations - I wonder why?) Finally, contrary to the statement of V. Ryzhov, General Vlasov did not surrender to the enemy. He was given to the Germans by local Old Believer peasants (oh, those strange locals!).
The circumstances of Vlasov's capture look like this in reality. By June 22, 1942, units of the 2nd Shock Army were finally dissected into separate pockets of resistance. On June 22-23, the army headquarters was located near the river. Glushitsa in the area of the Drovyanoe Pole (according to the map, south of the Chudovo railway station), being subjected to periodic attacks by enemy infantry. In connection with the situation, the commander, headquarters and military council of the army decided to go out in small groups to the location of the Soviet troops of the 59th army. A.A. Vlasov ordered the departments of the headquarters to break through to their own as part of the previously prescribed breakthrough units, formed from fighters of the 46th and 382nd rifle divisions. In the headquarters column, together with the commander, there were 100-120 fighters and commanders. Among them were the chiefs: of the army headquarters - Colonel P.S. Vinogradov, of the Special Department of the NKVD - Major of State Security A.G. Shashkov, army communications - Major General A.V. Afanasiev, intelligence department - Colonel A.S. Rogov and others.
On June 24, at about 23.00, a column under the cover of submachine gunners of the special department of the NKVD and fighters of the security company moved to the headquarters of the 46th Infantry Division, but near the river. Polist came under enemy artillery and mortar fire and crumbled. Rogov came out to his own miraculously, and a company of special officers was covered with mortar fire in the swamps between the river. Glushytsa and r. Polist. Mortally wounded by a mine explosion, Shashkov shot himself at about 2 am on June 25. The group in which A.A. Vlasov (40-45 people), spent the shelling in a large funnel, where the commander was slightly wounded in the leg. On June 25 at 9:30 a.m., the Germans finally cut the "corridor" in the Myasny Bor area and tightly blocked the tormented army units surrounded in the Drovyanoe Pole area. Vlasov's group near the former command post of the 382nd division united with the soldiers of the 46th division, led by its commander, Colonel F.E. Cherny, but then they parted, deciding to act independently. On the night of June 28, the last six fighters left the Myasnoy Bor area, and on June 29, German Colonel General F. Halder made an entry in his diary about the liquidation of the encircled group of Soviet troops on the Volkhov.
On June 25-26, together with Vlasov, about 50 people were looking for salvation. There is evidence that on the afternoon of June 25, the army commander, shocked by the senseless death of the army, went into shock and was in this state for several days. However, Konyaev's "sensational" statements that Vlasov, along with the cook M.I. During the period from June 27 to July 12, Voronova allegedly hid at an unknown checkpoint with a supply of food - nothing more than fiction. On June 26, the Vlasov detachment, commanded by Colonel Vinogradov, crossed the river. Kerest near Olkhovsky farms and took the direction to the village of Vditsko. From about June 27-28, a detachment of Vlasov and Vinogradov wandered around the village of Shelkovka. During the day they sat in old dugouts and primitive shelters, at night they sent out scouts in search of food. In fleeting skirmishes, the forces of the detachment continuously melted away. About Vlasov's wanderings during the first ten days of July and the circumstances of his capture on July 12, 1942, M.I. Voronova, interrogated on September 21, 1945 in the Baranovichi UNKGB, as well as the report of the interpreter of the XXXVIII Army Corps of the 18th Army of the Wehrmacht Sonderführer K. Pelhau. Both sources agree with each other in the main details. By the end of the first ten days of July, by a common decision of the detachment commanders, it was decided to cross the Batetskaya-Leningrad railway line and advance towards the village of Poddubie. Probably, it was during the crossing of the railroad tracks that Colonel Vinogradov was wounded. The chief of staff was constantly shivering from loss of blood, and Vlasov gave him his own overcoat with general insignia.
On the night of July 9 or 10, a greatly depleted detachment, numbering no more than 25-30 people, stopped 2 km from Poddubye. Vinogradov proposed to make their way further in small groups, and the detachment broke up. The fate of Vlasov, of course, could have turned out differently. For example, General Afanasyev already on July 13 near the village of Ostrov met partisans under the command of I.I. Dmitriev and was soon evacuated by plane to the rear. As for the Vlasov group, Vinogradov, the driver Pogibko, the soldier Kotov and the cook Voronova remained barely alive in it. Kotov and Pogibko probably took Vinogradov to the village of Yam-Tesovo, hoping to help him, but the chief of staff died from loss of blood. The fate of Kotov and Pogibko remained unknown, and the corpse of Vinogradov in Vlasov's overcoat was discovered on July 11 by an enemy patrol from the XXXVIII Corps, led by Captain M. von Schwerdtner. Initially, the Germans mistook the deceased for the commander of the army. But on the same day in the evening, Vlasov and Voronova came to the neighboring village of Tukhovezhi in search of food. The house to which they turned turned out to be the house of the local headman. While Vlasov and Voronova were eating, the headman called the local auxiliary police ("self-guard"), who surrounded the house and arrested the wanderers, while Vlasov persistently pretended to be a refugee teacher.
The arrested were put under lock and key in a barn, and the next day von Schwerdtner's patrol arrived in Tukhovezhi and identified Vlasov (by a portrait in a newspaper), by the way, noticing his resemblance to the deceased Vinogradov. For the extradition of Vlasov, the headman received a cow, 10 packs of shag, two bottles of caraway vodka and a certificate of honor from the German command of the 18th Army. Of course, Vlasov could have shot himself during his arrest - the party taught the Soviet person to be indifferent to his own and to someone else's life. But by July 1942, more than 70 generals of the Red Army were in German captivity. The vast majority of them could have shot themselves during captivity, but by a strange coincidence they did not shoot themselves, including the generals, whose fate is traditionally opposed to the fate of Vlasov: D.M. Karbyshev, M.F. Lukin, P.G. Ponedelina and others. then no one blames the lack of a suicide attempt. Those who still reproach Vlasov with a failed suicide, let them try to put themselves in his place.
V. Ryzhov believes that in captivity Vlasov succumbed to the temptation, exchanging the concentration camp for a "comfortable mansion in Berlin", but such a judgment is sly. Vlasov was not in a concentration camp, but in a prisoner of war camp - there was a fundamental difference between these concepts. The captured colonels and generals of the Red Army were treated incomparably better than ordinary soldiers and junior commanders, especially since the winter of 1941-1942, which was terrible for prisoners of war in terms of mortality. left in the past. Of the 83 captured generals, brigade commanders and commanders, whose ranks can be equated to such, only 9 people died from hunger, deprivation, the consequences of injuries and illnesses received in German captivity - less than 8%! Vlasov was physically strong, healthy, and not spoiled by comfort. He had every chance to save his life in captivity and, returning to his homeland after the war, to take a warm nomenklatura position of head of a department in some university. This happened with generals I.I. Alekseev, I.M. Antyufeev, I.P. Bikzhanov, M.D. Borisov, K.L. Dobroserdov, A.S. Zotov, I.A. Melnikov, M.G. Snegov and others who did not compromise themselves in any way before the regime. This could have happened to the commander of the 2nd Shock Army.
Vlasov, signing the first anti-Stalinist statement after much thought, understood perfectly well that he was changing the camp hut ... not for a "comfortable mansion", but on a noose in the courtyard of the Butyrka prison. He had no illusions about the possible fate of relatives and friends who remained in the USSR. Another confirmation of this can be the little-known words of Lieutenant General M.F. Lukin, with which the former commander of the 19th Army partly motivated his own unwillingness to participate in the Vlasov movement: “I know what awaits me in my homeland: a pension and a modest house where I am like the cripple could have lived his life." And no matter how one relates to Vlasov and his act, one cannot but admit the obvious: a completely prosperous, successful Soviet general, treated kindly by the System and the leader, deliberately refused “a pension and a modest house” in the name of a ghostly, almost impracticable opportunity to become the head of the anti-Stalinist movement. This serious circumstance in the fate of General V. Ryzhov either does not see or does not take into account.
Of course, no doubt, General Vlasov committed high treason by agreeing to head the Anti-Stalin Committee. However, Vlasov betrayed the state, which systematically exterminated millions of its own citizens, deprived them of their rights to property and property, and finally deliberately refused to protect the rights of their prisoners of war. Why, then, were prisoners of war obliged to maintain civic loyalty to such a state? A similar act in Soviet captivity was made by the commander of the LI Army Corps of the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht, General of Artillery Walter von Seidlitz-Kurzbach, who in 1943 became one of the leaders of the anti-Nazi Union of German Officers (SNO) and the National Committee "Free Germany" (NKSG). In West Germany in 1956, General Seidlitz was rehabilitated, he is considered a hero, because. “guided in his activities mainly by a hostile attitude towards National Socialism”. Although, we note, the scale of the crimes committed by the Nazis in relation to the German people cannot be compared with the scale of the crimes committed by the party nomenclature of the RCP (b) - VKP (b) in relation to the Russian people and other peoples of Russia.
Seidlitz was only traumatized by the fate of tens of thousands of soldiers and officers of the 6th Army, doomed by Hitler to death in Stalingrad and in the subsequent Soviet captivity. And Vlasov and those who followed him could bring Stalin and the party much more terrible accusations, in addition to the mediocre ruined armies in 1941-1942. The most serious omission of V. Ryzhov seems to us to be the fact that he considers the phenomenon of Vlasov's fate and his doomed movement outside the context of the era and previous decades of the history of the Soviet state. Let me remind readers that the scope of the terror unleashed in the 30s. party-Chekist nomenklatura against their own people, hardly has analogues in history. For example, only according to official data, in 1932-1940. in places of special settlements, 1.8 million dispossessed peasants died from inhuman conditions of existence and hard labor. Victims of the famine organized by the authorities after the collectivization of 1932-1933. on the Don and Kuban, in Kazakhstan, Moldova, the Volga region, in Ukraine amounted to at least 7.5-8 million people. Only in 1936-1938. in the USSR, the NKVD arrested 1,420,711 people, of which 678,407 were sentenced to death. In 1917-1941. the Bolsheviks killed 134 thousand clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church. What other people have experienced something like this?! It is not difficult to imagine that unprecedented social collisions would inevitably lead to mass cooperation of part of the population and prisoners of war with the enemy in the conditions of a major war. And is it not with this sad circumstance that the fact that in 1941-1945. on the side of the German armed forces carried military service approximately 1.1 million citizens of the USSR? But this means that approximately every 17th serviceman on the enemy's side was our compatriot. In this regard, the appearance on the historical stage of such a figure as General Vlasov was, to a certain extent, a natural event generated by Soviet reality. So it makes no sense to reduce to an ordinary betrayal an act of a person committed in relation to a country that is actually in a state of civil war, which did not disappear anywhere with the beginning of World War II.
