Russian partisans. Partisans of the Russian order. Army partisan detachments

Partisan actions have played a significant role in the course of many wars. The First World War stands apart in this respect. First of all, it should be noted that during the First World War, a partisan detachment was a light detachment sent to the flanks and rear of the enemy army to inflict material harm and exert a psychological impact on the enemy. Such a detachment created confusion and confusion on the lines of communication of the enemy army, making it difficult to bring supplies from the rear, interrupting communications between individual units and forcing the enemy to allocate significant forces to counter.

A characteristic feature of partisanship was the complete independence of the commanders of partisan detachments. Of course, the detachment, going on a search or raid according to the order of the army commander, received from him general instructions about the purpose of the actions and the approximate area of ​​\u200b\u200bbase. Otherwise, the independence of the partisan should not be constrained by anything. Breaking away from the army for a long time, the partisan commander himself chose the most profitable and effective means to carry out the assignment given to him. The fundamental conditions for the success of the activities of the partisan detachment were the speed of movement and the surprise of the attack.

Naturally, it follows of itself from this that partisan actions are best suited to cavalry, and only in individual cases (for example, in the absence of cavalry or when operating on unfavorable terrain) can it be partly replaced by infantry. This concept of military partisanship was not new: in practice, it was practiced back in 1812 by Russian partisan commanders Denisov, Kudashev, Davydov, Seslavin and others, and the famous Denis Davydov theoretically substantiated it in the book “Experience in the Theory of Partisan Action”.

The order to form partisan units appeared on October 30, 1915. It was trained at the headquarters of the Marching ataman of the Cossack troops of the Grand Duke Boris Vladimirovich. But even earlier, partisan formations appeared without prior notice on almost all fronts.

Partisans, in addition to service weapons, were supplied with binoculars, compasses, lanterns, hand grenades, maps, axes and saws, ropes and other things. It was supposed to provide them with machine guns, field telephones to connect to the enemy's communication lines, as well as explosives and a fuse cord.

In the winter of 1915-1916, a lull came on the fronts. The cavalry of the Russian army was in reserve, preparing for the spring campaign. Given the current favorable situation, the Russian command decided to recruit volunteers to conduct partisan operations in the rear of the German troops. The latter did not present any difficulties, since among the cavalry there were always many hunters to carry out various desperate enterprises. In addition, the start of partisan operations was favored by the friendly attitude of the civilian population of the territories occupied by the Germans, and the swampy forests in this area, and the presence of excellent personnel for such enterprises in the person of the Cossacks.

Partisan actions, by their very nature, required from the people in the detachment such qualities as experience in guard and reconnaissance services, a certain skill in stealth movement and diverting the attention of the enemy, the ability to make independent decisions in a difficult combat situation, and, finally, these people must be sincerely devoted to military affairs. Such requirements were most satisfied by the “naturally generated cavalry”, that is, due to historical and domestic conditions. Representatives of such a "natural" cavalry in Russia were the Cossacks.

“Facing with semi-savage tribes that were at enmity with us, the Cossacks learned from them the way of warfare, which, based on tireless mobility, consisted of sudden raids, shapeless, but fast, daring and wild. Under the influence of such living conditions, military fervor developed in the Cossacks - that spirit of selfless dashing, courage that knows no obstacles for itself, ... the ability to wield weapons, dexterity in single combat was developed; vigilance, caution, quick wit, resourcefulness, the ability for military tricks, and finally, certain physical abilities were developed, the eye, ear, and so on, developed to the subtlety. ... After that, what could be more ideal than a Cossack in the sense of a cavalryman, what could be more suitable than a Cossack in partisan service? ... Truly, it is impossible not to recognize the Cossacks as a high example of partisan cavalry, ”said the Russian military writer F.K. Gerschelman in his book Partisan War (1885).

Note that in relation to the cavalry, Russia of that time was placed in much better conditions than any European state. Possessing in abundance such an expensive means of warfare as cavalry in general and the Cossacks in particular, the Russian command could launch a guerrilla war on the widest scale without weakening the main armies and without depriving them of light cavalry. In addition, partisan activity was quite natural for the Russian cavalry, making up its "mentality", national strategy and tactics.

It should be noted that before the outbreak of the First World War, the Russian military press several times raised the question of the usefulness and significance of partisan activity in the rear of the enemy army. At the same time, the General Staff did absolutely nothing to prepare partisanship; moreover, it seems to have completely forgotten about this important means of struggle.

This situation is reminiscent of another war, the Great Patriotic War: then serious preparatory measures were taken in advance so that in the event of an attack it would be possible to launch an organized partisan struggle in the rear of the advancing enemy armies as soon as possible; and, despite this, in the summer of 1941 it suddenly turned out that there was absolutely nothing to “ignite the flame of the nationwide struggle”, as they said then.

The terrible year of 1937 did not pass by the Soviet saboteurs: almost all of them were repressed, and the bases and bookmarks with weapons, explosives and food were liquidated. But all this will be later, in three decades. In the meantime, 1915 is standing in the yard. Assessing the situation at that time on the fronts, we can conclude that the military leadership of Russia was missing two periods that could be very favorable for partisan operations.

First of all, this is a period of mobilization. At that moment, numerous partisan cavalry detachments, by daring raids and sabotage on enemy lines of communication, were able to seriously slow down the deployment of the Austro-Hungarian army in wartime states. The second most favorable period for the Russian partisans is the period of time when the Russian army retreated under the pressure of a superior enemy.

Here it was necessary to leave small cavalry detachments, equipped with appropriate instructions. The sympathy of the local population, the few and poorly guarded roads, as well as the numerous forests and swamps of the area where the Western Front passed - all this made it possible to deploy partisan activities at the lowest cost and on the greatest scale.

But… nothing was done. On the contrary, separate attacks by Russian cavalry units, which were cut off from their own and thus trying to disturb the enemy rear, were either simply not noticed by the Russian command, or caused dissatisfaction with their "incorrectness". For example, in September-October 1914, as a result of the extremely rapid offensive of the German infantry of General Hindenburg on Warsaw, on the left bank of the Vistula, several squadrons of Russian cavalry were cut off from their divisions.

These were the 6th squadron of the 14th Yamburg Lancers Regiment, the 5th squadron of the 14th Mitavsky Hussar Regiment and the 1st Squadron of the 5th Alexandria Hussar Regiment. The appearance of Russian horse patrols in the rear of the German army and their raid on the German convoy so disturbed the enemy command that it was forced to send a detachment consisting of a cavalry regiment and an infantry battalion to search.

