Caucasian War. Why the Caucasian War became the longest in the history of Russia What was the result of the Caucasian War

One should not think that the North Caucasus independently decided to ask for citizenship from Russia and became part of it without any problems. The cause and consequence of the fact that today Chechnya, Dagestan and others belong to the Russian Federation was the Caucasian War of 1817, which lasted about 50 years and was ended only in 1864.

The main reasons for the Caucasian war

Many modern historians call the main prerequisite for the start of the war the desire of the Russian Emperor Alexander I to annex the Caucasus to the territory of the country by any means. However, if you look at the situation more deeply, this intention was caused by fears for the future of the southern borders of the Russian Empire.

After all, such strong rivals as Persia and Türkiye looked at the Caucasus with envy for many centuries. Allowing them to spread their influence over and take it into their hands meant a constant threat to their own country. That is why military confrontation was the only way to resolve the problem.

Akhulgo translated from the Avar language means “Alarm Mountain”. There were two villages on the mountain - Old and New Akhulgo. The siege by Russian troops, led by General Grabbe, lasted for a long 80 days (from June 12 to August 22, 1839). The purpose of this military operation was to blockade and capture the imam's headquarters. The village was stormed 5 times; after the third assault, terms of surrender were offered, but Shamil did not agree to them. After the fifth assault, the village fell, but the people did not want to give up and fought until the last drop of blood.

The battle was terrible, women took an active part in it with weapons in their hands, children threw stones at the attackers, they had no thought of mercy, they preferred death to captivity. Huge losses were suffered by both sides. Only a few dozen companions, led by the imam, managed to escape from the village.

Shamil was wounded, in this battle he lost one of his wives and their infant son, and his eldest son was taken hostage. Akhulgo was completely destroyed and to this day the village has not been rebuilt. After this battle, the mountaineers briefly began to doubt the victory of Imam Shamil, since the aul was considered an unshakable fortress, but despite its fall, resistance continued for about 20 years.

From the second half of the 1850s, St. Petersburg intensified its actions in an effort to break the resistance; generals Baryatinsky and Muravyov managed to encircle Shamil and his army. Finally, in September 1859, the imam surrendered. In St. Petersburg he met with Emperor Alexander II, and then was settled in Kaluga. In 1866, Shamil, already an elderly man, accepted Russian citizenship there and received hereditary nobility.

Results and results of the campaign of 1817-1864

The conquest of the southern territories by Russia took about 50 years. It was one of the country's longest wars. The history of the Caucasian war of 1817-1864 was long; researchers are still studying documents, collecting information and compiling a chronicle of military actions.

Despite the duration, it ended in victory for Russia. The Caucasus accepted Russian citizenship, and Turkey and Persia henceforth had no opportunity to influence local rulers and incite them to unrest. Results of the Caucasian War of 1817-1864. well known. This:

• consolidation of Russia in the Caucasus;
• strengthening the southern borders;
• elimination of mountain raids on Slavic settlements;
• the opportunity to influence Middle Eastern policy.

Another important result can be considered the gradual fusion of Caucasian and Slavic cultures. Despite the fact that each of them has its own characteristics, today the Caucasian spiritual heritage has firmly entered into the general cultural environment of Russia. And today the Russian people live peacefully side by side with the indigenous population of the Caucasus.

Of all the more or less significant subjects in the study of the events of the Caucasian War, only its tragic consequences received the greatest coverage. They are presented in the form of ordinary discussions about the conquest of the Caucasus, the reactionary machinations of tsarism, genocide and oppression of the highlanders, which are presented in a one-sided, unattractive light for Russia. Displaying the results only from the side of the winners or losers and keeping silent does not meet the precepts of objectivity.

It is necessary to dwell on some results of the Caucasian War, which researchers have not previously paid attention to. It should be noted in advance that facts confirming the futility of the struggle of some of the highlanders against Russia during the Caucasian War actually exist.

According to one of Shamil’s own revelations, “this war could have ended earlier,” back in 1838. It was then that he wanted to express his submission to Russia and stop hostile actions against it, but, unfortunately, he did not meet with understanding, faced accusations of “treason against Sharia” and threats to kill, and was forced to obey the oath he had once taken. By his own admission, he lost his people in the war with Russia. Shortly before the surrender, almost the entire population, once subject to the imam, expressed submission to her and, contrary to the murids, favorably greeted the Russian troops and their commander-in-chief, Prince A.I. Baryatinsky.

In accordance with the stereotypes prevailing in historical science, the circumstances of the surrender look different. The modern prominent Caucasian scholar V.G. Gadzhiev describes them as follows: “After the end of the Crimean War, the autocracy... transferred a significant part of its army... to the North-Eastern Caucasus. And this army, which far outnumbered the mountain peoples, surrounded the imam with a dense ring, forced Shamil to lay down his arms and surrender to the mercy of the victors.” Apparently, the author considers it possible not to take into account the factor of the cessation of support from the population, although in the memoirs, accurately conveyed in the notes of M. N. Chichagova, Shamil himself calls it as a determining factor when making a decision.