Separate judgments of V. Ryzhov are capable of shocking. For example: “Cooperation with KONR may have saved someone from starvation, but after the war, almost all of them ended up in the northern camps.” Such a thesis is typical not so much for a historian as for formed Communist Party managers who for decades affirmed with inspiration: "Our main wealth is people." Indeed, there were so many people in the Soviet Union that they could pave endless roads and highways, leave hundreds of thousands in German "cauldrons", use them in military exercises using atomic weapons, and so on. Firstly, the abstract category “someone”, not specified by Ryzhov, actually amounted to hundreds of thousands of people. The actual existence of the KONR and the activities of the Main Civil Directorate of the KONR were invaluable for real improvement in the winter of 1944-1945. the domestic situation of Soviet prisoners of war and Ostarbeiters, from the protection of the rights of which the government of the USSR completely refused. According to the logic of V. Ryzhov, the help rendered to these people did not make any sense, because anyway, Stalin's Gulag awaited them. To complete the picture, V. Ryzhov only had to regret that the Nazis did not destroy all Soviet prisoners of war and all Ostarbeiters - the Soviet punitive authorities would have had less trouble after the war.
Quoting the Prague Manifesto of 1944 published 60 years ago, V. Ryzhov does not mention that this manifesto was written by three Soviet intellectuals who were repressed before the war - the microbiologist A.N. Zaitsev, the son of a priest, the architect N.A. Troitsky and the journalist N.V. Kovalchuk. The authors of the document did not just try to formulate some kind of positive program, they expressed the aspirations that were actually shared by a significant part of the “sub-Soviet” people. V. Ryzhov practically kept silent about the main provisions of the Prague Manifesto, although they deserve mention: the overthrow of Stalinist tyranny, the end of the war and the conclusion of an honorable peace with Germany on terms that do not affect the honor and independence of Russia, the destruction of the regime of terror and violence, the dissolution of concentration camps and collective farms, the transfer land to peasants in private ownership, the introduction of real freedom of religion, conscience, speech, assembly, press. There is no doubt that at the end of 1944 all the Vlasov events were hopelessly late, here one cannot but agree with V. Ryzhov. But, as I.L. Novosiltsev, who knew General well, testified to the author in 1995, “Vlasov wanted to show with this manifesto what he and his like-minded people fought for and in the end gave their own lives.” The Prague Manifesto is valuable precisely because it was written by three citizens of the USSR and, despite the conditions of Nazi censorship, was a positive and attractive document that attracted supporters to Vlasov even in 1945. After all, the last 9 commanders of the Red Army arrived from prisoner of war camps to join Vlasov army ... April 8-9. V.T.Shalamov in "Kolyma Tales" testifies how one of the Vlasovites, who arrived at their camp in 1946 on a stage from Italy, miraculously managed to save and bring a copy of the manifesto to Kolyma. Many Vlasovites counted not so much on the strength of arms as on the effectiveness of their own political program.
V. Ryzhov's ideas about the Vlasov army - the armed forces of the KONR (AF KONR) - are equally superficial. The former fighters of the anti-partisan brigade of B.V. Kaminsky, who really behaved outrageously in Warsaw in August 1944, did not in any way serve as the "core for the emerging 1st division." Firstly, by the time the Warsaw Uprising began, there were about 7 thousand military personnel in the Kaminsky brigade, and only a consolidated regiment was sent to Warsaw, formed from the most marginal elements (1.7 thousand people - 25% of the personnel brigades). Secondly, of the entire Kaminsky brigade, only 3.2 thousand people were enrolled in the 1st division, while the total number of the division exceeded 18 thousand people. Its main part was not made up of Kaminians, but the military personnel of the former eastern battalions of the ROA, transferred to Vlasov from the West Army Group. Probably, there were criminals and criminals among the Kamenians, but their looting attitude towards the civilian population of Warsaw was not much different from the attitude of the Red Army soldiers towards the civilian population of East Prussia in the winter - spring of 1945. The point, probably, is not in the army affiliation, but in the peculiarities of the mentality of the Soviet person. By the way, we note that when moving the march of the 1st division in the second half of April 1945, the German civil authorities noted the discipline and correct behavior of the Vlasovites in relation to the local population.
The Vlasovites entered the battle against units of the Red Army for the first time not in April, but on February 8, 1945. On that day, the anti-tank detachment of Colonel I.K. Sakharova achieved partial success in an attack near the town of Nei-Levin on a position occupied by units of the 990th regiment of the 230th Stalinist rifle division. combat operation The 1st division "April Wind" on the Oder on April 13, which V. Ryzhov stubbornly calls a "lost battle", in fact, was not lost. Two Vlasov infantry regiments attacked the bridgehead held by the forces of the 415th separate machine gun and artillery battalion from the 119th fortified area of the 33rd Army of the 1st Belorussian Front. During the first attack, the Vlasovites occupied the first line of trenches, having achieved success where the Germans could not achieve it for two months. But then, during the battle, the division commander, Major General S.K. Bunyachenko refused to continue unpromising attacks due to the strong artillery cover of the bridgehead from the eastern bank of the Oder. He carefully led the regiments out of the battle, and the fighting qualities of the Vlasovites were mentioned in a positive context in the report of the High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW) dated April 14, 1945.
It is surprising that V. Ryzhov writes practically nothing about the officers who served in Vlasov's army. But among them were the regular commanders of the Red Army (5 major generals, 2 brigade commanders, 29 colonels, 16 lieutenant colonels, 41 majors), who had excellent attestations while serving in the Red Army, and even three Heroes of the Soviet Union (pilots Antilevsky, Bychkov and Tennikov ). A number of commanders of the Red Army, having spent from one to three years in German camps, joined Vlasov after the publication of the Prague Manifesto and the creation of the KONR, when no one doubted the outcome of the war. Among them are colonels A.F. Vanyushin, A.A. Funtikov, lieutenant colonels I.F. Rudenko and A.P. Skugarevsky and others. V. Ryzhov does not inform the reader that in April 1945, under the legal command of A.A . Vlasov, there were more than 120 thousand people, however, who did not have time to complete the reorganization. The Vlasov army, which arose between November 1944 and April 1945, was armed with 44 aircraft, about 25 tanks and armored vehicles, more than 570 mortars, 230 guns, 2 thousand machine guns, etc. Did something similar take place in the national military history? Only 25 years separated the First World War from the Second World War. But in 1914-1917. not a single regular Russian officer who was captured served on the side of Germany. Attempts to form military units from Russian prisoners of war of a lower composition also did not give the Kaiser command a tangible result. Just over a quarter of a century later, the situation looked exactly the opposite. Therefore, something has happened in the country in these 25 years...
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Commander of the Air Force KONR Major General (in 1945)
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In addition, V. Ryzhov unreliably describes the history of the intervention of the Vlasovites in the Prague uprising on May 5-8, 1945. Bunyachenko agreed to help the Czech rebels only after he received an ultimatum from the German commandant of Prague, General R. Toussaint. Toussaint threatened to use all the forces of the Prague garrison against the 1st Vlasov division if Bunyachenko continued to ignore the orders of the command of the German Army Group Center. And the former colonel of the Red Army had no choice but to support the rebels. Captain M.I. Yakushov could not arrest General Vlasov on May 12, 1945 in front of the "disarmed Vlasov division" for the simple reason that Vlasov was detained by Soviet machine gunners deep in the American zonal territory in a small convoy of seven vehicles, while the 1st division it has been gone for several hours now. V. Ryzhov did not mention that tens of thousands of Cossacks and Vlasovites, who surrendered to the mercy of the Anglo-American allies, in 1945-1947. bloody forced repatriations to the Soviet zones of occupation from Lienz, Plattling, Dachau and other equally terrible places were waiting.
Finally, describing the final fate of A.A. Vlasov, V. Ryzhov ignores three important facts that any researcher would have to pay attention to. Firstly, Vlasov refused to abandon his own soldiers three times. For the first time - in June 1942 on the Volkhov near Novaya Kerest, when the last plane flew behind him to evacuate the commander to the deep rear. For the second time - in April 1945, when General F. Franco granted Vlasov political asylum and a special plane was ready to deliver the Chairman of the Presidium of the KONR to Spain. For the third time - on May 12, 1945, when the American commandant, US Army Captain R. Donahue offered to secretly take Vlasov deep into the American occupation zone, providing him with food cards and documents. But Vlasov went to the headquarters of the 3rd US Army in Pilsen to seek political asylum for soldiers and officers of the KONR Armed Forces. I would like to note that, for example, Vice-Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky and General I.E. Petrov, who led the defense of Sevastopol, shamefully abandoned the troops of the Sevastopol defensive region at the end of June 1942 and safely saved their own lives, setting an example of a characteristic Soviet system military prowess.
Secondly, over A.A. Vlasov, S.K. Bunyachenko, V.F. Malyshkin, V.I. Maltsev, M.A. Meandrov, F.I. Trukhin and other leaders of the Vlasov movement in 1946, an open trial was being prepared. All Soviet people were to angrily brand the contemptible traitors. However, the aforementioned "traitors" showed stubbornness uncommon for the clutches of the Stalinist investigation, defending their own political views. As a result, on April 26, 1946, the head of the SMERSH GUKR, Colonel-General V.S. Abakumov, turned to Stalin with a letter. The main obstacle that prevented an open trial in the October Hall of the House of the Unions, in the words of Abakumov, was the behavior "some defendants". Fearing the presentation of the defendants on open process anti-Soviet views “which can objectively coincide with the moods of a certain part of the population dissatisfied with the Soviet regime”, Abakumov asked Stalin to "hear the case of traitors ... in a closed court session... without the participation of the parties. The closed trial is one of the most convincing proofs of the political nature of the Vlasov movement. Finally, third, the decision to execute the general and his associates was not made on July 31, as V. Ryzhov is trying to assure the reader. Moreover, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR did not accept it either. The decision to execute General Vlasov and other leaders of the KONR was made at a meeting of the Politburo on July 23, 1946 by representatives of the highest party nomenclature of the CPSU (b) during the week before the start of the process. Ulrich's collegium only announced the Stalinist verdict, and the so-called "trial" was a common massacre for political reasons. Vlasov and other leaders of the movement were hanged not on the 2nd, but on the night of August 1, 1946, in the courtyard of the Butyrka prison. The remains of the executed were cremated and buried in the nameless moat of the Donskoy Monastery, where since the 1930s. buried the ashes of the victims of Stalinist repressions.