Unable to immediately catch the squadrons that had eluded them, the Germans hung out appeals in the nearest villages, where they offered the Russians to voluntarily lay down their arms and surrender. However, for some reason, the Russian cavalrymen did not believe these calls and continued their search in the enemy's rear. The local peasants were quite friendly towards the Russians, they supplied them with food and fodder, and besides, they strictly warned of the danger. When, as a result of the successful actions of the Russian troops in the Warsaw-Ivangorod operation, the enemy retreated, the squadrons safely left the German rear to meet the advancing infantry of the 9th Russian army.

Paradoxically, the command of the Russian army not only failed to understand the prospects opening up before it (in terms of the start of a full-scale guerrilla war), it did not even appreciate the actions of soldiers and officers. An official document that analyzed their activities in the rear stated that "the senior of the squadron commanders reduced his activities only to passive wandering around the rear in order to find a way out of a dangerous situation, completely without thinking about harming the enemy."

It is possible that the Russian cavalrymen really turned out to be too passive in that situation, but one must remember the important circumstance that the Combat Cavalry Regulations of 1912 outlined the activities of reconnaissance squadrons (closest to partisan activity) only in the most general terms, and in peaceful while the cavalry practiced search skills only in offensive conditions. In short, the high command on the eve and in the first period of the war did nothing to prepare and develop regulations on partisan activity. However, the natural need for it, as well as the realization of the considerable benefits that partisanship can bring to Russia, were expressed in numerous proposals for the formation of partisan detachments coming to the Headquarters and the headquarters of the fronts.

Andrei Grigoryevich Shkuro, who later became a prominent figure in the White movement, claimed in his memoirs Notes of a White Partisan that it was he who first came up with the idea of ​​creating a partisan detachment for raids behind enemy lines. True, some historical documents allow one to doubt this. For example, General V.N. Klembovsky in the book “Partisan Actions” (1919) wrote that A. Kuchinsky was the first to turn to Headquarters with such a proposal, and this happened in August 1915.

Nevertheless, Shkuro recalled that period as follows: “The organization of a partisan detachment was drawn to me like this: each regiment of a division sends 30–40 of the bravest and most experienced Cossacks from its composition, of which a divisional partisan hundred is organized. It penetrates behind enemy lines, destroys railways there, cuts telegraph and telephone wires, blows up bridges, burns warehouses, and in general, destroys the enemy’s communications and supplies to the best of its ability, incites the local population against him, supplies him with weapons and teaches him the technique of guerrilla operations, and also keeps him in touch with our command.”

In the end, the Russian command decided to somewhat "settle" the issue of the partisans, since the Headquarters received so many proposals on this issue that it was already impossible to simply dismiss them. However, there was not a single person in the Headquarters who, at least theoretically, was trained in matters of guerrilla warfare.

Therefore, in the early autumn of 1915, the headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief sent a request to all fronts, which included only two questions: firstly, which detachments and in what quantity were formed on this front, and secondly, is it not worth working out a single staff for such detachments ? The last question clearly showed how far the employees of the headquarters were from the specifics of partisan actions.

Nevertheless, the fronts reported, as a result of which it turned out that there were six partisan detachments on the Northern Front (three consisted of two officers and fifty-five lower ranks, and three more of five officers and one hundred and twenty-five lower ranks plus two machine guns), on Western Front - six (two cavalry detachments of three officers and seventy to eighty horsemen; in addition, there were four partisan parties, consisting of two officers and nine to twenty-five lower ranks), on the Southwestern Front there were as many as eleven detachments and parties different numbers.

As for the practical use of military partisans, the chief of staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General Alekseev, pointed out in one of the resolutions “the possibility of strong raids by small cavalry detachments to introduce a strong disorder in the service of rear institutions, dispersing those scoundrels who serve as convoys, bakers, workers. …

A smashed and burned convoy, destroyed kitchens - all this is achievable, all this will bring disorder to the enemy's activities. A clarification is needed here: Alekseev meant by “scoundrels” not Germans, but Russian prisoners, whom the Germans and Austrians used in large numbers to serve their rear. However, the time for the deployment of partisan activities had already been lost. By this time, the position of the enemy was a continuous fortified position, strongly developed in depth and densely braided with barbed wire.

Considering all this, the attempts of partisan parties to penetrate into enemy territory were not successful and were basically limited only to the destruction of enemy posts and outposts. Nevertheless, on October 30, 1915, order No. 2 of the Marching ataman of the Cossack troops, Grand Duke Boris Vladimirovich, was issued, which ordered the formation of partisan detachments in accordance with a special instruction attached to the order.

Further, it was ordered to immediately begin partisan actions; if local conditions do not allow this, then keep the selected partisans on a special account until they can be put into action. Six months later, on April 29, 1916, in addition to the instructions mentioned above, the headquarters of the Camping Ataman sent out a "Table of Special Property", which was to be supplied to detachments sent behind enemy lines.

So, for every ten partisans, binoculars, two compasses, two watches, three lanterns, ten hand grenades and ten Novitsky bombs (for making passages in wire fences), two axes, one saw, two machine guns, one explosive pack were to be allocated (including tol and fickford cord). Here attention is drawn to the surprising scarcity of the supply of the partisans, which is not at all justified by the lack of funds at the fronts.

At the end of 1915 and the beginning of 1916, A. Shkuro formed a hundred partisans from the Kuban Cossacks. This hundred began to be called the Kuban Special Purpose Cavalry Detachment. Combat service began at the end of January 1916. In his memoirs, Shkuro wrote: “Every two days we went out on raids at night, often with infantry scouts added to my detachment. We greatly disturbed the Germans, who increased their vigilance to such an extent that we had to constantly change our place of work. We took many prisoners, often bringing hundreds or more of them.

However, the main goal of our work - the organization of partisan activities of the population in the enemy's rear - was never achieved, due to the passivity and intimidation of the population. General Brusilov, who at that time was the commander of the front, later recalled the partisans in his sector very negatively. He noted that with the advent of partisan detachments formed in the rear, all sorts of misunderstandings began to occur, and even major troubles with the local residents, since the partisans did not at all rush behind the front line, but made a lot of robberies and hooliganism.