As for the connection between the end of the confrontation between part of the mountaineers in the North-East Caucasus and the Crimean War, the negative changes in the geopolitical situation in the region, directly caused by this defeat, should also be taken into account. In one of his letters from Istanbul on November 15, 1858, P. A. Chikhachev reported that after Russia lost its fleet on the Black Sea, “...Turkey openly patronizes the vile trade in slaves.” Consul A. N. Moshnin notified repeatedly in 1860 about the mass sale of slaves, including quite a few Russian citizens. After the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty, prices for slaves began to decline sharply, which indicates that only Russia fought against this shameful trade, while the British, French and other representatives of European powers took part in it, along with the Turks.

Russia counteracted this even during the period when it was called nothing less than the “gendarme of Europe.” But the scale of the slave trade was such that measures gave only partial results. With the introduction of widespread Russian administration in the Caucasus after its complete inclusion in the empire, trade in living goods in the region completely ceased.

In an article written in 1859 shortly before the end of the war in the North-East Caucasus, N.A. Dobrolyubov explained what was happening like this: “Shamil has long been no longer a representative of freedom and nationality for the mountaineers. That’s why there were so many people capable of betraying him...” At the same time, those under Shamil’s rule saw, as N.A. Dobrolyubov notes in conclusion, that “... the life of peaceful villages... under the auspices of the Russians is much calmer and more abundant...”. This forced them to make the appropriate choice, “with the hope of peace and the convenience of everyday life.”

Hot on the heels of the events, the participants, even on the part of the rebellious mountaineers, noticed something that was later consigned to oblivion: the Caucasus submitted not only to the power of weapons, but also to the power of the moral authority of Russia. There were, of course, mutual destructions during the fighting, but tough measures were taken only after “... the very extreme forced it to happen.”

By order of A.P. Ermolov, only traitors and those who engaged in robbery, raiding the Russian and native population who had accepted the citizenship of the empire were subject to punishment. The general believed that severity could prevent many crimes, and the economic blockade measures would force, without shedding blood, those who engaged in raids to change their “robber lifestyle.” One can hardly agree with the statement of M. M. Bliev that the “raiding industry” in the region was “... the same sustainable occupation as cattle breeding and agriculture.”

Indeed, Russia, having become involved in the Caucasian War that spanned half a century, first of all opposed the raiding practice of the highlanders. During the war there were casualties on both sides, but there were also mountain societies taken under the protection of Russian troops from the tyranny of the murids, there were children saved in battles, to whom Russian officers were obliged to deduct a certain percentage of their salaries until they came of age, not to mention large one-time donations, and special shelters, “military orphan departments”, created at the expense of the treasury, for young children of “disturbers and traitors among the mountain peoples.”

However, Shamil was not devoid of nobility. He allowed the Russian schismatics, who fled to the mountains, to freely attend divine services, erect chapels, and maintain scattered churches, without demanding taxes or duties for these rights. For their oppression, Shamil very strictly punished the perpetrators, and when the position of the village of Veden, in the vicinity of which there were several Old Believer hermitages, became precarious, he transferred them to Dagestan to ensure safety.

As an imam, he had enormous influence on the subject peoples, but at some stage the power of Russia's moral influence became greater, and Shamil was forced to admit this. Discrimination was allowed in the Imamate, for example, when collecting taxes from the subject population, as stated by N. I. Pokrovsky, “a Dagestani cattle breeder or gardener pays incomparably less...”.

This not least contributed to the fact that their mountain societies never became an organic part of the state created by Shamil, which ultimately did not overcome the barrier of a fragile ethnopolitical unification. Complex conflicts periodically arose in it and confrontation with the administrative apparatus did not stop. These are just small plot notes to the historiography of the issue; they clearly demonstrate the need to cleanse the stereotypes that have developed in it from the distortions that distort the truth. The truth is that the Caucasian War was not only a factor in a long-term confrontation, but also the state unification under the auspices of Russia of another more significant part of the native population.

It is necessary to note one more important detail of the consequences of the Caucasian War. After the completion of the last major military operations, a special control system was established for the indigenous peoples of the region, called the military-people's system. It was based on the preservation of the existing social system while providing the population with the opportunity to decide their internal affairs according to folk customs (adat). Legal proceedings and the usual methods of resolving legal problems, including according to the canons of the professed Muslim religion (Sharia), have also remained unchanged. And this was no exception. To perform administrative functions in the lower levels of the administrative apparatus, each people elected officials from among themselves, who only after that were confirmed in positions by the highest authorities.

As an imam, Shamil ruled the mountaineers much more harshly. He applied "merciless punishment" for any offenses, and subsequently viewed the previous cruelty as a "sad necessity" for maintaining socio-political stability. In this, the Russian government maintained continuity, but took into account existing features. Measures of firmness, it was assumed, would “give time and means” so that keeping the mountaineers in submission by military force would be replaced by dominion based on moral strength.

But maintaining external state order in such conditions required maintaining numerous administrative staff and military units on the North Caucasian outskirts, which led to the formation of a significant layer of officials and military personnel, in some areas it reached 7-8%. In this regard, expenses on the administrative apparatus reached 61% of the total, only partially reimbursed by tax collections from the subject population.

But it was precisely such a powerful state presence in this complex multi-ethnic region that forced even the Western European press to write that after the annexation of the region to Russia, for the first time in many centuries it “brought calm here,” laying the “beginning of peaceful prosperity.”