Lieutenant General Andrei Andreevich Vlasov is a tragic figure in modern Russian history. He was not an ordinary traitor, because. maintaining the status of a prisoner of war guaranteed his life and career to a much greater extent than the dangerous and uncertain prospect of an anti-Stalinist leader. The fate of Vlasov to a certain extent reflected the fate of hundreds of thousands of people, broken by the Stalinist regime and methodically erased into camp dust, for whom the white-blue-red stripe "ROA" remained the last chance to regain their lost dignity. Vlasov was not a successful, cunning politician who knew when and on which horse to bet; he surprisingly combined extraordinary will and naive hope in the decency of individual Germans or in the loyalty of the Anglo-American allies to their own democratic principles. But the chairman of the KONR was himself a decent soldier who managed to overcome his psychological dependence on Stalinism and dared to openly challenge it. Of course, because of the barbed wire of the German camp, this was easier to do, but even such an act required extraordinary determination and courage. After all, the majority of our compatriots still do not want to properly evaluate and comprehend Soviet period Russian history. There is no doubt that dozens more studies will be written about Vlasov and the tragedy of the Vlasov army. It is only important that their authors be professionals who not only know the factual side of events, but also feel the pain of that time.
Aleksandrov K.M. The officer corps of the army of Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasova, 1944-1945. SPb., 2001.
Aleksandrov K.M. against Stalin. Vlasovites and Eastern Volunteers in the Second World War. Sat. articles and materials. SPb., 2003.
Aleksandrov K.M. Army Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov 1944-1945. Materials for the history of the Armed Forces of the KONR. SPb., 2004.
Drobyazko S.I.. Russian Liberation Army. M., 2000.
Ermolov I.G., Drobyazko S.I.. Anti-Partisan Republic. M., 2001.
Okorokov A.V.. Anti-Soviet military formations during the Second World War. M., 2000.
Hoffmann I. History of the Vlasov army. Paris, 1990.
Tsurganov Yu.S. Failed revenge. White emigration in World War II. M., 2001.
Kirill ALEXANDROV,
Candidate of Historical Sciences,
history teacher
(St. Petersburg)
In the summer of 1942, Lieutenant General Andrei Vlasov of the Red Army was captured by the Nazis. He was not the first Soviet general to fall into the hands of the Germans. But Vlasov, unlike others, went to active cooperation, agreeing to take the side of Hitler.
From the beginning of the war, the Nazis were looking for collaborators among the captured Soviet military leaders. First of all, they staked on those who are older, in the hope of playing on nostalgic feelings for imperial Russia. This calculation, however, was not justified.
Vlasov, for the Germans, was a real surprise. A man agreed to cooperate with them, who owed his entire career to the Soviet system, a general who was considered Stalin's favorite.
How did General Vlasov end up in captivity, and why did he embark on the path of betrayal?
"I always stood firmly on the general line of the party"
The thirteenth child in a peasant family, Andrei Vlasov was preparing for a career as a priest. The revolution changed priorities - in 1919, an 18-year-old guy was drafted into the army, with which he connected his life. Having shown himself well in the final part of the Civil War, Vlasov continued his military career.
Young commander of the Red Army Vlasov with his wife Anna, 1926.
In 1929 he graduated from the Higher Army Command Courses "Shot". In 1930 he joined the CPSU (b). In 1935 he became a student of the MV Frunze Military Academy.
The repressions of 1937-1938 not only did not hurt Vlasov, but also helped his career growth. In 1938, assistant commander of the 72nd Infantry Division. In the fall of 1938, Vlasov was seconded to China as a military adviser, and in 1939 he became acting chief military adviser to the USSR under the government of Chiang Kai-shek.
After returning to the USSR in January 1940, Vlasov was appointed commander of the 99th Infantry Division. Soon the division becomes the best in the Kiev military district, and one of the best in the Red Army.
Hero of the first months of the war
In January 1941, Vlasov was appointed commander of the 4th Mechanized Corps of the Kiev Special Military District, and a month later he was awarded the Order of Lenin.War can be a difficult test for those officers who make a career not thanks to knowledge and skills, but with the help of intrigues and groveling before their superiors.
However, this does not apply to Vlasov. His corps fought with dignity in the first weeks near Lvov, holding back the onslaught of the Germans. Major General Vlasov earned high praise for his actions, and was appointed commander of the 37th Army.
During the defense of Kyiv, Vlasov's army was surrounded, from which hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers and officers did not leave. Vlasov was among the lucky ones who managed to escape from the "boiler".
In November 1941, Andrei Vlasov received a new appointment. He is ordered to form and lead the 20th Army, which will take part in the counteroffensive near Moscow.
The 20th Army took part in the Klinsko-Solnechnogorsk offensive operation, the troops defeated the main forces of the 3rd and 4th tank groups of the enemy, threw them back to the line of the Lama River - the Ruza River and liberated several settlements, including Volokolamsk.
Rewarding General Vlasov in 1942.
Andrei Vlasov was included in the official Soviet propaganda among the heroes of the battle for Moscow. On January 4, 1942, for these battles, Vlasov was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and promoted to lieutenant general.
Appointment to the Volkhov Front
Leading Soviet and foreign correspondents are interviewing Vlasov, and a book about him is planned. Everything indicates that Vlasov was considered by the top Soviet leadership as one of the most promising military leaders. That is why in early March 1942 he was assigned to one of the most important sectors of the Soviet-German front - Vlasov became deputy commander of the Volkhov Front.Since January 1942, the troops of the front, in cooperation with units of the Leningrad Front, have been conducting an offensive operation, the purpose of which is to break the blockade of Leningrad. At the forefront of the Soviet offensive is the 2nd shock army, which managed to break through the enemy's defenses and move forward significantly.
However, the troops had to advance through forest and swampy terrain, which seriously hampered operations. In addition, the breakthrough has not been able to expand. At the most successful moment, the width of its neck did not exceed 12 kilometers, which created the danger of a German counterattack and the encirclement of Soviet units.
In February 1942, the pace of the offensive dropped sharply. The task set by Moscow to take the settlement of Lyuban by March 1 was not fulfilled. On July 12, 1942, the commander of the 2nd shock army, General Vlasov, was captured by the Germans. He pointed out the reason: heavy losses of the 2nd shock army, lack of reserves, supply problems.
Andrey Vlasov was sent to strengthen the command staff of the front.
Break the blockade at any cost
Things were getting worse. On March 15, 1942, the German counteroffensive began, and a direct threat of encirclement loomed over the 2nd shock army. They did not stop the offensive and withdraw the divisions. This is usually interpreted as a whim and stupidity of the Soviet leadership.But we must not forget that the offensive was carried out for the sake of the blockade of Leningrad, Famine in the besieged city continued to methodically kill people. Refusal to advance meant a death sentence for hundreds of thousands of people. Furious battles were going on behind the supply corridor of the 2nd shock army. It then closed completely, then again made its way, however, with a much smaller width.
On March 20, a commission headed by Lieutenant General Vlasov was sent to the 2nd shock army with a check. The commission returned back without him - he was left to control and help the commander Nikolai Klykov.
In early April, Klykov fell seriously ill. On April 20, Vlasov was approved as commander of the army, with the post of deputy front commander retained. Vlasov was not happy with the appointment - he got not fresh, but badly battered troops, who were in a difficult situation. Meanwhile, the Volkhov Front was united with the Leningrad Front under the general command of Colonel General Mikhail Khozin. He received an order to release the army.
General Khozin thought about the plans promised to the Headquarters for three weeks, and then suddenly reported that the 2nd shock army should be taken to the neck of the breakthrough, expanded, and then consolidated at this line, and the offensive should be moved to another sector.
In fact, Khozin repeated what Meretskov had insisted on earlier, but three weeks were wasted senselessly. All this time, the troops of the 2nd shock army, eating breadcrumbs and horsemeat, suffering heavy losses, continued to hold their positions.
On May 14, the Stavka issues a directive on the withdrawal of the 2nd shock army from the Luban salient. General Khozin himself received a similar order verbally two days earlier.
But what about Vlasov himself? He carried out the duties assigned to him, but did not show any large-scale initiative. The fate of his army was determined by others. Despite everything, the first stage of the withdrawal of the 2nd shock army was successful. But the Nazis, realizing that prey was escaping, stepped up the pressure.
The disaster began on May 30. Taking advantage of the overwhelming advantage in aviation, the enemy launched a decisive offensive. On May 31, the corridor through which the 2nd shock army exited slammed shut, and this time the Germans managed to strengthen their positions in the area.
More than 40 thousand people ended up in the "cauldron" Soviet soldiers. Exhausted by hunger, people under continuous attacks by German aircraft and artillery continued to fight, breaking out of the encirclement.
The path to salvation through the "Valley of Death"
Later, Vlasov and his supporters would say that the Soviet command "left the 2nd shock army to its fate." This is not true, attempts to deblockade did not stop, units tried to break through a new corridor to the encircled.On June 8, 1942, General Khozin was removed from his post, the Volkhov Front again became a separate unit, and General Meretskov was sent to save the situation. Personally, Stalin set him the task of withdrawing the 2nd shock army from the "cauldron", even if without heavy weapons.
Meretskov gathered all the reserves of the front into a fist in order to break through to Vlasov's army. But on the other hand, the Nazis were transferring more and more new forces.
On June 16, a radiogram arrives from Vlasov: “The personnel of the troops are exhausted to the limit, the number of deaths is increasing, and the incidence of exhaustion is increasing every day. As a result of the cross-fire of the army area, the troops suffer heavy losses from artillery mortar fire and enemy aircraft ...
The combat composition of the formations has sharply decreased. It is no longer possible to replenish it at the expense of rears and special units. Everything that was taken. On the sixteenth of June in battalions, brigades and rifle regiments, on average, several dozen people remained.
On June 19, 1942, a corridor was broken through which several thousand Soviet soldiers were able to get out. But the next day, under air strikes, the saving path from the encirclement was again blocked.