However, Brusilov did not blame the commanders of these detachments for this, realizing that there was no way to conduct mounted battles in conditions of continuous long-term defense. Probably, in those specific conditions, according to Brusilov, the only way to carry out searches and raids was to create foot detachments and send them to the German rear, accompanied by guides from among the local residents. The only operation of the Russian military partisans was the "attack" on Nevel. On November 6, 1915, the staff captain of the 12th cavalry division Tkachenko carried out planned reconnaissance, after which he proposed to the heads of the partisan detachments of the 7th, 11th, Consolidated Guards, 1st Don and Orenburg divisions a plan for a joint attack on the towns of Nevel and Zhidachi. At the general council, the plan was approved.

On the night of November 14-15, Russian partisans, after conducting a thorough preliminary reconnaissance, attacked the estate near Nevel, which housed the headquarters of the 82nd German reserve division, as well as Nevel itself, where two enemy infantry companies were stationed. The attack was made simultaneously from two directions, from the north and from the east. The attack came as a complete surprise to the Germans. Acting mainly with bayonets and grenades, the Russian partisans destroyed up to six hundred enemy soldiers and officers, captured two generals, three officers, a doctor and several lower ranks. In addition, two artillery pieces were blown up, provisions warehouses were destroyed and enemy carts were burned.

During the battle, the partisans lost one officer and one private, and three officers and six lower ranks were wounded. At a time when the main forces of the partisans attacked Nevel, several separate groups of fighters ensured, as they would say now, "isolation of the area and the object of the raid", that is, they held back the attacks of the German reserves trying to surround the detachment. The cornet of the Crimean cavalry regiment Alexander Likhventsov, at the head of 25 partisans, “occupied a gorge that was far from the main forces, held it with stubborn battle, overturned several times the strongest enemy and contributed to the victory over the enemy with fire, providing the rear of the main forces of the partisans, without which the latter would have fallen into heavy position," the report said. Ensign of the 1st Volga Regiment Mikhail Vishnevsky commanded a small party of fighters.

At the same time, before the onset of the German infantry, “personally, with several partisans, he attacked the German guard and put him to flight, after which he himself, with two partisans, armed with a rifle, set up an ambush in front of the Russian chains in the reeds.” When the German chains appeared, the partisans let them pass, and then opened unexpected frequent rifle fire in the rear and flank, which forced the enemy to retreat in disorder to their trenches.

At the same time, the cornet of the 12th Dragoon Starodubovsky Regiment Konstantin Ivanov, under whose command there were two groups of partisans, by his actions “restrained the offensive of superior enemy forces and gave the detachment the opportunity to retreat with the captured general and cross the Strumen River, after which with a fight he crossed with his men and burned the bridge behind him.” There were many such examples during the battle, the most distinguished officers were later awarded St. George's crosses and St. George's weapons. But we emphasize once again: this dashing raid was a rare exception in the conditions of a positional war.

Communication passages, wolf pits and dugouts, wire fences and minefields stretched over vast distances to the east and west. The cavalry, whose duty was to observe, provide communications and develop success, in these conditions could not show their qualities. In addition, the tactical rear of the enemy was so densely filled with reserves and quartermaster services that partisan work was simply impossible. However, cavalry battles were still taking place on the Southwestern Front, since there were no heaps of trenches and concrete fortifications here. However, the partisans still had to fight here on foot - otherwise they would not get through the mountains. A. G. Shkuro later wrote that “three more partisan detachments were transferred to him: one Cossack commander Abramov (Abramovites) and a partisan detachment of the 13th cavalry division.

Thus, now under my command there were more than six hundred drafts. We had to act in the spurs of the southern Carpathians, and our work was coordinated with the tasks assigned to the infantry. While the infantry was preparing a frontal attack, I climbed into the rear of the enemy sector, disrupting communications, defeated the rear, and if it was possible, then attacked the enemy from the rear. The mountains were terribly steep, the movement of wagon trains was impossible, the delivery of products had to be carried out in packs along mountain paths, and the removal of the wounded was difficult.

In general, the work was terribly difficult. And yet, despite these isolated cases of successful use of partisans, large-scale partisan actions during the First World War did not work. Of course, it is not the fault of the Russian cavalry that individual raids behind the front line did not develop into a full-fledged guerrilla war.

Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov thirty years later, during the Great Patriotic War, who became the chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, wrote in the book Cavalry (1923): “Extensive marshy and wooded spaces; off-road; full sympathy of the population; wealth in the cavalry; long communication lines of the enemy; our retreat, which contributed to the abandonment of partisan detachments behind enemy lines; the initial sympathy of all for the opening of guerrilla action - everything contributed to the guerrilla war no less than in 1812.

And the results are null." What is the reason for the failures? Shaposhnikov saw it in the fact that the favorable moment for the deployment of military partisans, which was at the very beginning of the war, was missed. And in the autumn of 1915, a full-scale positional war began, which put an end to all projects of partisan operations.

The unsuccessful start of the war and the retreat of the Russian army deep into its territory showed that the enemy could hardly be defeated by the forces of regular troops alone. This required the efforts of the whole people. In the overwhelming majority of the areas occupied by the enemy, he perceived the "Great Army" not as his liberator from serfdom, but as an enslaver. The next invasion of "foreigners" was perceived by the overwhelming majority of the population as an invasion, which had the goal of eradicating the Orthodox faith and establishing godlessness.

Speaking about the partisan movement in the war of 1812, it should be clarified that the actual partisans were temporary detachments of regular military units and Cossacks, purposefully and organizedly created by the Russian command for operations in the rear and on enemy communications. And to describe the actions of the spontaneously created self-defense units of the villagers, the term "people's war" was introduced. Therefore, the popular movement in the Patriotic War of 1812 is an integral part of the more general theme "The People in the War of the Twelfth Year."

Some authors associate the beginning of the partisan movement in 1812 with the manifesto of July 6, 1812, as if allowing the peasants to take up arms and actively join the struggle. In reality, things were somewhat different.

Even before the start of the war, the lieutenant colonel drew up a note on the conduct of an active guerrilla war. In 1811, the work of the Prussian colonel Valentini "Small War" was published in Russian. However, in the Russian army they looked at the partisans with a significant degree of skepticism, seeing in the partisan movement "a pernicious system of divisive action of the army."

People's War

With the invasion of the Napoleonic hordes, the locals initially simply left the villages and went to forests and areas remote from hostilities. Later, retreating through the Smolensk lands, the commander of the Russian 1st Western Army called on his compatriots to take up arms against the invaders. His proclamation, which was obviously based on the work of the Prussian colonel Valentini, indicated how to act against the enemy and how to wage guerrilla warfare.