However, there is some exaggeration in these estimates. Complete peace in the region was not achieved at that time. From time to time, although on a much smaller scale, ethnic conflicts arose. But the size of the annexed population began to increase steadily. This indicates the beneficial and stabilizing significance of Russian state restrictions, and as established at the beginning of the 20th century by the fairly authoritative Austrian school of nationality, population growth is the most important indicator of ethnic development. Local peoples, after joining Russia, retained a “continuous Territory and traditional economic structure.”

The systemic combination of Russian restrictions in military-popular governance with guarantees of non-interference in internal affairs indicates that internal stabilization was achieved not through suppression, as is commonly thought, but through a political compromise offered to all mountaineers, despite the military defeat of the adamant followers of the theocratic doctrine. It was assumed that the majority of the mountaineers would eventually recognize Russia as their fatherland. It was civic inclusion that was the ultimate goal of this compromise.

His conditions, although not immediately, were accepted by the illustrious imam himself, the inspirer of the ghazavat with the heterodox Orthodox state. After Shamil’s surrender on August 25, 1859, the Russian government recognized all his services. All murids who had previously crossed over to the Russian side immediately “received complete forgiveness” and were accepted into service with confidence if they wished, and those who remained irreconcilable to the end were released to “live freely” in villages with personal weapons, so as not to humiliate their dignity , however, it was left to the imam and with it he appeared before the governor, and then before the Russian monarch.

The meeting with Alexander II, which took place on September 15, 1859, during which the tsar treated him surprisingly generously and assured him that Shamil would not repent of surrendering, especially deeply touched the imam. He began to understand that he was “not in a hostile... but in a friendly country.” A house was built for him in Kaluga, and he was given a very decent allowance. And such treatment was not only with him. Shamil also saw other exiled highlanders who “walked free, also received maintenance from the sovereign, engaged in free work and lived in their own homes,” and he repented to the depths of his soul that he had not kept Russian prisoners in the right way. Shamil became convinced that no one was angry with him or wished harm, not even the boys, and in the Caucasus, according to him, in the same situation, “they would throw... mud at him,... beat him up... and even kill him...”. To the question asked by someone: “Why didn’t you give up so stubbornly?”, he sincerely answered: “Yes, I regret that I did not know Russia and that I had not previously sought its friendship.” After seven years of stay in Russia, on August 26, 1866, Shamil and his entire family, in full compliance with the norms and customs of the Sharia, swore allegiance to her, after which, like everyone who went through this ritual, including entire nations, he was already considered a compatriot. This was based on the relevant legal norms contained in the code of laws of the Russian Empire.

Shamil really hoped that all his sons and sons-in-law, having taken the oath, would serve the new fatherland and its monarchs “faithfully and truly.” Shamil died in 1871 in Medina, blessing Russia and praying for its “magnanimous monarch.”

His fate reflects the fate of all mountain peoples, torn apart by conflicting sentiments “for” and “against” unification with Russia. Shamil's son Jamal-Eddin, given as a hostage to the Russians by his father in 1839, was raised in the Corps of Pages, the most prestigious military educational institution, ended up serving in one of the guards regiments and passionately fell in love with his second homeland. Shafi-Mohammed became a major general, and, apparently, was also a patriot of Russia. Kazi-Magomet violated his father’s will, did not return from abroad and joined the Turkish troops, as part of which he took part in various military campaigns against Russia, especially in 1877-1878.

Exactly the same contradictions manifested themselves in the integration processes with Russia among all North Caucasian peoples without exception. One, most often the most significant part of certain ethnic communities, came to realize their unity with Russia, while the other continued to maintain either neutral uncertainty towards it for the time being, or even open hostility.

This duality emerged especially clearly on the surface of historical events in extreme situations. During periods of war, for example, some of the region’s Muslims prayed, like Imam Shamil once did, for Russia, and some indulged in religious fanaticism that had not had time to cool down during the years of Russian citizenship and fell under the influence of other political orientations. The formation of general civil ties occurred already with the entry of certain national communities into Russia and continued at subsequent stages. At the turn of the 20th century, this process became increasingly stable, but was not yet completed. It did not receive completion, as the modern conflict in Chechnya shows to this day.

The comparisons made allow us to see the presence of connections between the peoples inhabiting Russia that were by no means “violent, feudal, military,” as V.I. Lenin believed. The evolution that took place in the North Caucasus, for example, led to their gradual displacement by general civil ones, which was determined by the rapid processes of integration of local foreign communities into the system of Russian state relations. This can be confirmed by the emergence of a Russian identity among the North Caucasian tribes that became part of Russia, both voluntarily and as a result of coercion. This happened, of course, in the collision of multidirectional contradictory tendencies. However, in the 20s and 30s of the 20th century, in Russian historical science, despite this, the point of view about the existence of violent ties between peoples in the Russian Empire was established and similar ideas are still preserved.

The line of compromise in the policy pursued in the North Caucasus, which ensured the gradual evolutionary integration of its indigenous population into the Russian state system, was still maintained in general terms at the beginning of the 20th century. In the context of the emerging political crisis of the autocratic form of government at the beginning of the 20th century, which affected all spheres of public and social relations, including in the North Caucasus outskirts, this compromise was less and less enriched with constructive ideas that adequately reflected new realities. Representatives of the authorities did not notice the integration of the majority of the local population into Russian civil society, the growing tendency for them to recognize Russia as their fatherland. In a number of critical situations that required government intervention, they acted inappropriately to the circumstances, relying only on coercive measures.