On June 21, a corridor with a width of 250 to 400 meters was opened. It was shot through, hundreds of people died, but still several thousand people were able to go out to their own.
On the same day, a new radiogram came from Vlasov: “Army troops have been receiving fifty grams of crackers for three weeks. The last days there was absolutely no food. We eat the last horses. People are extremely exhausted. Group mortality from starvation is observed. There is no ammunition ... ".
The corridor for the exit of fighters at the cost of heavy losses was held until June 23. The agony of the 2nd shock army was coming. The territory she controlled was now being shot through by the enemy.
On the evening of June 23, the soldiers of the 2nd shock army went to a new breakthrough. It was possible to open a corridor about 800 meters wide. The space, which was narrowing all the time, was called the "Valley of Death". Those who went through it said that it was a real hell. Only the luckiest managed to break through.
The last hours of the 2nd shock
On the same day, the Germans attacked Vlasov's command post. The fighters of the company of the special department managed to repulse the attack, which allowed the staff workers to retreat, but the leadership of the troops was lost.In one of the last radiograms, Meretskov warned Vlasov that on June 24 the troops outside the “cauldron” would make a last decisive attempt to save the 2nd Shock Army. Vlasov appointed for this day the exit from the encirclement of the headquarters and rear services. On the evening of June 24, the corridor was opened again, but now its width did not exceed 250 meters.
The headquarters column, however, having gone astray, ran into German bunkers. Enemy fire fell on her, Vlasov himself was slightly wounded in the leg. Of those who were next to Vlasov, only the head of the intelligence department of the army Rogov managed to break through to his night, who alone found a saving corridor.
Around 9:30 am on June 25, 1942, the ring around the 2nd shock army slammed shut completely. More than 20 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers remained surrounded. In the following weeks, singly and in small groups, several hundred more people managed to escape.
But what is important is that German sources record that there were no facts of mass surrender. The Nazis noted that the Russians in Myasny Bor preferred to die with weapons in their hands. The 2nd shock army died heroically, not knowing what a black shadow would fall on it because of its commander ....
Rescue of General Afanasyev
Both the Germans and ours, knowing that the command of the 2nd shock army remained surrounded, tried to find him at all costs. Vlasov's headquarters, meanwhile, tried to get out. The few surviving witnesses claimed that a breakdown occurred in the general after the failed breakthrough. He looked indifferent, did not hide from the shelling.The command of the detachment was taken over by the chief of staff of the 2nd shock army, Colonel Vinogradov. The group, wandering around the rear, tried to get to their own. She entered into skirmishes with the Germans, suffered losses, gradually decreasing.
The key moment occurred on the night of 11 July. Vinogradov, the chief of staff, suggested that we split up into groups of several people and go out to our own. He was objected to by the chief of communications of the army, Major General Afanasyev. He suggested that everyone go together to the Oredezh River and Lake Chernoye, where they could feed themselves by fishing, and where partisan detachments should be located.
Afanasiev's plan was rejected, but no one began to prevent him from moving along his route. 4 people left with Afanasyev.
Literally a day later, Afanasyev's group met with partisans who contacted the "Great Land". A plane arrived for the general, which took him to the rear.
Aleksey Vasilyevich Afanasyev turned out to be the only representative of the senior command staff of the 2nd shock army who managed to get out of the encirclement. After the hospital, he returned to duty, and continued to serve, ending his career as chief of communications artillery Soviet army.
"Don't shoot, I'm General Vlasov!"
Vlasov's group was reduced to four people. He broke up with Vinogradov, who was ill, because of which the general gave him his overcoat.On July 12, Vlasov's group split up to go to two villages in search of food. The cook of the canteen of the military council of the army, Maria Voronova, remained with the general.
General Vasov in a POW camp.
They entered the village of Tukhovezhi, introducing themselves as refugees. Vlasov, who introduced himself as a school teacher, asked for food. They were fed, after which they unexpectedly pointed their weapons and locked them in a barn. The “hospitable host” turned out to be the local headman, who called for help local residents from the Auxiliary Police.
It is known that Vlasov had a pistol with him, but he did not resist. The headman did not recognize the general, but considered the newcomers to be partisans.
On the morning of the next day, a German special group drove into the village, which the headman asked to pick up the prisoners. The Germans waved it off, because they were following ... General Vlasov.
The day before, the German command received information that General Vlasov had been killed in a skirmish with a German patrol. The corpse in the general's overcoat, which was examined by the members of the group upon arrival, was identified as the body of the commander of the 2nd shock army. In fact, it was Colonel Vinogradov who was killed.
On the way back, having already passed Tukhovezhi, the Germans remembered their promise and returned for the unknown. When the barn door opened, a phrase in German sounded out of the darkness:
- Do not shoot, I am General Vlasov!
Two Fates: Andrey Vlasov vs. Ivan Antyufeev
At the very first interrogations, the general began to give detailed testimony, reporting on the state of the Soviet troops, and giving characteristics to the Soviet military leaders. And a few weeks later, while in a special camp in Vinnitsa, Andrei Vlasov himself would offer the Germans his services in the fight against the Red Army and Stalin's regime.What made him do this? Vlasov's biography shows that from the Soviet system and from Stalin, he not only did not suffer, but received everything he had. The story about the abandoned 2nd shock army, as shown above, is also a myth.
For comparison, we can cite the fate of another general who survived the Myasny Bor disaster.
Ivan Mikhailovich Antyufeev, commander of the 327th Rifle Division, took part in the battle for Moscow, and then with his unit was transferred to break the blockade of Leningrad. The 327th division achieved the greatest success in the Luban operation. Just as the 316th Rifle Division was unofficially called "Panfilovskaya", the 327th Rifle Division received the name "Antyufeevskaya".
Antyufeev received the rank of major general at the height of the fighting near Lyuban, and did not even have time to change the colonel's shoulder straps to the general's, which played a role in his future fate. The divisional commander also remained in the "boiler", and was wounded on July 5 while trying to escape.
Ivan Mikhailovich Antyufeev
The Nazis, having taken the officer prisoner, tried to persuade him to cooperate, but were refused. At first he was kept in a camp in the Baltic states, but then someone reported that Antyufeev was in fact a general. He was immediately transferred to a special camp.
When it became known that he was the commander of the best division of Vlasov's army, the Germans began to rub their hands. It seemed to them self-evident that Antyufeev would follow the path of his boss. But even having met with Vlasov face to face, the general refused the offer of cooperation with the Germans.
Antyufeev was shown a fabricated interview in which he declared his readiness to work for Germany. They explained to him - now for the Soviet leadership he is an undoubted traitor. But even here the general answered "no."
General Antyufeev stayed in the concentration camp until April 1945, when he was liberated by American troops. He returned to his homeland, was reinstated in the cadres of the Soviet Army. In 1946, General Antyufeev was awarded the Order of Lenin. He retired from the army in 1955 due to illness.
But here's a strange thing - the name of General Antyufeev, who remained faithful to the oath, is known only to lovers of military history, while everyone knows about General Vlasov.
"He had no convictions - he had ambition"
So why did Vlasov make the choice he made? Maybe because in life he loved fame and career growth more than anything. Suffering in the captivity of lifetime glory did not promise, not to mention comfort. And Vlasov stood, as he thought, on the side of the strong.Let us turn to the opinion of a person who knew Andrei Vlasov. The writer and journalist Ilya Ehrenburg met the general at the peak of his career, in the midst of a successful battle for him near Moscow. Here is what Ehrenburg wrote about Vlasov years later:
“Of course, the alien soul is dark; yet I dare to state my conjectures. Vlasov is not Brutus and not Prince Kurbsky, it seems to me that everything was much simpler. Vlasov wanted to complete the task entrusted to him; he knew that Stalin would congratulate him again, that he would receive another order, that he would exalt himself, that he would amaze everyone with his art of interrupting quotations from Marx with Suvorov jokes.
It turned out differently: the Germans were stronger, the army was again surrounded. Vlasov, wanting to save himself, changed his clothes. Seeing the Germans, he was frightened: a simple soldier could be killed on the spot. Once in captivity, he began to think about what to do. He knew political literacy well, admired Stalin, but he had no convictions - he had ambition.
He knew that his military career was over. If the Soviet Union wins, it will be demoted at best. So, there is only one thing left: to accept the offer of the Germans and do everything so that Germany wins. Then he will be the commander-in-chief or the minister of war of a ripped Russia under the auspices of the victorious Hitler.
Of course, Vlasov never said that to anyone, he declared on the radio that he had long hated the Soviet system, that he longed to “liberate Russia from the Bolsheviks,” but he himself gave me a proverb: “Every Fedorka has his own excuses” ... Bad people is everywhere, it does not depend on the political system, nor on education.
General Vlasov was mistaken - betrayal did not bring him back to the top. On August 1, 1946, Andrei Vlasov, deprived of his title and awards, was hanged in the courtyard of the Butyrka prison for treason.
A tall man in round glasses has not been able to sleep for several days now. The main traitor, General of the Red Army Andrei Vlasov, is interrogated by several NKVD investigators, replacing each other day and night for ten days. They are trying to understand how they could miss the traitor in their orderly ranks, devoted to the cause of Lenin and Stalin.
He had no children, he never had a spiritual attachment to women, his parents died. All he had was his life. And he loved to live. His father, a church elder, was proud of his son.
Parental traitorous roots
Andrei Vlasov never dreamed of being a military man, but, as a literate person who graduated from a religious school, he was drafted into the ranks of Soviet commanders. He often came to his father and saw how he was destroying new government his ancestral strong nest.
He used to betray
Parsing archival documents, traces of Vlasov's military operations on the fronts of the Civil War cannot be found. He was a typical staff "rat", which, by the will of fate, ended up at the top of the country's command podium. One fact speaks about how he moved up the career ladder. Arriving with an inspection to the 99th Infantry Division and learning that the commander was engaged in a thorough study of the methods of action of the German troops, he immediately wrote a denunciation of him. The commander of the 99th Rifle Division, which was one of the best in the Red Army, was arrested and shot. Vlasov was appointed to his place. This behavior has become the norm for him. No remorse of conscience of this man was tormented.
First environment
In the early days of the Great Patriotic War, Vlasov's army was surrounded near Kiev. The general leaves the encirclement not in the ranks of his units, but together with his fighting girlfriend.