It arose spontaneously and was a speech by small scattered detachments of local residents and soldiers lagging behind their units against the predatory actions of the rear units of the Napoleonic army. Trying to protect their property and food supplies, the population was forced to resort to self-defense. According to memoirs, “in every village the gates were locked; with them stood old and young with pitchforks, stakes, axes, and some of them with firearms.

The French foragers sent to the countryside for food faced not only passive resistance. In the region of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, detachments of peasants made frequent day and night raids on enemy carts, destroyed his foragers, and captured French soldiers.

Later, the Smolensk province was also plundered. Some researchers believe that it was from this moment that the war became domestic for the Russian people. Here the popular resistance also gained the widest scope. It began in Krasnensky, Porechsky districts, and then in Belsky, Sychevsky, Roslavl, Gzhatsky and Vyazemsky counties. At first, before the appeal of M.B. Barclay de Tolly, the peasants were afraid to arm themselves, fearing that they would then be held accountable. However, this process has since intensified.

Partisans in the Patriotic War of 1812
Unknown artist. 1st quarter of the 19th century

In the city of Bely and Belsky district, peasant detachments attacked parties of the French that made their way to them, destroyed them or took them prisoner. The leaders of the Sychevsk detachments, police officer Boguslavsky and retired major Yemelyanov, armed their villagers with guns taken from the French, established proper order and discipline. Sychevsk partisans attacked the enemy 15 times in two weeks (from August 18 to September 1). During this time, they destroyed 572 soldiers and captured 325 people.

Residents of the Roslavl district created several peasant detachments on horseback and on foot, arming the villagers with pikes, sabers and guns. They not only defended their county from the enemy, but also attacked marauders who made their way to the neighboring Yelnensky county. Many peasant detachments operated in the Yukhnovsky district. Organizing defense along the river. Ugra, they blocked the path of the enemy in Kaluga, provided significant assistance to the army partisan detachment D.V. Davydov.

In the Gzhatsk district, another detachment was also active, created from peasants, headed by an ordinary Kiev Dragoon Regiment. The detachment of Chetvertakov began not only to protect the villages from marauders, but to attack the enemy, inflicting significant losses on him. As a result, in the entire space of 35 versts from the Gzhatskaya pier, the lands were not devastated, despite the fact that all the surrounding villages lay in ruins. For this feat, the inhabitants of those places "with sensitive gratitude" called Chetvertakov "the savior of that side."

Private Eremenko did the same. With the help of the landowner Michulovo, by the name of Krechetov, he also organized a peasant detachment, with which on October 30 he exterminated 47 people from the enemy.

The actions of the peasant detachments were especially intensified during the stay of the Russian army in Tarutino. At this time, they widely deployed the front of the struggle in the Smolensk, Moscow, Ryazan and Kaluga provinces.

Fight Mozhaisk peasants with French soldiers during and after the Battle of Borodino. Colorized engraving by an unknown author. 1830s

In the Zvenigorod district, peasant detachments destroyed and captured more than 2 thousand French soldiers. Here the detachments became famous, the leaders of which were the volost head Ivan Andreev and the centurion Pavel Ivanov. In the Volokolamsk district, such detachments were led by retired non-commissioned officer Novikov and private Nemchinov, volost head Mikhail Fedorov, peasants Akim Fedorov, Filipp Mikhailov, Kuzma Kuzmin and Gerasim Semenov. In the Bronnitsky district of the Moscow province, peasant detachments united up to 2 thousand people. History has preserved for us the names of the most distinguished peasants from the Bronnitsky district: Mikhail Andreev, Vasily Kirillov, Sidor Timofeev, Yakov Kondratiev, Vladimir Afanasyev.

Don't shut up! Let me come! Artist V.V. Vereshchagin. 1887-1895

The largest peasant detachment in the Moscow region was a detachment of Bogorodsk partisans. In one of the first publications in 1813 about the formation of this detachment, it was written that “the economic volosts Vokhnovskaya head, centurion Ivan Chushkin and the peasant, Amerevsky head Yemelyan Vasilyev gathered peasants under their jurisdiction, and also invited neighboring ones.”

The detachment numbered in its ranks about 6 thousand people, the leader of this detachment was the peasant Gerasim Kurin. His detachment and other smaller detachments not only reliably protected the entire Bogorodsk district from the penetration of French marauders, but also entered into an armed struggle with the enemy troops.

It should be noted that even women participated in sorties against the enemy. Subsequently, these episodes were overgrown with legends and in some cases did not even remotely resemble real events. A typical example is with, to which popular rumor and propaganda of that time attributed no less than leadership of a peasant detachment, which in reality was not.

French guards under escort of Grandmother Spiridonovna. A.G. Venetsianov. 1813

A gift for children in memory of the events of 1812. Caricature from the series I.I. Terebeneva

Peasant and partisan detachments fettered the actions of the Napoleonic troops, inflicted damage on the enemy's manpower, and destroyed military property. The Smolensk road, which remained the only protected postal route leading from Moscow to the west, was constantly subjected to their raids. They intercepted French correspondence, especially valuable delivered to the main apartment of the Russian army.

The actions of the peasants were highly appreciated by the Russian command. “Peasants,” he wrote, “from the villages adjacent to the theater of war inflict the greatest harm on the enemy ... They kill the enemy in large numbers, and deliver those taken prisoner to the army.”

Partisans in 1812. Artist B. Zworykin. 1911

According to various estimates, more than 15 thousand people were taken prisoner by peasant formations, the same number were exterminated, significant stocks of fodder and weapons were destroyed.

In 1812. Captured French. Hood. THEM. Pryanishnikov. 1873

During the war, many active members of the peasant detachments were awarded. Emperor Alexander I ordered to award people subordinate to the count: 23 people "in command" - insignia of the Military Order (George Crosses), and the other 27 people - a special silver medal "For Love of the Fatherland" on the Vladimir ribbon.

Thus, as a result of the actions of military and peasant detachments, as well as militias, the enemy was deprived of the opportunity to expand the zone controlled by him and create additional bases for supplying the main forces. He failed to gain a foothold either in Bogorodsk, or in Dmitrov, or in Voskresensk. His attempt to get additional communications that would link the main forces with the corps of Schwarzenberg and Rainier was thwarted. The enemy also failed to capture Bryansk and reach Kiev.