It should be noted that in Russian politics these relapses have appeared from time to time before, since different approaches have always collided in it. When the traditional state policy of maintaining balance, recognizing two state principles, Russian and foreign, and maintaining moral authority, which contributed to the unification of various peoples over the centuries, became dominant, Russia achieved major successes, and when deviations from it were outlined, it paid with instability and upheaval. Thus, the results of the Caucasian War - the conquest of this multinational region not only by force of arms, but also by the force of the moral authority of Russia, the political compromise and the civil inclusion of the indigenous population in it - remained unnoticed by science.

Recently, the topic of the “Circassian genocide” of the 19th century has been actively discussed in the media in Russia and abroad. We are talking about the so-called Muhajirism (Mahajirism) - a mass exodus of the indigenous (mostly Muslim) population from the Caucasus conquered by the Russian Empire to the Ottoman Empire at the end of the Caucasian War (1817-1864) and in the subsequent decades of the 19th - early 20th centuries. Among the forced migrants-Muhajirs, the Circassians (Circassians) predominated numerically. This topic is perceived painfully in the North Caucasus today. It is treated especially emotionally in the north-west of the region (in Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, Adygea and Krasnodar Territory), the majority of whose mountain population left the Caucasus and Russia forever in the 19th - early 20th centuries. In recent years, this historical drama has often been politicized, including for anti-Russian purposes.

The term "Muhajir" itself is of Arabic origin ( muhajaret- resettlement, emigration, exile) and Islamic historical and religious overtones. In the second third of the 19th century. This is how Muslims who were forced to leave their places of residence, and later the Caucasus, called themselves. They identified themselves with the heroes of early Islam, who bear the name Muhajirs in the Muslim tradition - with the Prophet Muhammad and his companions, who were forced to migrate (hijra) from pagan Mecca to Yathrib (the future Muslim Medina). The concept of "muhajir" received in the Imamate - a military-theocratic state on the territory of Nagorno-Dagestan, Chechnya and Trans-Kuban Circassia under the leadership of Imam Shamil (1834-1859) - the meaning of an honorary title of a fighter for the faith. In the second half of the 19th century. it spread to forced migrants from the Russian Caucasus to the Ottoman Empire. Among them were many former muhajirs from the Shamil Imamate.

The cessation of armed confrontation marked the beginning of administrative and socio-economic reforms in the region, aimed at integrating the Caucasus into the state body of the Russian Empire. The basic principle of Caucasian policy was the line towards centralization and unification of the region with the all-Russian legal and administrative system. Many obstacles to the implementation of government plans were created by the specifics of the Caucasus and, above all, its social diversity, multiethnicity and multiconfessionalism.

Muhajirism was caused by violent actions not only by the Russian authorities. It grew out of wartime internal migrations, such as the spontaneous transitions of the peasants of Kabarda to Trans-Kuban Circassia, the descent of the highlanders to the plain, the creation of enlarged villages and fortified cities of the Central and North-Western Caucasus, and organized military colonization. Sometimes the mountaineers (Shapsugs and others) agreed to move from the mountains to the flat places indicated to them by the authorities. All forces involved in the Caucasian wars used massive population movements for political purposes. The Russian military carried out resettlement to encourage the “peaceful highlanders” and Cossacks. As a repressive measure, they used the expulsion of individual families and entire villages outside the region. The tsarist authorities used part of the conquered Circassians, who swore an oath of loyal citizenship to Russia, as soldiers of auxiliary detachments created to establish and maintain order in the Caucasus. So, on February 2, 1860, the commander of the troops of the right wing of the Caucasian line, Lieutenant General G.I. Philipson sent the chief of staff of the Black Sea Cossack army, Major General L.I. Kusakov received a report on the call to duty of the Bzhedukh policemen. Displacing the mountaineers from strategically important foothills and river valleys, the Russian authorities resettled Cossacks and military settlers in their place. In turn, Imam Shamil forcibly resettled rural communities that resisted the imamate. In the North-West Caucasus, Shamilev’s naib of Trans-Kuban Circassia, Muhammad-Amin, resorted to the same policy. It was precisely the areas of mass internal migrations during wartime - Kabarda and Trans-Kubania, Ossetia and Ingushetia - that subsequently became centers of muhajirdom.

The Adygs (Circassians) were faced with a choice: either remain on lands controlled by Russian troops, or move to Turkish possessions. The initiative for mass emigration (Muhajirism) most often came from the Adyghe nobility. With the abolition of serfdom in Russia, local Tfokotli princes were faced with the prospect of freeing their dependent tribesmen. They understood that they would have to give freedom to their fellow tribesmen from the dependent classes and give them land.

The Muslim clergy of the Circassians also advocated emigration, not wanting to be in the power of the Orthodox king. In addition, alarming rumors were spreading among the local population that the Russians would introduce conscription, which would make it impossible to perform Islamic rituals. This religious aspect was of particular importance in Dagestan (mainly among the Avars and Dargins), where muhajirism also began - albeit to a much lesser extent than in the north-west of the Caucasus. The impetus for it was also given by the resettlement of Imam Shamil’s naibs (governors) to Turkey.