But Stalin forgave him this offense. Vlasov received a new appointment - to lead the main attack near Moscow. But he is in no hurry to go to the troops, referring to pneumonia and poor health. According to one version, the entire preparation of the operation near Moscow fell on the shoulders of the most experienced staff officer Leonid Sandalov.
"Star disease" - the second reason for betrayal
Stalin appoints Vlasov as the main winner of the battle near Moscow.
The general begins "star fever". According to the reviews of his colleagues, he becomes rude, arrogant, mercilessly curses his subordinates. Constantly trumps his proximity to the leader. Does not obey the orders of Georgy Zhukov, who is his immediate superior. The transcript of the conversation between the two generals shows a fundamentally different attitude to the conduct of hostilities. During the offensive near Moscow, Vlasov's units attacked the Germans along the road, where the enemy's defense was extremely strong. Zhukov, in a telephone conversation, orders Vlasov to counterattack, off-road, as Suvorov did. Vlasov refuses, citing high snow - about 60 centimeters. This argument infuriates Zhukov. He orders a new attack. Vlasov disagrees again. These disputes last for more than one hour. And in the end, Vlasov still gives up and gives the order Zhukov needs.
How Vlasov surrendered
The second shock army under the command of General Vlasov was surrounded in the Volkhov swamps and gradually lost its soldiers under the pressure of superior enemy forces. Along a narrow corridor, shot through from all sides, scattered units of Soviet soldiers tried to break through to their own.
But General Vlasov did not go along this corridor of death. Through unknown ways, on July 11, 1942, Vlasov deliberately surrendered to the Germans in the village of Tukhovezhi, Leningrad Region, where the Old Believers lived.
For some time he lived in Riga, food was brought by a local policeman. He told the new owners about the strange guest. A car drove up to Riga. Vlasov came out to meet them. He said something to them. The Germans saluted him and left.
The Germans could not accurately determine the position of a man dressed in a worn jacket. But the fact that he was dressed in riding breeches with the stripes of a general said that this bird was very important.
From the first minutes, he begins to lie to the German investigators: he introduced himself as a certain Zuev.
When the German investigators began to interrogate him, he confessed almost immediately who he was. Vlasov stated that in 1937 he became one of the participants in the anti-Stalinist movement. However, at that time Vlasov was a member of the military tribunal of two districts. He always signed the execution lists of Soviet soldiers and officers convicted under various articles.
Women betrayed countless times
The general always surrounded himself with women. Officially, he had one wife. Anna Voronina from her native village led her weak-willed husband mercilessly. They had no children due to an unsuccessful abortion. The young military doctor Agnes Podmazenko, his second common-law wife, left the encirclement near Kiev with him. The third, nurse Maria Voronina, was captured by the Germans when she was hiding with him in the village of Tukhovezhi.
All three women ended up in prison, suffered the brunt of torture and humiliation. But General Vlasov was no longer worried. Agenheld Biedenberg, the widow of an influential SS man, became last wife general. She was the sister of Himmler's adjutant and helped her new husband in every possible way. Adolf Hitler attended their wedding on April 13, 1945.
Maneuvering the General's Fox
Vlasov madly wanted to live. He maneuvered between circumstances with the cunning of a dodgy fox. Tried to shift the blame to others. Himmler got it too. During interrogations at the NKVD, Abakumov, the head of the SMERSH Main Directorate of Counterintelligence, said that the proposal to create the Russian Liberation Army came directly from Himmler. But a number of close German generals argue the opposite: it was Vlasov who imposed the idea of \u200b\u200bcreating his own army on the German command.
The General's Two Major Betrayals
He surrendered always and everywhere. When in 1945 the outcome of the war was already obvious, he raises an uprising in Prague in the hope of pleasing the American troops. In the area of the Prague military airfield Ruzina, German units were attacked by the Vlasovites. The Germans were very surprised by this turn of events.
But this last ploy of the general ended in failure. Driven into a deadly corner, he begins to rush about. Trying to negotiate with Sweden. I refuse him. Tries to fly to Spain to General Franco. And again failure. Makes an attempt to escape, hides under the carpet in the car. But battalion commander Yakushev with his reconnaissance group pulled him out of there by the collar.
Two-faced convict under number 31
Secret prisoner number 31 was hanged along with his 12 accomplices by the verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR under the leadership of Colonel General of Justice Ulrich.
General Vlasov - a traitor to the Motherland or a fighter against socialism? We will answer this question in this article, based on facts and historical documents.
I'll tell you the truth about you
which is worse than any lie.
A.S. Griboyedov
In our critical time, the opportunity has arisen to assess the recent tragic events of national history in a new way. Previously, they were presented from the point of view of historical materialism, when the interests of the then dominant CPSU were put in the first place. Now a number of studies have appeared that go to the other extreme, evaluating historical processes from the point of view of boundless liberalism.
The attention of liberal researchers is attracted by the figure of Lieutenant General Andrei Andreevich Vlasov. It is alleged that Vlasov changed his oath in order to fight for a free Russia, against socialist Russia, and this idea is so attractive that it justified his struggle and can be considered a hero.
We will try, as far as we can, to shed light on this issue, based on facts and published documents.
“On the thirteenth day of a deliberate pestilence by starvation of people, the Germans drove a wounded horse into the camp. And a huge crowd of prisoners rushed to the unfortunate animal, opening knives and razors on the move, hastily fumbling in their pockets for something sharp, capable of cutting or tearing moving meat. Two towers opened machine-gun fire on the formed giant pile of people. Perhaps, for the first time in the entire war, the Nazis spent cartridges so beautifully and economically. Not a single surprisingly luminous bullet made a whistle, leaving over the heads of the prisoners! And when the people fled to the barracks, in the place where five minutes ago the nag still hobbled on three legs, there was a pile of bloody, still warm bones and around them about a hundred people were killed, crushed, wounded ... "
Soviet soldiers who were taken prisoner found themselves in monstrous conditions that exceeded the limits of human strength. Among the many prisoners there were those who could not stand these sufferings and, having received an offer to put on a German uniform and receive a hearty ration of a German soldier, agreed to cooperate with the Nazis. Some went to outright treason voluntarily, out of conviction, wanting to take revenge on the Bolsheviks for their atrocities during the Civil War, collectivization, and mass repressions. There were also those who betrayed their homeland out of cowardice, justifying their low deed with some plausible pretexts. Of course, a person is free to revise his convictions, but it is quite another matter, saving his life, to change his convictions.
These latter included Lieutenant General Vlasov. The army he commanded was surrounded, and he himself surrendered in July 1942. Once in captivity, General Vlasov changed his communist beliefs to Nazi ones. However, for comparison, we can recall, for example, Lieutenant General Karbyshev. He, like Vlasov, was captured, but, unlike him, he did not surrender, but was precisely taken prisoner, because he was seriously wounded in battle. For refusing to cooperate with the Nazis, General Karbyshev was tortured to death. We can also recall Lieutenant General Denikin, who also received an offer of cooperation. Knowing perfectly well that he lives in a time when, according to the famous philosopher Ivan Ilyin, “word became deed, and deed became death,” he answered with a decisive refusal. And when asked why he did not want to serve the Germans, he answered with military brevity and firmness: “General Denikin served and serves only Russia. He has not served a foreign state and will not serve.”
Of course, it is difficult for us, who are in completely different conditions, to objectively judge what happened in those distant and tragic times. But we can look at events through the eyes of direct participants. Here is a fragment from the memoirs of Vasily Ivanovich Kamardin, recorded by his son:
“My father was in captivity in Germany and spoke about his camp life like this: At first they had a good boss, caring. So caring that every morning without a break he came to the barracks with convoys and soldiers and, in order to speed up the rise, laid the prisoners on long tables along the barracks and ordered them to flog with a whip in the blood. Traces of this "caring" remained on the body of his father for life. When, after the war, my father and I went to the bathhouse, I saw scars on his back and buttocks from torn pieces of meat.
In another camp, the leader was "very good." He felt sorry for them, he did not beat anyone. Only once a week, on Sundays, he lined everyone up on the parade ground and ordered them to pay off on the first to seventh. Every seventh was immediately shot. Father often happened to be the sixth. From such a “good life” and even “good food” (and the food was only swede and pieces of black, like coal bread), the father was already ready to die, as he began to walk with one blood.
Many of his comrades could not stand it and laid hands on themselves. There was not a single rise, my father recalled, so that someone, or even several, would not be immediately found hanged on hooks, which the “benefactors” of the Germans drove into the walls of the barracks specifically for this. Everyone who wished had the opportunity to hang himself, without bothering the "caring" owners once again. But my father firmly knew that suicide is a mortal sin, and, committing himself to the will of God, he endured everything to the end.
Many times, when building on the parade ground, representatives of the Russian Liberation Army (ROA) offered them to join its ranks, promising all the benefits, if only they would go to kill their brothers. "Thank God! - as my father recalled, - almost no one ever failed. Despite the unbearable life, there were only a few Judas.”
In 1940, Vlasov wrote about his communist beliefs in his autobiography.
Autobiography of brigade commander Andrey Andreevich Vlasov.
... In the period 1928-1929. In 1934-1935 he graduated from the tactical and rifle training courses for the improvement of the command staff of the Red Army "Shot" in Moscow, in 1934-1935. graduated from the 1st year of the Military Evening Academy of the Red Army in the Leningrad branch.
In the Red Army he was awarded the medal "XX Years of the Red Army" No. 012543 and various personal personalized gifts. For a government business trip, he was presented for awarding the Order of the USSR.
He did not serve in the old tsarist army and the white army, he did not live in captivity and on the territory occupied by the whites.
He joined the CPSU (b) in 1930, was accepted by the divisional party organization of the 9th Don Rifle Division. Party card No. 0471565. Conducted campaign work, was repeatedly elected a member of the party bureau of the school and regiment. He was the editor of the school newspaper. He has always taken an active part in public work. He was elected a member of the district military tribunal, a member of the Presidium of Osoaviakhim regional organizations and a friend.
Didn't have any partnerships. In other parties and oppositions he never belonged anywhere and did not take any part. He didn't have any hesitation. He always stood firmly on the general line of the Party and always fought for it.
He was never brought to court by the Soviet authorities. Was not abroad.
Commander of the 99th Infantry Division
brigade commander VLASOV
The first thing that attracts attention is Vlasov's low professional training. A general whose army was captured cannot be called a skilled commander. This is also evidenced by the testimonies of Soviet commanders who had to fight under him. The passage below refers to the events that took place at the beginning of the winter of 1942 during the counter-offensive of Soviet troops near Moscow.