Army partisan detachments

Army partisan detachments also played an important role in the Patriotic War of 1812. The idea of ​​their creation arose even before the Battle of Borodino, and was the result of an analysis of the actions of individual cavalry units, by the will of circumstances that fell into the rear communications of the enemy.

The first partisan actions were started by a cavalry general who formed a "flying corps". Later, on August 2, already M.B. Barclay de Tolly ordered the creation of a detachment under the command of a general. He led the combined Kazan Dragoon, Stavropol, Kalmyk and three Cossack regiments, which began to operate in the area of ​​​​the city of Dukhovshchina on the flanks and behind enemy lines. Its number was 1300 people.

Later, the main task of the partisan detachments was formulated by M.I. Kutuzov: “Since now the autumn time is coming, through which the movement of a large army becomes completely difficult, I decided, avoiding a general battle, to wage a small war, because the separate forces of the enemy and his oversight give me more ways to exterminate him, and for this, being now 50 versts from Moscow with the main forces, I am giving away important units from me in the direction of Mozhaisk, Vyazma and Smolensk.

Army partisan detachments were created mainly from the most mobile Cossack units and were not the same in size: from 50 to 500 people or more. They were tasked with sudden actions behind enemy lines to disrupt communications, destroy his manpower, strike at garrisons, suitable reserves, deprive the enemy of the opportunity to get food and fodder, monitor the movement of troops and report this to the main apartment of the Russian army. Between the commanders of the partisan detachments, interaction was organized as far as possible.

The main advantage of partisan detachments was their mobility. They never stood in one place, constantly on the move, and no one except the commander knew in advance when and where the detachment would go. The actions of the partisans were sudden and swift.

The partisan detachments of D.V. Davydova, etc.

The personification of the entire partisan movement was the detachment of the commander of the Akhtyrsky Hussar Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Denis Davydov.

The tactics of the actions of his partisan detachment combined a swift maneuver and striking an enemy unprepared for battle. To ensure secrecy, the partisan detachment had to be on the march almost constantly.

The first successful actions encouraged the partisans, and Davydov decided to attack some enemy convoy going along the main Smolensk road. On September 3 (15), 1812, a battle took place near Tsarev-Zaimishch on the big Smolensk road, during which the partisans captured 119 soldiers, two officers. At the disposal of the partisans were 10 food carts and a cart with cartridges.

M.I. Kutuzov closely followed the brave actions of Davydov and attached great importance to the expansion of the partisan struggle.

In addition to the Davydov detachment, there were many other well-known and successfully operating partisan detachments. In the autumn of 1812, they surrounded the French army in a continuous mobile ring. The flying detachments included 36 Cossack and 7 cavalry regiments, 5 squadrons and a team of light horse artillery, 5 infantry regiments, 3 battalions of rangers and 22 regimental guns. Thus, Kutuzov gave the guerrilla war a wider scope.

Most often, partisan detachments set up ambushes and attacked enemy transports and convoys, captured couriers, and freed Russian prisoners. Every day, the Commander-in-Chief received reports on the direction of movement and actions of enemy detachments, repulsed mail, protocols of interrogation of prisoners and other information about the enemy, which were reflected in the log of military operations.

A partisan detachment of Captain A.S. was operating on the Mozhaisk road. Figner. Young, educated, who knew French, German and Italian perfectly, he found himself in the fight against a foreign enemy, not being afraid to die.

From the north, Moscow was blocked by a large detachment of General F.F. Wintzingerode, who, by allocating small detachments to Volokolamsk, to the Yaroslavl and Dmitrov roads, blocked the access of Napoleon's troops to the northern regions of the Moscow region.

With the withdrawal of the main forces of the Russian army, Kutuzov advanced from the Krasnaya Pakhra region to the Mozhaisk road in the area with. Perkhushkovo, located 27 miles from Moscow, a detachment of Major General I.S. Dorokhov as part of three Cossack, hussar and dragoon regiments and half a company of artillery in order to "make an attack, trying to destroy enemy parks." Dorokhov was instructed not only to observe this road, but also to strike at the enemy.

The actions of the Dorokhov detachment were approved in the main apartment of the Russian army. On the first day alone, he managed to destroy 2 squadrons of cavalry, 86 charging trucks, capture 11 officers and 450 privates, intercept 3 couriers, recapture 6 pounds of church silver.

Having withdrawn the army to the Tarutinsky position, Kutuzov formed several more army partisan detachments, in particular detachments, and. The actions of these units were of great importance.

Colonel N.D. Kudashev with two Cossack regiments was sent to the Serpukhov and Kolomenskaya roads. His detachment, having established that there were about 2,500 French soldiers and officers in the village of Nikolsky, suddenly attacked the enemy, killed more than 100 people and took 200 prisoners.

Between Borovsk and Moscow, the roads were controlled by a detachment of Captain A.N. Seslavin. He, with a detachment of 500 people (250 Don Cossacks and a squadron of the Sumy Hussar Regiment), was instructed to act in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe road from Borovsk to Moscow, coordinating his actions with the detachment of A.S. Figner.

In the Mozhaisk region and to the south, a detachment of Colonel I.M. Vadbolsky as part of the Mariupol Hussars and 500 Cossacks. He advanced to the village of Kubinsky to attack enemy carts and drive away his parties, having mastered the road to Ruza.

In addition, a detachment of a lieutenant colonel of 300 people was also sent to the Mozhaisk region. To the north, in the region of Volokolamsk, a detachment of a colonel operated, near Ruza - a major, behind Klin towards the Yaroslavl tract - Cossack detachments of a military foreman, near Voskresensk - Major Figlev.

Thus, the army was surrounded by a continuous ring of partisan detachments, which prevented it from carrying out foraging in the vicinity of Moscow, as a result of which a massive loss of horses was observed in the enemy troops, and demoralization intensified. This was one of the reasons why Napoleon left Moscow.

The partisans A.N. were the first to learn about the beginning of the advance of French troops from the capital. Seslavin. At the same time, he, being in the forest near the village. Fomichevo, personally saw Napoleon himself, which he immediately reported. About Napoleon's advance to the new Kaluga road and about the cover detachments (corps with the remnants of the avant-garde) was immediately reported to the main apartment of M.I. Kutuzov.

An important discovery of the partisan Seslavin. Unknown artist. 1820s.

Kutuzov sent Dokhturov to Borovsk. However, already on the way, Dokhturov learned about the occupation of Borovsk by the French. Then he went to Maloyaroslavets to prevent the advance of the enemy to Kaluga. The main forces of the Russian army also began to pull up there.