The authorities of both Russia and Turkey were interested in the resettlement of the mountain peoples of the Caucasus and in preventing their re-emigration. Muhajirism became part of the ongoing Russian-Turkish rivalry in the Middle East, complicated by the actions of Western powers trying to weaken Russia. Representatives of the Ottoman government actively promoted the resettlement. From the very beginning of the resettlement, emissaries of the Turkish government sought to convince the mountaineers that Turkey was a “paradise land”, the patroness of all Muslims, and the Sultan was their head.

Showing interest in the resettlement of highlanders from the North Caucasus, the Ottoman Empire pursued its own strategic goals: 1) to increase the share of Muslims in the areas where the Christian population lived in the rebellious Balkans, as well as in Asia Minor; 2) use the Circassians as a punitive force to suppress the liberation movement of the peoples of the Ottoman Empire; 3) replenish the Turkish army with settlers to increase its combat effectiveness and conduct military operations against Russia. During the war of 1877-1878, when Russian troops temporarily abandoned Sukhumi, Turkish military authorities forcibly evicted the inhabitants of Abkhazia to the Ottoman Empire.

The Turkish authorities allocated places for the settlers that, due to their climatic and other conditions, turned out to be disastrous for them. For example, in the Kars vilayet they were given an almost uninhabitable rocky area without forest or water. Thus, most of the highlander settlers were abandoned to their fate on the territory of the Ottoman Empire. Official reports from the Ottoman authorities stated that the mountaineers were given land, livestock, and arable tools free of charge, and houses were built for them. More than once during the 1860-1870s. deputations of Muhajirs disillusioned with the “Turkish paradise” turned to the Russian authorities with requests to allow them to return to their homeland or settle in other regions of Russia.

In the first two decades after the end of the Caucasian War, the Russian authorities did not prevent the exodus of the highlanders, counting on the departure of potential rebels. Mass emigration, high mortality rates during resettlement in Russian and Turkish transit camps are undoubtedly a huge tragedy in the history of the Adyghe people. However, the tsarist government did not at all set the goal of exterminating the Circassians (Circassians). The main goal of his policy in the Caucasus was to secure the Black Sea coast and establish himself on the new borders of the empire. It is well known that many representatives of the Adyghe peoples (especially Kabardians) took the side of Russia, received an education, and became officers and officials. Many Muhajirs subsequently wished to return to their homeland, but the Russian authorities limited this return movement for fear of destabilizing the situation in the region and the penetration of foreign agents. The peoples who remained in the Caucasus, living today as part of Russia, were able to preserve their religion, identity, language, and culture.

The actions of the Russian side, which resulted in muhajirism, can in no way be regarded as genocide in a strictly legal sense, i.e. (in accordance with the 1948 UN Convention) as “acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such,” since the purpose of these actions was not the extermination of the population, but its reduction to submission through the organization of semi-forced relocations. The Russian authorities did not and could not have the intention to exterminate the Caucasian peoples. In addition, it seems unlawful to apply modern legal norms and definitions in relation to the events of the 19th century.

Today, the descendants of Caucasian highlander settlers live in Egypt, Jordan, Cyprus, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey and other countries. Many of them were subjected to assimilation in a foreign land, which became their new homeland, and most of them lost their native language and cultural and everyday traditions (by the way, those representatives of the Adyghe peoples who remained within Russia retained all this). Nevertheless, the historical memory of muhajirism is alive both in the Circassian diaspora abroad and in the Western Caucasus. It is actively used for political purposes by those who are interested in weakening Russia and inciting ethnic and religious hatred in the Caucasus region. The “Circassian issue” became especially aggravated in connection with the 2014 Olympics in Sochi. Inciting anti-Russian sentiments, the Georgian authorities took upon themselves the role of the main defenders of the interests of the Adyghe peoples. On May 20, 2011, the Georgian parliament adopted a resolution recognizing the genocide of the Circassians by the Russian Empire in the Caucasian War.

The calls of irresponsible populist politicians interfering in the internal affairs of the Russian Federation to restore “historical justice” in relation to the descendants of the Muhajirs are impossible to implement. Firstly, many of the descendants of Caucasian settlers took root in the Middle East, socially and culturally integrated into local communities, lost their native language and are not eager to return to their ancestral homeland. Secondly, the ethno-demographic and socio-economic situation in the North Caucasus has changed too much over the past century and a half. Any attempt to dramatically disrupt it by organizing mass relocations, as well as revising administrative-territorial boundaries and land-property relations may lead to a new conflict with dire consequences.

Valery Tishkov
Scientific director of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences

10514

The conquest of the highlanders of the North Caucasus and the long Caucasian War brought significant human and material losses to Russia. During the war, about 96 thousand soldiers and officers of the Caucasian Corps suffered. The bloodiest period was the period of the struggle against Shamil, during which more than 70 thousand people were killed, wounded and captured. Material costs were also very significant: Yu. Kosenkova, based on data from A.L. Ghisetti, indicates that in the 40s - 50s. XIX century the maintenance of the Caucasian Corps and the conduct of the war cost the state treasury 10 - 15 million rubles. in year.

Nevertheless, Russia achieved its goals:

1) strengthening the geopolitical position;

2) strengthening influence on the states of the Near and Middle East through the North Caucasus as a military-strategic springboard.

3) the acquisition of new markets for raw materials and sales on the outskirts of the country, which was the goal of the colonial policy of the Russian Empire.