“I remember Wednesday also because here I had a clash with the commander of the 20th Army, Vlasov. We had information that large enemy forces were concentrated in Sereda, and it was well prepared for long-term defense (especially in the eastern part along the Mutnya River). All around her was open, waist-deep snowy terrain. In addition, our scouts discovered that an enemy infantry column was moving towards Sereda from the side of the Knyazhy Gory station. In the event of a protracted battle, these reinforcements could fall on the right flank of the group. I reported to the army headquarters the situation and my decision: to bypass Seredu's knot of resistance and continue to develop the offensive against Gzhatsk. Vlasov's answer was received very quickly: he ordered to attack the enemy defending Sereda with a blow from the north along the highway and, having captured it, hold it with part of the forces until the infantry approached, while the main forces continued the offensive.
An attack on the “forehead” of a well-organized defense, and even through an open area waist-deep in snow, was too risky. We would have had to overcome the zone of dense barrage, incurring unjustified losses. And the situation was such that in order to fulfill this order, part of the forces had to be returned back. I had no other choice but to carry out the tasks previously assigned to the units. The offensive developed successfully. The battle for Krasnoye Selo has just ended with the crossing of Ruza. In the course of it, further tasks for units and formations were specified, and they, without delay, continued to develop success. The 3rd Guards Cavalry Division moved around Sereda from the northwest, the 20th division from the southwest. General Vlasov again called me to the radio and demanded to report on how his order was being carried out. I confirmed my decision and tried to reasonably prove its expediency. The reaction, as one would expect, was very violent. Vlasov ordered to report to him within the agreed time that Sereda had been taken by a blow “on the forehead” from the north along the highway. I didn't answer and hung up. He immediately called again, but I ordered the signalman to answer that the corps commander had already left for the troops in order to organize a frontal attack on Sereda along the highway. This kind of military cunning helped in relations with Vlasov. After all, otherwise he could send one of his deputies, and then the Cossacks would have to climb through the snowdrifts to the dense, well-organized enemy fire. According to Pliev's plan, the village of Sereda was surrounded and taken without unnecessary losses.
In fairness, it should be noted that during that period of the war, such harsh methods of command were used not only by General Vlasov, but also by some other commanders. This is recalled by General A.V. Gorbatov: “In that situation, it was natural for the division commander to choose objects for private operations himself, to determine the forces of the detachment and the time for an attack using surprise. In such cases, the enemy usually had losses two, three, or even four times greater than ours. It’s another matter when they tell you everything from afar and order you to capture Maslova Pristan on January 17, Bezlyudovka on January 19, Arkhangelskoye on January 24, etc., indicating the hour of the attack, they will determine the forces (besides, they do not correspond to either the task or your possibilities). In these cases, the result was almost always the same: we had no success and suffered losses two or three times greater than the enemy.
Particularly incomprehensible to me were persistent orders - despite the failure, to attack again, moreover, from the same starting position, in the same direction for several days in a row, to advance, not taking into account that the enemy had already strengthened this area. Many, many times in such cases, my heart bled ... But it was a whole stage of the war, at which many of our commanders learned how to fight and, therefore, how not to fight. The slowness with which this science was assimilated - no matter how obvious the bloody examples were - was the result of those general pre-war conditions in which the thinking of the commanders took shape.
A prominent domestic specialist in the field of military ethics, psychology and philosophy A.A. Kersnovsky, analyzing the behavior of the commander, who got into a difficult situation with his troops, cites General Klyuev as a negative example. During the First World War, the corps entrusted to him during the East Prussian operation was surrounded. General Klyuev “surrendered, completely unaware of what he was doing by this, of how the enemy’s morale would rise and our own would decrease when news of the surrender of such an important person as the corps commander. He knew that he was in command of the corps, but he never suspected that he was still has the honor of commanding. The higher the official position, the greater this honor. And the commander of the corps - at the appearance of which tens of thousands of people freeze, refuse their own "I", who can order forty thousand people to go to death - should realize this honor especially and pay for it when it has to - pay without flinching. ... It is easier for the homeland to endure the death in a fair battle of a corps or squadron than their surrender to the enemy.
What a strong negative impact the betrayal of General Vlasov had on his former subordinates in the midst of the Battle of Stalingrad, can be seen from the memoirs of Professor-Archpriest Gleb Kaleda, at that time an ordinary soldier of the Red Army.
“The Battle of Stalingrad… Terrible tension on both sides. The constant smell of corpses, penetrating into all the cracks, strongly affected the psyche. For a month and a half, warehouses burned in the city, and the sky was covered with black clouds of smoke. Rivers of fuel oil flowed through the streets; flooded the dugout of the commander of the 62nd Army, General Chuikov.
In fulfilling the order to drive the Germans out of the market area, we were attached to the 99th Infantry Division, which was commanded by General Vlasov before the war. This division was one of the best in the Red Army, holding the challenge banner of the people's commissar. The officers proudly told us: “We are Vlasovites!” The battles for the market began on September 21, we were supported by a tank brigade, but in three days we crawled only 800 meters, having at the beginning of the fighting a pre-war kit: 800 bayonets in a battalion. Every night the division received reinforcements, and by the end of the third day, only 200 bayonets remained on average in the battalions, more people died than the original composition of the battalion. The Germans fought heroically, they literally grabbed our tanks with their hands and smashed bottles of combustible mixture on them. Our sacrifices did not help: the right flank lagged behind and did not crawl these 800 meters, the Germans hit on it, and in three hours we surrendered these blood-stained meters, retreated ...
We were tormented by German aviation: 28 raids a day, ten and one hundred bombers each. The first raid is still nothing, the second - worse, the third - the hassle begins, and then the nerves just give up. Psychological impact the strongest: it seems that the plane is flying right at you, the pilot turns on the siren, shells, bombs are flying ...
The next day they waited for a new order. I wandered across the steppe and picked up a leaflet, fortunately I was alone: it was forbidden to read leaflets. I read: "To the soldiers and commanders of the 99th Infantry Division." I turn, look at the signature: “Former commander of the 99th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General Vlasov. It was written in the leaflet: I fought, got surrounded, then I realized that military resistance was pointless and gave the order to lay down my arms. Long days of reflection led to the conclusion: the Red Army cannot win, because the army must have a one-man command, and all commanders are bound hand and foot by commissars and employees of organs who understand nothing about military affairs. But the Russian people have the strength to free themselves, there is a volunteer army, it is necessary to conclude an honorable peace with the Germans and cooperate with them. In conclusion, it was said: "Post-war Russia should be without the Bolsheviks and without the Germans." Naturally, after such a leaflet, the commanders of the 99th division were no longer proud that they were students of Vlasov.
The second thing I want to pay attention to when studying Vlasov’s autobiography is that he joined the ranks of the CPSU (b) in 1930 and “never belonged anywhere and did not take any part in other parties and oppositions. He didn't have any hesitation. I always stood firmly on the general line of the party and always fought for it. For the fact that, indeed, Vlasov "did not have any hesitation" and always fought for the general line of the party, his election as a member of the military tribunal of the Kiev Special Military District testifies. Military tribunals were punitive bodies, with the help of which a significant part of the regular officers and military leaders of the Red Army was destroyed before the war. In addition, by condemning a superior, a member of the military tribunal ensured rapid career growth. According to Vlasov's biographer A. Kolesnik, in 1937-1938 Vlasov “was a member of the military tribunal in the Leningrad and Kiev military districts. Getting acquainted with his activities in this role, it was not possible to find a single verdict of acquittal issued on his initiative. This is the third thing that Vlasov's autobiography says.
Just a few weeks after the surrender, the following document came out signed by Vlasov: “The officer corps of the Soviet Army, especially the captured officers who can freely exchange thoughts, are faced with the question: how can the Stalin government be overthrown and a new one created? Russia? All are united by the desire to overthrow Stalin's government and change the state form. There is a question: to whom exactly to join - to Germany, England or the United States? The main task - the overthrow of the government - speaks for the fact that we should join Germany, which declared the struggle against the existing government and regime the aim of the war.
I have come to the firm conviction that the tasks facing the Russian people can be solved in alliance and cooperation with the German people. The interests of the Russian people have always been combined with the interests of the German people, with the interests of all the peoples of Europe. In alliance and cooperation with Germany, he must build a new happy homeland within the framework of a family of equal and free peoples of Europe.
We consider it our duty to our people and to the Fuhrer, who proclaimed the idea of creating a new Europe, to bring the above to the attention of the High Command and thereby contribute to the implementation of the said idea.
Former commander of the 2nd Army, Lieutenant General Vlasov
Former commander of the 41st Infantry Division, Colonel Boyarsky.
The document, drawn up in Vinnitsa on August 8, 1942, when Germany was at the zenith of its military successes, is intended to cast a shadow on the entire officer corps of the Red Army, which allegedly faces the question: in what way can the Stalin government be overthrown and a new Russia created? In addition, the document indicates that Vlasov joined a stronger master, the Führer, and began to consider it his duty to serve Hitler, leaving his former, as he himself called him "Master". Here is what he wrote to his wife, Anna Mikhailovna Vlasova, on February 14, 1942, during our counteroffensive near Moscow: «
You won't believe it, dear Anya! What joy I have in life. I talked there with our biggest Boss. This honor fell to me for the first time in my life. You cannot imagine how excited I was and how inspired I left him. You, apparently, will not even believe that such a great man has enough time even for our personal affairs. So believe me, he asked me where my wife is and how she lives. He thought you were in Moscow. I said that it was far away, so I would not stop in Moscow for an hour, but would go back to the front. The case does not wait. Dear Anya, we continue to beat the fascists and drive them to the west.
On the same day, he sent a letter to his wife in the field, military doctor Agnessa Pavlovna Podmazenko, to whom he wrote practically the same thing as to his wife: “The biggest and main owner called me to him. Imagine, he talked to me for an entire hour and a half. You can imagine how lucky I am. You won't believe this big man and is interested in our little family affairs. He asked me: where is my wife and in general about health. This can only be done by HE, who leads us all from victory to victory. With him we will smash the fascist reptile."