After a 12-hour march, D.S. By the evening of October 11 (23), Dokhturov approached Spassky and united with the Cossacks. And in the morning he entered the battle on the streets of Maloyaroslavets, after which the French had only one way to retreat - Staraya Smolenskaya. And then be late report A.N. Seslavin, the French would have bypassed the Russian army near Maloyaroslavets, and what the further course of the war would have been is unknown ...

By this time, the partisan detachments were reduced to three large parties. One of them under the command of Major General I.S. Dorohova, consisting of five infantry battalions, four cavalry squadrons, two Cossack regiments with eight guns, on September 28 (October 10), 1812, went to storm the city of Vereya. The enemy took up arms only when the Russian partisans had already burst into the city. Vereya was liberated, and about 400 people of the Westphalian regiment with a banner were taken prisoner.

Monument to I.S. Dorokhov in the city of Vereya. Sculptor S.S. Aleshin. 1957

Continuous exposure to the enemy was of great importance. From 2 (14) September to 1 (13) October, according to various estimates, the enemy lost only about 2.5 thousand people killed, 6.5 thousand Frenchmen were taken prisoner. Their losses increased every day due to the active actions of the peasant and partisan detachments.

To ensure the transportation of ammunition, food and fodder, as well as road safety, the French command had to allocate significant forces. Taken together, all this significantly affected the moral and psychological state of the French army, which worsened every day.

The great success of the partisans is considered to be the battle near the village. Lyakhovo west of Yelnya, which occurred on October 28 (November 9). In it partisans D.V. Davydova, A.N. Seslavin and A.S. Figner, reinforced by regiments, 3,280 in all, attacked Augereau's brigade. After a stubborn battle, the entire brigade (2 thousand soldiers, 60 officers and Augereau himself) surrendered. This was the first time that an entire enemy military unit had surrendered.

The rest of the partisan forces also continuously appeared on both sides of the road and disturbed the French vanguard with their shots. Davydov's detachment, like the detachments of other commanders, all the time followed on the heels of the enemy army. The colonel, who followed the right flank of the Napoleonic army, was ordered to go ahead, warning the enemy and raiding individual detachments when they stopped. A large partisan detachment was sent to Smolensk in order to destroy enemy stores, convoys and individual detachments. From the rear of the French, the Cossacks M.I. Platov.

The partisan detachments were used no less vigorously in the completion of the campaign to expel the Napoleonic army from Russia. Detachment A.P. Ozharovsky was supposed to capture the city of Mogilev, where there were large enemy rear depots. On November 12 (24), his cavalry broke into the city. And two days later, the partisans D.V. Davydov interrupted communication between Orsha and Mogilev. Detachment A.N. Seslavin, together with the regular army, liberated the city of Borisov and, pursuing the enemy, approached the Berezina.

At the end of December, the entire detachment of Davydov, on the orders of Kutuzov, joined the vanguard of the main forces of the army as his vanguard.

The guerrilla war that unfolded near Moscow made a significant contribution to the victory over Napoleon's army and the expulsion of the enemy from Russia.

Material prepared by the Research Institute (Military History)
Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

My homeland was torn to pieces -
There were no meaner enemies.
I quietly partisan
On the scraps of native fields.

Not exploding or shooting
For a ruthless enemy
I protect my fields
How I can and how I can.

Again it seems - everything is gone,
Again we are making a coffin.
Again, the Motherland fell
Under a cruel alien boot.

But pray, remnants of the faithful,
Be courageous, as of old.
Immeasurable universal filth
Our altar is not embraced yet!

And for our fraternal mass
We will damage the enemy.
In this church, simple and poor,
Our secret partisan cache.

Hallelujah, fire on the reptiles!
Hallelujah! Hearts are pure.
Somewhere out there, on a sloping hill,
They are already putting up crosses for us.

And when I die personally
Having penetrated the firmament of heaven,
They put a sign on my chest
That I was a Russian partisan ...
D.S.

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Comments 17

Comments

16. Eric Lampe : scraps of native fields
2011-09-29 at 15:50

How true it is said about the Motherland, torn to pieces by the communists: scraps of native fields! That's right, and the grain was imported from capitalist Canada so that the slaves in the Soviet concentration camp would not rebel.

Who is a Russian partisan? This is the son of a kulak whom I once met in my childhood. No, he did not plow the land, because he cannot (as a matter of principle) work on a collective farm. He was engaged in small handicraft business, a locksmith. And this is the Russian gene pool, a descendant of the best peasants, with 1000 years of experience in cultivating the Russian land!!!

Who is a Russian partisan? This is a physics teacher, the daughter of a nobleman, with whom fate also pushed me once. An unfinished scum, as admirers of Maximov Gorky, Stalin and other nonhumans would call it. This unfinished, dodging all the frills of Soviet pedagogy, taught children according to the old methods of the tsarist school. And all her students sacredly keep the memory of this Russian partisan - their teacher!

So who is the same Russian partisan? No, this is not a Soviet partisan at all! This is a Russian person who has preserved spiritual continuity from his ancestors. Regardless of the violence of the Soviet ideology, or the collapse of Russian civilization. No matter what! This is "the last of the Mohicans" in our Russian version. Read Fenimore Cooper, gentlemen....

15. Priest Alexander Zaitsev : George
2011-09-29 at 13:50

Why are you, Georgy, what a white émigré style! And this does not suit Gorbovsky at all.
But Gorbovsky is a real poet, not homegrown.
Yes, it is sad, sad that this is happening to Russia, but there is hope: there will be an Epiphany.
The image of the flooded temple is very strong.
And children are different. For Gorbovsky, these are the children who leave their mother, who have forgotten Russian traditions, but this does not mean that everyone is like that.
But it's time to get rid of the "white émigré" way of thinking.
A “partisan” way of thinking, a sort of a priori positioning of oneself as a lone fighter for the truth, and there are only enemies around (“fire on reptiles”), is a spiritually dangerous state.
Elijah the prophet HAD every reason to consider himself such a lonely fighter, and then he was instructed by the Lord that there are still 7,000 righteous men in Israel. The prophet experienced both fear and impotence in order to know God in the gentle breath of the breeze, in order to understand that the power of God is perfected in weakness.
"Fire on the bastards" - says D.S., but where are they, these bastards? Can Medvedev be shot for his homegrown reforms?
Or is there nothing human, good, albeit naive in it? No respect for the Church?
We already went through this shooting at reptiles in the 17th, and it would be time to understand that the first reptiles are in man, and they are not afraid of firing, but are expelled by "prayer and fasting."