In general, we can conclude that the successful completion of the war strengthened Russia’s international position and increased its strategic power. In economic and commercial-industrial relations, according to M. Hammer, the conquest of the Caucasus region facilitated trade between Europe (and Russia) and Asia and provided Russian industry with an extensive market for the sale of factory and industrial products.

The Caucasian War had enormous geopolitical consequences. Reliable communications were established between Russia (heartland) and its Transcaucasian periphery (rimland) due to the fact that the barrier separating them, which was the territories not controlled by St. Petersburg, disappeared. Russia has finally managed to firmly establish itself in the most vulnerable and strategically very important sector of the Black Sea - on the North-East coast. The same applies to the northwestern part of the Caspian Sea, where St. Petersburg previously did not feel entirely confident. The Caucasus took shape as a single territorial and geopolitical complex within the imperial “supersystem” - a logical result of Russia’s southern expansion. Now it could serve as a secure rear and a real springboard for advancing to the southeast, to Central Asia, which was also of great importance for the development of the imperial periphery. Russia has set a course to conquer this unstable region, open to external influence and international rivalry. In an effort to fill the political vacuum that had formed there, she looked for “natural” borders for herself, from the point of view of not only geography, but also state pragmatism, which demanded the division of spheres of influence and the establishment of a regional balance of power with another giant - the British Empire. In addition, Russia's penetration into Central Asia gave St. Petersburg a powerful lever of pressure on London in Middle Eastern and European affairs, which it successfully used.

After the end of the war, the situation in the region became much more stable. Dial, riots began to happen less frequently. In many ways, this was a change in the ethno-demographic situation in the war-torn territories. A significant part of the population was evicted outside the Russian state (the so-called muhajirism). People from the inner provinces of Russia, Cossacks, and foreign mountaineers settled on the abandoned lands.

However, Russia provided itself with problems for a long time by including “restless”, freedom-loving peoples in its composition - echoes of this can be heard to this day. According to M. Feigin, the current problems in the North Caucasus, which he proposes to call the “second Caucasian War,” originate in a complex of unresolved problems of the Caucasian War of the 19th century. We must also not forget that the result of the war for the North Caucasus was also casualties among the population, many dozens of destroyed villages, the loss of national independence, and the deterioration of the situation of the local rural population as a result of the colonial oppression of the tsarist administration. But displaying the results of the Caucasian War only from the perspective of the vanquished and keeping silent about the same fate of Cossack villages and Russian villages, as G. Kokiev, Kh. Oshaev and some other authors did, does not at all correspond to the commandments of objectivity.

It is important to note the role of Russia's victory over the North Caucasus in ending or at least significantly reducing the volume of slave trade in the Black Sea. Back on October 15, 1858, in one of his letters from Istanbul, the famous representative of Russian science P. A. Chikhachev reported that after Russia lost its fleet on the Black Sea (as a result of the Crimean War), Turkey “openly patronizes the vile trade in slaves.” Consul A. N. Moshnin from Trebizond notified the ambassador of the Russian Empire to this country several times in 1860 about the mass sale of slaves, including many Russian subjects. With the introduction of widespread Russian administration in the Caucasus after its complete inclusion in the empire, trade in living goods in the region completely ceased.

According to V.N. Ratushnyak, the positive aspects of the annexation of the North Caucasus should also be noted: its peoples, together with the Cossacks and newcomer peasants of Russia, achieved significant success in the economic development of the region, mutually enriching their production skills and skills, their culture. Peaceful development to many mountaineers after decades of war seemed preferable to the harsh discipline of the Imamate. It is not without reason that after the victory of Russia, the role of Sharia everywhere began to be replaced by traditional law - adats.

A very important circumstance that determined changes in the self-awareness of the mountaineers in favor of Russia was the nature of the population management established in the imamate, which turned out to be difficult for tribes not accustomed to obedience. At the same time, those under Shamil’s rule saw that “the life of peaceful villages... under the auspices of the Russians is much calmer and more abundant.” This is what forced them, according to N.A. Dobrolyubov, to finally make the appropriate choice, “with the hope of peace and the convenience of everyday life.”

The peaceful settlement was also facilitated by certain measures taken by the government to strengthen Russia’s authority in the North Caucasus. A number of large and beautiful mosques were built in Chechen and other villages with money allocated from the personal funds of the “main culprits” of the conquest, for example, A.P. Ermolov. The authority of the Russian army was also increased by the facts of the rescue of mountaineer children in battles, to whom Russian officers were obliged to deduct a certain percentage of their salary until they reached adulthood, not to mention large one-time donations and special shelters created at the expense of the treasury, “military orphan departments” for young children “ troublemakers and traitors among the mountain peoples.” Naturally, raising these children was not only an act of mercy, but also corresponded to the strategic goals of the Russian government. It has already been told how Shamil was amazed that his hostage son grew up to be an exemplary Russian officer. The “half-breed” sons of A.P. Ermolov became military officers: Victor (Bakhtiyar), Sever (Allahiyar) and Claudius (Omar).

Children who grew up in “military orphan units”, as a rule, also became officers loyal to Russia, and by the end of the Caucasian War in the Caucasian Corps, a significant part of the officer corps were “natives” by blood. From the point of view of the most conservative mountaineers, these young people, of course, were traitors, but, on the other hand, their example for sober-minded fellow tribesmen contributed to the strengthening of relations between Russia and the North Caucasus.