In the same letter, he congratulated Agnes Pavlovna, who, having become pregnant from him, left active army, with the medal "For Courage": "Dear Alya! Now let me congratulate you on a high government award - a medal for courage. You have now overtaken Comrade. Cousin: he has a medal for military merit, and you already immediately received a second one: “for courage”. I am sincerely glad, but not only me. All our employees congratulated me.” “The medal “For Courage” is awarded for personal courage and courage shown in battles with the enemies of the socialist Fatherland; in the defense of the state border of the USSR; in the performance of military duty in conditions involving a risk to life, ”and not in the bed of an army commander.
In Stalin's time, people close to the betrayer of the Motherland were declared ChSIR "members of the family of the traitor to the Motherland", and the wife became FIR - "the wife of the traitor to the Motherland." Vlasov named the name of Anna Mikhailovna when, in May 1945, he filled out the questionnaire of the arrested person at the Lubyanka. She was arrested already in 1942, and she was held in the case as "the wife of a traitor to the Motherland." Paying for the betrayal of her husband, she spent 8 years in the camps. It is known that in recent years she lived in Balakhna, Nizhny Novgorod region. Rehabilitated only in 1992. And the regimental wife, Agnes Pavlovna, did not escape this bitter fate. In 1943, by decision of the Special Meeting, she received five years in the camps. It is known that she was also serving a link. Rehabilitated in 1989, died in 1997. The former member of the military tribunal could not help but know what awaits people close to him.
The so-called Smolensk Declaration, which was declaratively propagandistic in nature, said: “Stalin's allies, the British and American capitalists, betrayed the Russian people. In an effort to use Bolshevism to master natural resources of our Motherland, these plutocrats not only save their own skin at the cost of the lives of millions of Russian people, but also concluded secret enslaving treaties with Stalin.
At the same time, Germany is waging war not against the Russian people and their homeland, but only against Bolshevism. Germany does not encroach on the living space of the Russian people and their national and political freedom .
The National Socialist Germany of Adolf Hitler sets as its task the organization of a New Europe without Bolsheviks and capitalists, in which every people will be provided with a place of honor. December 27, 1942 Smolensk.
About what "place of honor" was being prepared for the Russian people in New Europe, said in the General Plan "Ost". The plan itself has not been preserved, but additions to the plan have been preserved, drawn up by a certain Dr. Wetzel, head of the colonization department of the First Main Political Directorate of the Rosenberg Ministry:
Top secret
It is not only about the defeat of the state with its center in Moscow. Achieving this historic goal would never mean a final solution to the problem. The point is most likely to defeat the Russians as a people, to divide them. Only if this problem is considered from a biological, especially from a racial-biological point of view, and if the German policy in the eastern regions is carried out in accordance with this, will it be possible to eliminate the danger posed to us by the Russian people.
If the German leadership manages to... prevent the influence of German blood on the Russian people through extramarital affairs, then it is quite possible to maintain German dominance in this area, provided that we can overcome such a biological danger as the monstrous ability of these people to reproduce... There are many ways to undermine the biological the strength of the people ... The goal of German policy in relation to the population on Russian territory will be to bring the birth rate of Russians to a lower level than that of the Germans. The same applies, by the way, to the extremely prolific peoples of the Caucasus, and in the future, partly to Ukraine. So far, we are interested in increasing the Ukrainian population as opposed to the Russians. But this should not lead to the Ukrainians taking the place of the Russians over time. In order to avoid an increase in population in the eastern regions, which is undesirable for us, it is urgently necessary to abandon in the East all the measures that we used to increase the birth rate in the empire. In these areas, we must consciously pursue a policy of population reduction. By means of propaganda, especially through the press, radio, cinema, leaflets, brief pamphlets, reports, etc., we must constantly instill in the population the idea that it is harmful to have many children. It is necessary to show how much money the upbringing of children requires and what could be purchased with these funds. It is necessary to talk about the great danger to which a woman is exposed when giving birth to children, etc. In addition, the widest propaganda of contraceptives should be launched. It is necessary to establish a wide production of such funds. Their distribution and abortion should not be restricted in any way. Every effort should be made to expand the network of abortion clinics, as well as promote voluntary sterilization, prevent the struggle to reduce infant mortality, and prevent training of mothers in the care of infants and preventive measures against childhood diseases. It is necessary to reduce to a minimum the training of Russian doctors in such specialties, and not provide any support to kindergartens and other similar institutions. Apart from these measures in the field of health, there should be no obstacles to divorce. Assistance should not be given to illegitimate children. We should not provide financial assistance to large families in the form of wage supplements .., allow them any tax privileges.
For us Germans, it is important to weaken the Russian people to such an extent that they will not be able to prevent us from establishing German domination in Europe. We can achieve this goal in the above ways ...
The above document, which conveys the very essence of German fascism, is so eloquent that it does not require comments.
Here is what SS Reichsfuehrer Heinrich Himmler said about Vlasov on one of important meetings before party functionaries and representatives of the state and military leadership:
“Now we have discovered the Russian General Vlasov. Our Brigadeführer Fegelein captured this Russian general. He was the commander of one shock army. Our brave Fegelein said to his men: "Let's try to treat him like he really is a general!" And famously stood in front of him at attention: "Mr. General, Mr. General! .." After all, everyone is pleased to hear this. It's like that all over the world. And it worked here too. Still, this man, after all, had the Order of Lenin number 770, he later presented it to Brigadeführer Fegelein. When the Fuhrer awarded Fegelein with the Oak Leaves, he gave this order to the Fuhrer. The Fuhrer ordered to put it in a silver case and returned it to Fegelein. So this general was treated properly, terribly polite, terribly nice. This man gave us all his divisions, his entire plan of attack, and in general everything he knew.
The price for this betrayal? On the third day, we said to this general something like this: “The fact that there is no way back for you, you must be clear. But you are a significant person, and we guarantee you that when the war is over, you will receive a lieutenant general's pension, and in the near future - here's schnapps, cigarettes and women for you. That's how cheap you can buy such a general! Very cheap. You see, in such things one must have a damned accurate calculation. Such a person costs 20,000 marks a year. Let him live 10 or 15 years, that's 300 thousand marks. If only one battery fires well for two days, this also costs 300 thousand marks ... And this Russian pig, Mr. Vlasov, offers his services for this. Some old people here wanted to give this man an army of millions. They wanted to give weapons and equipment to this unreliable type, so that he would move with these weapons against Russia, and maybe one day, which is very likely, which is good, and against ourselves!
In no, even the most barbaric and cruel, culture of the world, in which honor and valor are valued, we will not meet with the approval and encouragement of a traitor who has changed the military oath.
The great Suvorov spoke in his usual impetuous manner: "For a soldier - courage, for an officer - courage, for a general - courage." A captured general needs special courage. Obviously, Vlasov not only lacked the consciousness that he " has the honor of commanding", but also the courage to "pay without flinching." As it turned out, a general who lacks courage, who, because of his ambition and incompetence, does not spare the soldiers, can be bought cheaply. But for the soldiers who, due to the inept command of General Vlasov, were captured, the price was very high: suffering in captivity or death. With the same high price, that is, the suffering and death of Soviet soldiers, his betrayal was also paid. He betrayed everything he knew to the Germans, and as commander of the 2nd Shock Army and deputy commander of the Volkhov Front, he had extensive information about the disposition of the forces and means of the Red Army and about the plans of the Soviet High Command. Of course, these data were used by the German command in planning and conducting the summer campaign of 1942.
According to Protopresbyter Alexander Kiselev, Vlasov settled in a suburb of Berlin in a two-story stone house with a small garden, where he lived calmly, comfortably and prosperously on the general's pension. As for "cigarettes, schnapps" and women, Vlasov did not refuse either one or the other, or the third. He, with the sanction of Himmler, married in again, and the widowed German aristocrat Adele Bielenberg became his chosen one. In fact, Vlasov became a polygamist, because with his legal wife, who remained in Russia and, because of his betrayal, found himself behind barbed wire, he continued to be legally married.
As for wine, one can cite the memoirs of I.L. Novosiltsev, who was present at the dinner given by the Governor-General of Poland Frank in honor of Vlasov after the signing of the manifesto in Prague. “Dinner was rich, wine, as they say, flowed like a river. Many could not resist the temptation, and their behavior disapproved of Vlasov. He himself was strict with himself and did not allow any excess. To test himself, he called Novosiltsev to him and asked in his ear: “Igor, how am I holding myself?” Apparently, not only "many", but Vlasov himself could not resist "the temptation", since he needed external control in order to find out how he behaves. But this is not the main thing, the main thing is whose invitation he accepted and whose wine he drank.
Hans Frank, one of the most sinister fascist criminals, was appointed by Hitler to carry out the following task: “Men capable of leading in Poland must be eliminated. Those that follow them... must be destroyed in their turn." At a meeting of the leadership in Krakow, Frank uttered the following words: “As for the Jews, I want to tell you quite frankly that they need to be removed one way or another ... Gentlemen, I have to ask you to get rid of any kind of pity. Our duty is to destroy the Jews." Frank, this executioner of the Polish and Jewish peoples, among other Nazi criminals, decided international court in Nuremberg was sentenced to death penalty through hanging. The sentence was carried out on October 16, 1946 by American professional executioner John Wood. Despite the fact that Vlasov could not have been unaware of Frank's atrocities, he did not refuse the dubious "honor" of drinking at the table of a Nazi criminal who destroyed millions of people.
Obviously, Vlasov, whose goal was to save his life, was just a pawn in the war of German fascism against the Russian people. In the documents signed by Vlasov, there is an idea identical to the one that the Bolsheviks once proclaimed: "to turn the imperialist war into a civil war in order to overthrow the existing government." As a result, the people were plunged into the bloody chaos of a civil war, and Soviet power reigned over a vast country for many years. As you know, Lenin and the Bolshevik Party he led, acted on orders and with extensive financial support from Kaiser Germany, which was at war with Russia.
These ideas are not new, they sounded already in the 19th century. F. M. Dostoevsky, through the mouth of the character of his novel, Smerdyakov, whose surname speaks for itself, formulated them as follows: “There was a great invasion of Russia and it would be good if they subdued us ... A smart nation would subdue a very stupid one, sir, and annex it to itself. There would even be other orders, sir.” It is surprising that Smerdyakov's lackey point of view continues to attract supporters in our time.
The fascist leadership used the same methods as the Kaiser's, but failed to repeat the result. The Russian people during the Great Patriotic War did not fall for the bait that liberal-minded circles fell for in 1917 Russian Empire. Otherwise, if Nazi Germany won and General plan"Ost" would be implemented, then, indeed, "there would even be completely different orders, sir."