14. George : 13. Priest Alexander Zaitsev
2011-09-28 at 23:03

On the same topic, only without partisanship

Excuse me, father, but that's a different topic. This poem is written in the white émigré style ("the children abandoned her"). The children didn't leave her. They are surrounded, disarmed, but they are fighting. They are already being thrown into prison. In defense of Konstantin Dushenov:

You laugh - but secretly, hidden
you hate the whole world
Souls are alien to you open impulse
And the poison of ridicule is your idol.

How incapable of creation
You are unable to kill them.
And a spark of God's sign
It is not in your power to extinguish.

But the scourge was placed in your hands
And permission is given -
To be born a brother of the Lord
From His faithful servant.

13. Priest Alexander Zaitsev : On the same topic, only without partisanship.
2011-09-28 at 22:30

In the days of unquenchable sadness,
in the days of robbery and revelry, -
save, Lord, my Russia,
do not cross out her fate.

She is slandered, crucified,
torn apart ... Crows are circling.
She, like a mother, is not to blame,
that the children had abandoned her.

Like a church in a flood zone
She does not sink - she does not swim -
everything is waiting and waiting for the Epiphany.
And the waves are already beating under the arch.

Gleb Gorbovsky.

11. Priest Alexander Zaitsev : Phew, thank God!
2011-09-28 at 21:04

Dear Anatoly Dmitrievich, to be honest, I am glad of my embarrassment. Sorry.
I don’t like it when our jingoistic patriots start shooting ahead of time or join partisans, even in such a poetic way.
I think we will fight again - normally, tactically, without partisanship.

10. grandfather pensioner : 5. Priest Alexander Zaitsev:
2011-09-28 at 20:06

"... for there is a danger of derailing trains after the onset of peace."
"They will object to me: there will be no peace. But the real war," partisan "including, is still ahead."

So let it in, or not let it in? After peace, is it possible or not?
Will there be peace or not?

The fact of the matter is that with such guides they derail all life.
The whole world, and with the world, and without.
And we can not turn off this path, because the end is near.

8. George : 5. Priest Alexander Zaitsev: Re: Russian partisan 2011-09-28 at 16:55 I assume that D.S. - are these the initials of the editor-in-chief?
2011-09-28 at 17:53

"Alleluia" and "fire on reptiles" - isn't it rude? How does it fit?

During the war combined. Both are the cry of the soul in moments of mortal danger. Not for yourself - for others.

7. George : 6. Descendant of subjects of Emperor Nicholas II
2011-09-28 at 17:50

Dear offspring! Of course, TV was just a word. It's like a drug. Whether you understand it or not, it still works. I agree with you about the "white and fluffy" in the Orthodox camp. By bowing before the enemies of the Russian people, they push it away from the Church and deprive it of its role as a guiding force in our society. I agree about Nazarov and others like him. The ultra-patriotism of these revolutionaries is not fundamentally Russian. We need a calm leader who understands the danger looming over Russia - the destruction of the Russian people, their holding force. Putin, for all his imaginary "rigidity", is a supporter of the "status quo" - Russia as part of the world community. In addition, he does not have the dedication of a leader that is needed at the moment. He's just an effective hole plug. I'm afraid Russia will simply not survive his new term.

6. Descendant of subjects of Emperor Nicholas II : Re: Russian partisan
2011-09-28 at 17:03

Turn off the zombie in our country
TV for the week. Maybe people would think
WHO is leading them?

Dear George! It seems to me that you have not quite correctly indicated the main danger. Many people have already understood what television is. I will refer as an argument to the television vote on behalf of Russia. Even if Stalin really took the third, and not the first place, then in this case, the zombification of television has not yet been very successful. It seems that "truly Orthodox patriots" are becoming more dangerous now. They just tried together to destroy the great feat of Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya. One of those feats thanks to which we came to the Victory, which still gives us life. Life is given by God, and this once again reminds us that without God's will we would not have Victory. But "white and fluffy" prefer to praise Krasnov, and Vlasov, and we are offered to admire the songs in which "truly Orthodox heroes" destroy "partisan dogs". Their comrades in arms are Bandera and Shukhevych. It seems that the time is coming when it must be firmly said that whoever sings of Judas is the same Judas, no matter what "white clothes" he wears. Otherwise, instead of "your bloody Stalin", they already picked up the "civilized dictator" Pinochet (well, there, in extreme cases, Franco is also "civilized" and "non-bloodthirsty"). The main thing is that we renounce the feat of Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya and recognize that the "dogs-partisans" were the Stalinist NKVD pack, robbing the population and substituting it for "just retaliatory actions" of kind fascists who opened churches in the occupied territories. Mr. Savchenko also urges: surrender quickly, resistance is useless! I must say, I was very upset by Yuri Serb. He mentioned that he recommends Nazarov and Turik as assistants to the possible Russian leader. It turned out that this was not a slip of the tongue, but a belief. He even began to assert that Budzilovich, Nazarov's patron, was not a CIA agent. Yes, if a person imposes Vlasov on us as a hero and "martyr of Stalin's dungeons" - he is a notorious accomplice of the CIA. I'm afraid that from Yuri Serb we will receive a response poem about "partisan dogs". Lord, don't let Russia perish.

5. Priest Alexander Zaitsev : Re: Russian partisan
2011-09-28 at 16:55

I assume that D.S. - are these the initials of the editor-in-chief?
"Alleluia" and "fire on reptiles" - isn't it rude? How does it fit?
I would not wish partisan positioning on anyone, because there is a danger of derailing trains after the onset of peace.
They will object to me: there will be no peace. But the real war, including "partisan" war, is still ahead.

4. island72 : Re: Russian partisan
2011-09-28 at 16:33

At a recent congress of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, anticipating a fair wind and a nearby marina, the opportunist and conciliator Gennady Zyuganov quoted the Frenchman Calderon that a bloodless victory is the greatest victory. But one writer who spoke in the debate found herself objecting to Gennady Andreevich with a quote from our Russian Nekrasov:
Go to the fire for the honor of the fatherland, The poem is comparable in strength to the poems of Nikolai Melnikov.

And yet we all need to live longer, to partisan. And the Cross - yes, a good monument to everyone in Russia, remembering Rubtsov, I will add.