Let's turn to another important aspect. As is known, after the completion of the last major military operations, which predetermined the final outcome of the entire campaign, a special control system was established for the indigenous peoples of the region, adapted mainly to their political traditions, which was called the military-people's system. It was based on the preservation of the existing social system while providing the population with the opportunity to decide their internal affairs according to folk customs (adat). Legal proceedings and the usual methods of resolving legal problems, including according to the canons of the professed Muslim religion (Sharia), which at first were most alien in spirit to Russian rule, were also preserved unchanged. And this was not some kind of forced exception. According to the existing laws of the Russian Empire, “censure of other churches was prohibited.”

To perform administrative functions in the lower echelons of the administrative apparatus, each people elected officials (foremen and judges) from among themselves, who only after that were confirmed in positions by their superiors.

Of course, the Russian administration maintained external order by using military force in critical situations. However, as an imam, Shamil ruled the mountaineers much more harshly, believing that this only required an “iron hand.” He mercilessly punished any wrongdoing and subsequently viewed the previous cruelty as a “sad necessity” for maintaining socio-political stability. The Russian government maintained continuity in this, but took into account the peculiarities of the psychological make-up of local peoples, who were not inclined to submit to strict state power, and, apparently, was still somewhat softer. Measures of firmness, it was assumed, would “give time and means” so that keeping the mountaineers in submission by military force would be replaced by dominion based on “moral strength.”

However, maintaining external state order under such circumstances required maintaining excessively numerous administrative staff and military units on the North Caucasian outskirts, which led to the formation of a very significant layer of officials and military personnel. In this regard, the costs of the administrative apparatus were significant, reaching 61% of the total, and considerable costs were imposed on the Russian budget to cover them, only partially reimbursed by tax collections from the subject population.

But, according to V. Matveev, it was precisely the powerful state presence in a complex multi-ethnic region, the lot of which was previously essentially non-stop bloody mutually destructive clashes, provoked, among other things, by raids, that forced even the discerning Western European press, after the region was included in Russia, to write about that , that for the first time in many centuries she “brought peace here,” laying the foundation for “peaceful prosperity.”

True, there is a certain amount of exaggeration in these estimates. Complete peace in the region was not achieved at that time. From time to time, although on a much smaller scale, it was more than once illuminated by the flames of interethnic conflicts. However, the size of the annexed population began to increase steadily. It is not possible to calculate this trend in detail due to statistical gaps, but its presence is obvious based on the available data. This indicates the beneficial and stabilizing value of Russian government restrictions. Population growth, as established quite authoritatively at the beginning of the 20th century. Austrian school of nationality, is the most important indicator of ethnic development. According to the calculations of F.P. Troino, only from 1868 to 1898 it reached 162% in the northwestern part, and 212% in the northeastern part. This growth was higher than the national average for the same period, and for certain ethnic groups the increase in numbers even doubled. Local peoples, after joining it, retained a continuous territory and traditional economic structure.

The presence of advantages in approaches to management in the Russian outskirts compared to the same Western European standards was at one time recognized abroad. In the policies of the two largest empires in the East, Otto von Bissmarck established the following differences: “The British behave in Asia less civilized than the Russians; they are too contemptuous of the indigenous population and keep their distance from them... The Russians, on the contrary, attract the peoples that they include in the empire, get acquainted with their life and merge with them.”

The English traveler Father Harold Baxon, who visited the Caucasus in 1914, noted: “The Russians have done in Georgia over the last century... a thing of enormous scale. Thanks to the peace and order that they introduced into the country, the population multiplied, culture developed, and rich cities and villages grew. Russian officials never show the same arrogance and contempt towards the natives that are characteristic of British officials in our colonies; Russian natural kindness and cordiality give them the opportunity to be on a completely equal footing with the Georgians, which not only does not diminish, but, on the contrary, increases the prestige of the Russian government...”

The systemic combination of Russian state restrictions in military-people's governance with guarantees of non-interference in internal affairs indicates that final stabilization was achieved not through suppression, as is commonly thought, but through a political compromise offered to all mountaineers, despite the military defeat of the adamant followers of the theocratic doctrine and all sorts of orientations within its mainstream. As part of the compromise, official recognition of the mountaineers was ensured (regardless of the previous circumstances of entry, however, with differentiation for the transition period in the trust of the authorities) as compatriots and it was assumed that the majority of the mountaineers would eventually recognize Russia as their fatherland.

Thus, the results of the Caucasian War were ambiguous. On the one hand, they allowed Russia to solve its problems, provided markets for raw materials and sales, and a profitable military-strategic springboard for strengthening its geopolitical position. At the same time, the conquest of the freedom-loving peoples of the North Caucasus, despite certain positive aspects for the development of these peoples, left behind a set of unresolved problems that fell to the Soviet Union and then to the new Russia.

In 1817, the Caucasian War began for the Russian Empire, which lasted for almost 50 years. The Caucasus has long been a region into which Russia wanted to expand its influence, and Alexander 1, against the backdrop of successes in foreign policy, decided on this war. It was assumed that success could be achieved in a few years, but the Caucasus has become a big problem for Russia for almost 50 years. The interesting thing is that this war was fought by three Russian emperors: Alexander 1, Nicholas 1 and Alexander 2. As a result, Russia emerged victorious, however, the victory was achieved with great effort. The article offers an overview of the Caucasian War of 1817-1864, its causes, course of events and consequences for Russia and the peoples of the Caucasus.