Once in the hands of Soviet justice, Vlasov went to cooperate with the investigation, realizing that this would save him from physical measures, perhaps he hoped to mitigate his fate. He revealed facts that could not be known to the court and the investigation, which, of course, could not arouse the approval of his fellow businessmen:
« Defendant Vlasov. The defendant Zhilenkov did not quite accurately tell the court about his role in his connections with the SS. In particular, he showed the court that it was only on my instructions that he contacted the representative of the SS. This is not entirely true. Zhilenkov was the first to have contact with representatives of the SS, and it was thanks to his role that I was accepted by Himmler. Until then, Himmler had never received me.
Defendant Zhilenkov. I do not deny Vlasov's testimony, but I want to say that only after my trip to the Lvov region and establishing contact with Himmler's representative d'Alcain, through the latter, we managed to organize a meeting between Vlasov and Himmler. I knew that Himmler called Vlasov a runaway pig and a fool. It fell to my lot to prove to d'Alken that Vlasov is not a pig and not a fool. So, with my active participation, a meeting between Vlasov and Himmler was organized.
Vlasov preferred to remain silent about his actions, which could cause legal condemnation, but his former subordinates paid him the same coin and gave out what he did not want to reveal to the investigation:
« presiding. Defendant Maltsev, when the question of moving to the south of Germany arose, did you suggest that one of your subordinates report on the eighteen arrested to Vlasov and what instructions did you give?
Defendant Maltsev. Yes, I suggested that Tukholnikov report the 18 arrested to Vlasov and ask him for instructions on how to deal with them. Moreover, cases were completed for six people from among those arrested, and I recommended insisting on their execution. Vlasov approved the execution of six people.
Defendant Vlasov. Yes, it was, but that was the only time I approved death sentences, and that was because Maltsev reported it to me.”
To approve the death sentences of their compatriots who are in captivity and, we can assume, who tried to show some kind of resistance - this very eloquently characterizes Vlasov. The lackadaisical attitude towards the new owners is also characteristic:
presiding. And what prompted you to communicate with Nedich and exchange pleasantries with him?
Defendant Vlasov. I did this mainly on the recommendation of the German representative with me. In fact, I never saw Nedic. I sent congratulatory telegrams and addresses to Ribbentrop, Himmler, Guderian on behalf of the Russian people.
presiding. You seem to have been close to the strangler of the Czechoslovak people, Frank, protector of the Czech Republic and Moravia, and sent various kinds of congratulations to him?
Defendant Vlasov. Yes, it took place. Frank at one time gave us the territory and everything we needed, and later he helped us to move to the south of Germany by road.”
In his final speech at the trial, Vlasov said: “The crimes I have committed are great, and I expect severe punishment for them. The first fall into sin is the surrender. But not only did I completely repent, although it was too late, but during the trial and investigation I tried to bring out the whole gang as clearly as possible. I expect the most severe punishment." At the trial and investigation, as well as in German captivity, he betrayed everything he knew, and "tried to reveal the whole gang as clearly as possible", but did not achieve mitigation of the fate and was sentenced to the highest degree and hanged with his accomplices.
German folk wisdom says: “To lose money - to lose nothing, to lose health - to lose something, to lose honor - to lose a lot, to lose courage - to lose everything, it would be better not to be born into the world.”
It cannot be considered that only in the Soviet Union they dealt so harshly with traitors. John Amery, son of Leo Amery, secretary of state on Indian affairs in the military cabinet of Winston Churchill, was captured and led a detachment of British soldiers ready to fight on the side of Germany. British SS fought in the 11th Volunteer Panzergrenadier Division "Norland". Amery was arrested at the end of the war in Milan. He was found guilty of treason and put to death by hanging.
And yet, despite these very eloquent facts, voices are heard trying to elevate Vlasov to the rank of a national hero. American political scientist Y. Layen, in the book “Our Secret Allies” wrote: “For many, his name has become a banner. They are sure that someday the label of a traitor will be removed from his memory, and he will take his place among the great heroes of the free Russian spirit.”
However, as the people say, “you can’t wash a black dog white” even with the help of “secret allies”. Making a hero out of Vlasov is an attempt with clearly unsuitable means. Of course, not all Americans thought so, or think so. There were and are decent people who hold a different point of view. The captain of the American army, to whom Vlasov came in May 1945, told him: “Vell, Mr. General, now it’s all over for you! Unfortunately, you changed owners in vain and bet on a dark horse!”
In conclusion, let us cite the authoritative opinion of the great American writer, laureate Nobel Prize, Ernest Hemingway, who fought against fascism with weapons in his hands: “When people fight to liberate their homeland from foreign invaders, ... then, looking at their life, and struggle, and death, you begin to understand that there are things worse than war. Cowardice is worse, betrayal is worse, selfishness is worse.” Prot. Alexander Kiselev. The appearance of General Vlasov. New York. Publishing House "Way of Life", p. 62.
Ibid., p. 90.
E. Hemingway. Writer and war. June 1937 2nd Congress of American Writers vol.3. M. 1968 Hood. lit. pp. 613-615.
In the middle of the summer of 1942, General of the Red Army Andrei Vlasov surrendered to the soldiers of the Wehrmacht. According to him, the transition to the Nazis was made by him deliberately. The military leader claimed that he wanted to fight for the Russian people against Stalinism and Bolshevism.
incredulous
Andrey Vlasov was born into the family of a middle peasant farmer Andrei Vladimirovich Vlasov. The father of the future general was highly respected in the village and was appointed church elder. Andrei grew up as a smart child. His brother, Ivan, died on the fronts of the First World War, and his father had high hopes for his youngest son, Andrei. Andrei Vlasov went to study at the seminary, but the revolution made adjustments, the former seminarian first became a student at the Nizhny Novgorod Agricultural Academy, and then went to the Red Army. All his later life was connected with "army science". Higher education Vlasov never got it. In the pocket of his tunic, the general always kept an icon, a gift from his mother, but he could be considered Orthodox only nominally: his way of life was far from righteousness. According to the recollections of people who knew him closely, Andrei Vlasov did not read prayers, did not take communion and did not confess.
hoaxer
Having shown himself on the fronts of the civil war, Andrei Vlasov rapidly climbed the army career ladder. However, he mainly occupied staff, formal positions and was far from applied military science. In 1929, Vlasov graduated from the Higher Army Command Courses "Shot". In 1930 he joined the CPSU(b). In 1935 he became a student of the MV Frunze Military Academy. Information about the fate of Vlasov in the late 1930s varies among historians. According to one version, Vlasov was a member of the tribunal of the Leningrad and Kiev military districts and was directly involved in Stalin's "purge" of the highest command staff. Historians agree on one thing: in the fall of 1938, Vlasov was sent to China to work as part of a group of military advisers under Chiang Kai-shek. During this period, Vlasov proved himself to be a skilled hoaxer. According to him, the Chinese side treated him with great reverence, Vlasov even claimed that before Chiang Kai-Shek's departure, he personally awarded Vlasov the Order of the Golden Dragon, and Chiang Kai-Shek's wife gave him a watch. Upon arrival in the Soviet Union, both, as Vlasov said, were taken from him. However, Vlasov's version is at odds with the real state of affairs. In the customs declarations of that time there is not a word about either the order or the watch. Moreover, such an order did not exist in nature. Vlasov himself carefully invented a story for himself. In fact, during his stay in China, the hoax attache was repeatedly seen in alcoholic sprees and caught in relationships with underage girls.
Kyiv boiler
Andrei Vlasov met the war near Lvov, where he commanded the 4th mechanized corps, after which he was appointed commander of the 37th army defending Kyiv. Vlasov learned about Stalin's order to leave Kyiv and his units were surrounded. The situation was very tense. More than half a million soldiers died in those days, but Vlasov managed to get through the encirclement. Vlasov passed through the environment not alone, but with his mistress. They changed into simple peasant clothes and managed to cross the front line. The general left his army.
"Savior of Moscow". Propaganda
After leaving the encirclement near Kiev, Vlasov ended up in the hospital. Meanwhile, Moscow was under threat. Here again we encounter mythology. From Vlasov diligently made a hero. A myth arose that, having only 15 tanks, the Vlasov units stopped tank army Walter Model in the Moscow suburb of Solnechegorsk, and drove the Germans back 100 kilometers, while freeing three cities. In the newspapers of that time, General Vlasov was called nothing less than the "savior of Moscow" and put on a par with Georgy Zhukov. On the instructions of the Main Political Directorate, a book is being written about Vlasov called "Stalin's commander." In fact, Vlasov spent all this time in the hospital, where he was brought orders to sign. Nobody saw the general on the battlefields, but they made him a figure of propaganda. While other military leaders were at the front, Vlasov gave interviews about his heroism and devotion to the Motherland. General Vlasov was actively promoted by Khrushchev, which, in fact, explains his rapid military career. On April 20, 1942, A. A. Vlasov was appointed commander of the 2nd shock army, while remaining part-time deputy commander of the Volkhov Front.
Captivity
The capture of Andrei Vlasov is shrouded in no less secrets than his whole life. According to one version, leaving the encirclement, Andrei Vlasov refused the aircraft provided to him, according to another, there was no aircraft. According to one version, Vlasov himself surrendered to the Nazis, according to another, he was captured and even beaten. For the Nazis, he became a valuable trophy. Photographs of Vlasov during the capture have been preserved: the general is depressed and confused on them. Vlasov was taken prisoner by Wehrmacht soldiers and sent to a POW camp.
Agitation
Andrei Vlasov swore allegiance to Hitler a year after the events in Myasnoy Bor. In March and April 1943, Vlasov makes two trips to the Smolensk and Pskov regions, and criticizes Bolshevism in front of large audiences, making sure that the liberation movement resonates with the people. During his speeches, Vlasov also allows criticism of German policy. For such propaganda work, the Nazis send the general under house arrest.
Prague uprising and execution
Vlasov undoubtedly understood that Nazi Germany was doomed. The last attempt to rehabilitate for him could be the participation of the ROA in supporting the Prague uprising, but Vlasov resolutely refused to take part in it, their paths with the ROA diverged. According to some reports, Vlasov also refused American and Spanish political asylum, which at least somehow whitens him before history. Vlasov was captured Soviet soldiers, delivered to the headquarters of Marshal Konev and sent by plane to Moscow. August 1, 1946 General Vlasov was hanged.