1. George : Re: Russian partisan
2011-09-28 at 08:43

God bless the author of the poem. The state of mind of a Russian person in the state of the Russian Federation is very accurately conveyed. Wherever you look, there is legislative, anti-Russian abomination all around. Turn off zombie TV in our country for a week. Maybe people would think WHO is in charge of them? There is one question: is it possible to quote this poem with initials?
FROM THE EDITOR. Probably, it is possible, dear George, why not? These are the real initials of the author.

A significant contribution to the victory of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany was made by partisan detachments operating behind enemy lines from Leningrad to Odessa. They were headed not only by military personnel, but also by people of peaceful professions. Real heroes.

Old Man Minai

By the beginning of the war, Minai Filipovich Shmyrev was the director of the Pudot cardboard factory (Belarus). The past of the 51-year-old director was a combat one: he was awarded three St. George's Crosses in World War I, in the Civil War he fought against banditry.

In July 1941, in the village of Pudot, Shmyrev formed a partisan detachment from factory workers. In two months, the partisans fought the enemy 27 times, destroyed 14 vehicles, 18 fuel tanks, blew up 8 bridges, and defeated the German district administration in Surazh.

In the spring of 1942, Shmyrev, on the orders of the Central Committee of Belarus, teamed up with three partisan detachments and headed the First Belarusian Partisan Brigade. The partisans drove the fascists out of 15 villages and created the Surazh partisan region. Here, before the arrival of the Red Army, Soviet power was restored. On the Usvyaty-Tarasenki section, the Surazh Gate existed for half a year - a 40-kilometer zone through which the partisans were supplied with weapons and food.
All relatives of Old Man Minai: four small children, sister and mother-in-law were shot by the Nazis.
In the fall of 1942, Shmyrev was transferred to the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement. In 1944 he was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.
After the war, Shmyrev returned to economic work.

The son of the fist "Uncle Kostya"

Konstantin Sergeevich Zaslonov was born in the city of Ostashkov, Tver province. In the thirties, his family was dispossessed and exiled to the Kola Peninsula in Khibinogorsk.
After school, Zaslonov became a railway worker, by 1941 he worked as the head of a locomotive depot in Orsha (Belarus) and was evacuated to Moscow, but voluntarily went back.

He served under the pseudonym "Uncle Kostya", created an underground, which, with the help of mines disguised as coal, derailed 93 Nazi echelons in three months.
In the spring of 1942, Zaslonov organized a partisan detachment. The detachment fought with the Germans, lured 5 garrisons of the Russian National People's Army to their side.
Zaslonov died in a battle with RNNA punishers, who came to the partisans under the guise of defectors. He was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

NKVD officer Dmitry Medvedev

A native of the Oryol province, Dmitry Nikolaevich Medvedev was an officer in the NKVD.
He was fired twice - either because of his brother - "the enemy of the people", then "for the unreasonable termination of criminal cases." In the summer of 1941 he was reinstated in the ranks.
He headed the Mitya reconnaissance and sabotage task force, which conducted more than 50 operations in the Smolensk, Mogilev and Bryansk regions.
In the summer of 1942, he headed the "Winners" special squad and conducted more than 120 successful operations. 11 generals, 2000 soldiers, 6000 Banderites were destroyed, 81 trains were blown up.
In 1944, Medvedev was transferred to staff work, but in 1945 he traveled to Lithuania to fight the Forest Brothers gang. He retired with the rank of colonel. The hero of the USSR.

Saboteur Molodtsov-Badaev

Vladimir Alexandrovich Molodtsov worked at the mine from the age of 16. He went from trolley racer to deputy director. In 1934 he was sent to the Central School of the NKVD.
In July 1941 he arrived in Odessa for reconnaissance and sabotage work. He worked under the pseudonym Pavel Badaev.

Badaev's detachments hid in the Odessa catacombs, fought with the Romanians, tore communication lines, staged sabotage in the port, and carried out reconnaissance. They blew up the commandant's office with 149 officers. At the Zastava station, the train with the administration for the occupied Odessa was destroyed.

The Nazis threw 16,000 people to liquidate the detachment. They let gas into the catacombs, poisoned the water, mined the passages. In February 1942, Molodtsov and his contacts were captured. Molodtsov was executed on July 12, 1942.
Hero of the Soviet Union posthumously.

Desperate partisan "Mikhailo"

Azerbaijani Mehdi Ganifa-ogly Huseynzade was drafted into the Red Army from his student days. Member of the Battle of Stalingrad. He was seriously wounded, captured and taken to Italy. Fled in early 1944, joined the partisans and became a commissar of a company of Soviet partisans. He was engaged in reconnaissance, sabotage, blew up bridges and airfields, executed the Gestapo. For desperate courage he received the nickname "partisan Mikhailo".
A detachment under his command raided the prison, freeing 700 prisoners of war.
He was captured near the village of Vitovle. Mehdi fired back to the end, and then committed suicide.
His exploits were known after the war. In 1957 he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

OGPU officer Naumov

A native of the Perm region, Mikhail Ivanovich Naumov, by the beginning of the war, was an employee of the OGPU. He was shell-shocked while crossing the Dniester, was surrounded, went out to the partisans and soon led the detachment. In the autumn of 1942 he became chief of staff of partisan detachments in the Sumy region, and in January 1943 he headed a cavalry unit.

In the spring of 1943, Naumov carried out the legendary Steppe raid 2,379 kilometers long through the rear of the Nazis. For this operation, the captain was awarded the rank of major general, which is a unique event, and the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
In total, Naumov conducted three large-scale raids behind enemy lines.
After the war, he continued to serve in the ranks of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Kovpak

Sidor Artemyevich Kovpak became a legend during his lifetime. Born in Poltava in a poor peasant family. In World War I, he received the St. George Cross from the hands of Nicholas II. In the Civil partisan against the Germans, fought with the whites.

Since 1937 he was the chairman of the Putivl city executive committee of the Sumy region.
In the autumn of 1941, he headed the Putivl partisan detachment, and then - the connection of detachments of the Sumy region. The partisans carried out military raids behind enemy lines. Their total length was more than 10,000 kilometers. 39 enemy garrisons were defeated.

On August 31, 1942, Kovpak participated in a meeting of partisan commanders in Moscow, was received by Stalin and Voroshilov, after which he made a raid across the Dnieper. At that moment, Kovpak's detachment had 2000 fighters, 130 machine guns, 9 guns.
In April 1943 he was promoted to the rank of major general.
Twice Hero of the Soviet Union.