Causes of the war

At the beginning of the 19th century, the Russian Empire actively directed efforts to seize lands in the Caucasus. In 1810, the Kartli-Kakheti kingdom became part of it. In 1813, the Russian Empire annexed the Transcaucasian (Azerbaijani) khanates. Despite the announcement of submission by the ruling elites and consent to annexation, the regions of the Caucasus, inhabited by peoples mainly professing Islam, declare the beginning of the struggle for liberation. Two main regions are being formed in which there is a sense of readiness for disobedience and armed struggle for independence: Western (Circassia and Abkhazia) and North-Eastern (Chechnya and Dagestan). It was these territories that became the main arena of hostilities in 1817-1864.

Historians identify the following main reasons for the Caucasian War:

1. The desire of the Russian Empire to gain a foothold in the Caucasus. And not just to include the territory into its composition, but to fully integrate it, including by extending its legislation.
2. The reluctance of some peoples of the Caucasus, in particular the Circassians, Kabardians, Chechens and Dagestanis, to join the Russian Empire, and most importantly, the readiness to conduct armed resistance to the invader.
3. Alexander 1 wanted to rid his country of the endless raids of the peoples of the Caucasus on their lands. The fact is that since the beginning of the 19th century, numerous attacks by individual detachments of Chechens and Circassians on Russian territories for the purpose of robbery have been recorded, which created big problems for border settlements.

Progress and main stages

The Caucasian War of 1817-1864 is a vast event, but it can be divided into 6 key stages. Let's look at each of these stages next.

First stage (1817-1819)

This is the period of the first partisan actions in Abkhazia and Chechnya. The relationship between Russia and the peoples of the Caucasus was finally complicated by General Ermolov, who began to build fortified fortresses to control the local peoples, and also ordered the resettlement of the highlanders to the plains around the mountains, for stricter supervision over them. This caused a wave of protest, which further intensified the guerrilla war and further escalated the conflict.

Map of the Caucasian War 1817 1864

Second stage (1819-1824)

This stage is characterized by agreements between the local ruling elites of Dagestan regarding joint military actions against Russia. One of the main reasons for the unification was that the Black Sea Cossack Corps was relocated to the Caucasus, which caused mass discontent in the Caucasus. In addition, during this period, fighting took place in Abkhazia between the army of Major General Gorchakov and local rebels, who were defeated.

Third stage (1824-1828)

This stage begins with the uprising of Taymazov (Beibulat Taymiev) in Chechnya. His troops tried to capture the Grozny fortress, but near the village of Kalinovskaya the rebel leader was captured. In 1825, the Russian army also won a series of victories over the Kabardians, which led to the so-called pacification of Greater Kabarda. The center of resistance completely moved to the northeast, to the territory of the Chechens and Dagestanis. It was at this stage that the current of “muridism” emerged in Islam. Its basis is the duty of gazavat - holy war. For the mountaineers, war with Russia becomes an obligation and part of their religious belief. The stage ends in 1827-1828, when a new commander of the Caucasian corps, I. Paskevich, was appointed.

Muridism is an Islamic teaching about the path to salvation through an associated war - ghazavat. The basis of Murism is the obligatory participation in the war against the “infidels”.

Historical reference

Fourth stage (1828-1833)

In 1828, a serious complication occurred in relations between the highlanders and the Russian army. Local tribes create the first independent mountain state during the war years - the Imamate. The first imam is Ghazi-Muhamed, the founder of muridism. He was the first to declare gazavat to Russia, but in 1832 he died during one of the battles.

Fifth stage (1833-1859)

The longest period of the war. It lasted from 1834 to 1859. During this period, the local leader Shamil declares himself an imam and also declares the gazavat of Russia. His army establishes control over Chechnya and Dagestan. For several years, Russia completely loses this territory, especially during participation in the Crimean War, when all military forces were sent to participate in it. As for the hostilities themselves, they were carried out for a long time with varying degrees of success.

The turning point came only in 1859, after Shamil was captured near the village of Gunib. This was a turning point in the Caucasian War. After his capture, Shamil was taken around the central cities of the Russian Empire (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kyiv), arranging meetings with the top officials of the empire and veteran generals of the Caucasian War. By the way, in 1869 he was released on a pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, where he died in 1871.

Sixth stage (1859-1864)

After the defeat of the Shamil Imamate from 1859 to 1864, the final period of the war occurs. These were small local resistances that could be eliminated very quickly. In 1864, they managed to completely break the resistance of the highlanders. Russia ended a difficult and problematic war with victory.

Main results

The Caucasian War of 1817-1864 ended in victory for Russia, as a result of which several problems were solved:

1. The final seizure of the Caucasus and the spread of its administrative structure and legal system there.
2. Increasing influence in the region. After the capture of the Caucasus, this region becomes an important geopolitical point for increasing influence in the East.
3. The beginning of the settlement of this region by Slavic peoples.

But despite the successful conclusion of the war, Russia acquired a complex and turbulent region that required increased resources to maintain order, as well as additional protection measures due to Turkish interests in this area. This was the Caucasian War for the Russian Empire.